

Evaluation
of the activities of the Dutch Cooperating Aid Organisations involved in the
SHO Haiti Action covering the year 2010

Terms of Reference
Final

10 March 2011

1. Introduction

The earthquake that hit Haiti on 12 January 2010 killed more than 200,000 people, injured 300,000 and displaced 2.3 million people of which one million were left homeless. With its epicentre only ten kilometres below the surface and close to the urban centres of Port-au-Prince, Leogane and Jacmel, the earthquake was the most powerful and devastating the country had experienced in 200 years. In response, a massive relief and recovery effort has been undertaken by a complex array of national and international actors, one of the largest since the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004.

Immediately after the disaster, a consortium of Dutch non-governmental organisations specialised in humanitarian assistance – the Foundation of Dutch Cooperating Aid Organisations (SHO)¹ – set up a national plan of action to raise funds to provide immediate emergency relief and recovery activities for the victims of the earthquake. The fundraising campaign “Giro 555” culminated in a national television fundraising broadcast on the evening of 21 January featuring Haiti. During the event the Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation announced that he would match the total amount provided by the Dutch public at the close of the broadcast. This contribution, to be provided as a subsidy to SHO, amounted to EUR 41.7 million. In total the fund raising campaign resulted in EUR 111.4 million.

According to its second progress report to the Dutch public, published late September 2010, SHO stated that EUR 23 million (i.e. 20.7% of the total funds raised) was spent during the first 6 months following the disaster. More than 90% of this amount was spent on direct emergency relief activities such as shelter, health, water and sanitation facilities and food security.² It was pointed out that activities geared towards recovery would gradually become more prominent. However, recent events such as the cholera epidemic as well as the effects of hurricane Tomas have resulted in the need to extend the emergency relief phase. In its third report to the Dutch public in January 2011, SHO indicated that the amount transferred to be spent on emergency relief including activities related to the cholera epidemic and the effects of hurricane Tomas had reached about EUR 43 million by the end of 2010.³

It is stipulated in the subsidy agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and SHO that SHO will commission a ‘meta evaluation’ in 2015 upon completion of its Haiti programme. This meta evaluation will synthesize the results of evaluations conducted by the individual SHO members of their projects and programmes. In addition the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has planned to conduct evaluations of the emergency phase as respectively the rehabilitation/reconstruction phase. The Dutch Court of Audit will also separately report on the way in which the SHO accounts for the funds spent and will investigate the results of the activities implemented or supported by the respective SHO partner organisations.

The Humanitarian Aid Division (DMH/HH) of the Department for Human Rights, Good Governance and Humanitarian Aid (DMH) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has requested the independent Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) to conduct an evaluation

¹ See section 3 below.

² The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has earmarked EUR 12 million of its contribution to SHO as funds for immediate relief. This amount was transferred to SHO in April 2010. The remainder of the contribution is earmarked for rehabilitation and reconstruction and will be transferred to SHO in instalments based on SHO’s multi-annual plan for reconstruction activities which will be submitted in February 2011 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

³ See Press release SHO, 25 November 2010 and SHO-rapportage Haiti 12 januari 2010 – 12 januari 2011, SHO, 11 januari 2011.

covering SHO's emergency relief and recovery activities implemented in 2010. The evaluation is to serve a dual purpose. By providing an insight in the effects of these activities⁴ it will provide lessons that can be taken into account during the remaining period of the Haiti programme of the SHO partner organisations. It also serves an accountability purpose by providing an insight how the SHO organisations have spent the funds and to what effect. The report of the evaluation will be published and sent to the Dutch Parliament together with the policy reaction of the Secretary of State for Development Cooperation. It will also serve as one of the building blocks for the above mentioned meta evaluation to be commissioned by SHO upon finalisation of the Haiti Programme of its partner organisations in 2015.

To facilitate joint evaluation efforts and coherence of evaluation activities among donor agencies and to minimize the burden on operational agencies as well as local communities, the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) together with the OECD-DAC Network on Development Evaluation and the United Nations Evaluation Group have produced a context analysis paper which includes a framework with overarching questions for evaluating the support to Haiti.⁵ The Terms of Reference for the current evaluation draw to a large extent on this framework.⁶

2. Haiti – Background to the current crisis and donor assistance

2.1. Background to the current crisis

The earthquake struck the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere and exacerbated to a large extent the position of the country's already impoverished population and its weak economy. It struck Ouest Province with a population of 2.2 million, and had its epicentre 17 km south-west of Haiti's capital, Port-au-Prince. The town of Léogâne was reported to be almost 90% destroyed and in Jacmel almost half of all buildings were destroyed.⁷

According to the Haitian Government the earthquake has led to the death of over 220,000 people (2% of the country's population). The affected population was estimated at three million (30% of the Haiti's population), of whom over 1,200,000 were in immediate need of shelter. The findings of the Post Disaster Needs Assessment⁸ reveal that the total value of damage and losses caused by the earthquake was estimated at US\$7.8 billion (US\$4.3 billion representing physical damage and US\$3.5 billion economic losses) – over 120 percent of the 2009 gross domestic product. The initial relief efforts in Haiti were challenged in an unprecedented way as much of the physical infrastructure in and around the country's capital was damaged or destroyed by the earthquake. There was a need for extensive rehabilitation of the infrastructure and to organise logistics to begin operations. The level of casualties sustained by the civil service and damage to public buildings severely affected national capacity to immediately lead and coordinate the response. Reportedly national and local authorities have become increasingly active as key partners in the relief effort.

⁴ Effects occur at three levels: output, outcome and impact.

⁵ Rencoret, N., A. Stoddard, K. Haver, G. Taylor and P. Harvey (2010), *Haiti Earthquake Response. Context Analysis*, ALNAP, OECD/DAC Evaluation Network, United Nations Evaluation Group, July 2010.

⁶ The framework is also providing a useful structure for a future system-wide report on the Haiti response. It is envisaged that ALNAP will be instrumental in preparing such a synthesis report making use of evaluation reports produced by individual donors and agencies who are invited to place their reports on ALNAP's evaluation inventory.

⁷ SHO First Joint Report 13 January- 31 March 2010, '*SHO-actie 'Help slachtoffers Aardbeving Haiti'*'.

⁸ Republic of Haiti, Haiti Earthquake Post Disaster Needs Assessment: Assessment of damage losses, general and sectoral needs, Annex to the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti, Republic of Haiti, March 2010.

The immediate, medium and longer term catastrophic consequences of the earthquake⁹ can not only be related to the magnitude and impact of the earthquake itself. Already prior to the earthquake, Haiti was considered as one of the poorest countries in the Western hemisphere, placed at 149 out of 182 countries according to the Human Development Index Score. The country's economic and physical infrastructure is weak, social security networks non-existent and its weak government and administrative structures have resulted in very poor levels of governance. Historically, the State has not been able to deliver basic services, provide security to the majority of the population, safeguard basic human rights or facilitate sustainable social and economic development. Main factors being enduring and high levels of corruption and long-term political instability. The latter is exemplified by the recent national election process.¹⁰

In the past international aid has not been sufficiently conducive to help to change this overall picture as pointed out by a recent report of Oxfam: "Over the years, most donors have not done enough to help to resolve the lack of state capacity and action in Haiti. Instead some donors and governments have too often responded in ways that have exacerbated institutional weaknesses and bypassed the Haitian people."¹¹

Haiti has to cope frequently with natural disasters, being hit periodically by hurricanes like the series of devastating ones of 2008 and hurricane Tomas which struck Haiti after the cholera epidemic which started in October 2010 in a region that had not been affected by the earthquake. The epidemic spread very fast also as a result of the effects of the hurricane and quickly became a 'crisis in a crisis'.¹²

2.2. Donor assistance to Haiti

The UN Flash Appeal, requesting US\$562 million for immediate emergency humanitarian assistance, was launched on January 15. The subsequent Consolidated Appeal raised this to a level of US\$1.5 billion of which 72% was funded by 15 November 2010.¹³

Massive international support with many donors attempting to base their funding on needs assessment as much as possible in the immediate aftermath of the major disaster helped to avoid further loss of life. The initial response was mainly US-led with the US military taking over operations at the damaged Port-au-Prince airport handling large numbers of emergency flights. Many donors (including the Netherlands) fielded search and rescue (SAR) teams trying to save lives.¹⁴ UN agencies as well as well-established international non-governmental organisations were part of the massive response as were larger numbers of new actors which

⁹ The earthquake has severely jeopardised the people's food security. The loss of goods, jobs, migration, as well as increased food prices affected and continue to affect households' survival strategies and their means of subsistence.

¹⁰ The election process was challenged by the cholera outbreak, attempts of fraud and violent incidents. The postponement of the February 2010 elections for the Chamber of Deputies and one third of the Senate contributed to a climate of political uncertainty resulting from the absence of a quorum in the Parliament where all deputies and one third of the senators had completed their mandates. Therefore, the elections on 28 November 2010 were essential to confirm the State's legitimacy and consolidate the country's stability. (See United Nations (2010). Report of the United Nations in Haiti 2010 – Situation, Challenges and Outlook, p. 48 - 49. www.onu-haiti.org).

¹¹ From Relief to Recovery – support to good governance in post-earthquake Haiti. Oxfam briefing paper 142, 6 January 2011, p.p. 11. See also SHO First Joint Report 13 January- 31 March 2010, '*SHO-actie 'Help slachtoffers Aardbeving Haiti'*'.

¹² UNICEF Children in Haiti One Year After – The long road from relief to recovery, January 2011.

¹³ See annex IV, p. 149 of the Consolidated Appeal 2011 (<http://www.humanitarianappeal.net>). The Appeal included some US\$ 174 million for cholera response.

¹⁴ According to a recent evaluation of OCHA's response to the Haiti earthquake in 2010 (see Bhattacharjee, A and R. Lossio, 2011) 26 SAR teams rescued 134 persons. Most of people rescued from collapsed and damaged buildings, however, were saved by their fellow citizens.

were unfamiliar with Haiti or even disaster response.¹⁵ According to a recent report of the UN, the international response provided during the first months following the earthquake swamped a weakened government unable to take charge of the coordination of relief efforts'.¹⁶

Besides donors providing financial and other types of support, large scale fund raising campaigns have taken place in many countries to collect private donations in order to support of the victims of the earthquake.¹⁷ To ensure maximum coordination among the different emergency aid efforts, the United Nation's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) was appointed as the main coordinating body of the humanitarian response in Haiti. Similar to humanitarian assistance provided elsewhere, a cluster system was established whereby different UN-organisations are responsible to lead and coordinate the aid in specific sectors (Cluster Leads). The following 12 clusters exist: Camp Coordination and Camp Management, Education, Emergency Shelter and Non-Food Items, Food, Logistics, Nutrition, Protection, Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), Agriculture, Early Recovery, Emergency Telecommunications, and Health. Six clusters were established in and worked from the Dominican Republic: Logistics/ Telecommunications, Health, Emergency Shelter, Water and Sanitation (WASH), Nutrition and Protection. For each cluster agencies and organisations providing aid were to be mapped to ensure that there are no overlaps and that the aid is equally distributed among the different communities affected by the disaster.¹⁸ This implies that the current evaluation will investigate whether and to what extent the SHO partner organisations have adhered to the cluster approach (see evaluation questions below).

At the international donors conference 'Towards a New Future for Haiti' held at the UN Headquarters in New York on 31 March 2010 a total of US\$9.9 billion was pledged in support of the Haitian Government's Action Plan for National Recovery and Development. Of this amount, US\$5.3 billion was to be spent over a period of two years.¹⁹

Following the donors conference, a multi-donor trust fund was established. This fund is administered by the World Bank but managed by the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) which is co-chaired by former US President Bill Clinton (UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Haiti) and Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive. The Commission will oversee the implementation of the Government of Haiti's Action Plan for National Recovery and Development, ensuring that international assistance is aligned with the priorities of the Haitian people and their Government, ensuring accountability and

¹⁵ Exact numbers of humanitarian actors remain unclear but were estimated at 2,000 by the Inter-agency real-time evaluation in Haiti: three months after the earthquake (Grunewald, F, Binder, A. and Georges, Y., 2010).

¹⁶ United Nations (2010). Report of the United Nations in Haiti 2010 – Situation, Challenges and Outlook, p. 8. www.onu-haiti.org

¹⁷ In March 2010 donors subsequently pledged US\$ 2.1 billion for reconstruction and rehabilitation in 2010 at an international donor conference in New York of which some 42 per cent was actually funded in 2010. Some donors argued that these pledges were supposed to also cover subsequent years (see Oxfam, 2011, *ibid*. All in all the international community has pledged US\$ 8 billion (see SHO-rapportage Haiti 12 januari 2010 – 12 januari 2011 (SHO, 11 January 2011). These pledges include those of DAC-donors, non-DAC donors including a considerable number of developing countries, funds generated by the public and channelled through well-established international NGOs (INGOs) and 'new' NGOs that similar to aftermath of the tsunami disaster in Southeast Asia entered the stage following fundraising campaigns in donor countries as well as private-for-profit entities. It is unlikely that the magnitude of funding raised and in-kind contributions in support of Haiti will be known with any accuracy.

¹⁸ The cluster approach was rolled out for the first time in Haiti in response to the 2008 hurricane season. At the time ten clusters were established, led by the United Nations and international organisations in conjunction with the corresponding Haitian line ministries. The

¹⁹ Recently there have been reports criticising the apparent limited levels of disbursements by donors in relation to their pledges and commitments.

transparency.²⁰ IHRC's mandate *inter alia* covers to bring together donors, government and Haitian civil society, coordinate projects to avoid overlap, and monitor and report on 'high-level progress' of projects. In its report *Haiti One Year Later: The Progress to Date and the Path Forward*, IHRC points out the various accomplishments and remaining challenges.²¹ There has been criticism on the IHCRC for not adequately involving Haitian ministries, local government institutions and (representatives of) the Haitian people in the process of planning and implementation of projects and programmes.²²

All donors and agencies providing humanitarian assistance are supposed to adhere to internationally accepted humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence.²³ Agencies providing emergency relief should operate according to the so-called Sphere standards²⁴ which entail the minimum requirements which good humanitarian aid should satisfy. These are global standards for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, but have been adjusted to the specific context of Haiti. The agencies should also adhere to the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and non-Governmental Organisations in disaster relief.²⁵

Lessons learned from previous responses to disasters²⁶ point out the importance of engaging with national and local authorities and civil society groups. Such partnerships are important to promote national ownership and coordination during and following a disaster, and pave the way for sustainable recovery.²⁷

Referring to a number of studies, the Haiti Earthquake Response Context Analysis states that 'Past experience shows that urban disasters are different from those occurring in rural settings. They have distinctive features of scale, density, economic systems and livelihood strategies, resource availability, governance and public expectations, large informal

²⁰ The Commission's governing board consists of representatives from the Haitian government, parliament and judiciary; donors including Brazil, Canada, CARICOM, the European Union, France, Inter-American Development Bank, Norway, Spain, United States, Venezuela and the World Bank; Haitian labor unions and the private sector. In addition, representatives from the Diaspora, Haitian and international civil society organizations, and the Organization of American States participate as non-voting members.

²¹ Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (2011). *Haiti One Year Later: The Progress to Date and the Path Forward*. A report from the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission, January 12, 2011.

²² See e.g. From Relief to Recovery – support to good governance in post-earthquake Haiti. Oxfam briefing paper 142, 6 January 2011.

²³ This implies *inter alia* that the SHO partner organisations, receiving a subsidy from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs from its humanitarian aid budget, should adhere to the overall objectives of Dutch humanitarian assistance namely the guiding principle of humanity (or the humanitarian imperative).

²⁴ See Sphere Project (2004). *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response*. Oxford: Oxfam Publishing. The Sphere standards define a minimum level of services to be attained in a given context. Standards are developed for 1) water supply, sanitation and hygiene promotion; 2) food security, nutrition and food aid; 3) shelter, settlement and non-food items; 4) health services.

²⁵ The Code of Conduct establishes common standards for disaster relief and identifies the alleviation of human suffering as the prime motivation for humanitarian assistance which must be provided on the basis of need.

²⁶ See for instance O'Donnell, I., K. Smart, and B. Ramalingam. *Responding to urban disasters: Learning from previous relief and recovery operation*. ALNAP and ProVention Consortium, London, June 2009.

²⁷ Rencoret, N. et al. reiterate a number of lessons provided by evaluations and studies of past responses to disasters which are also relevant in the Haitian context. These include amongst others (i) the importance of coordination, leadership and national ownership in the response; (ii) the necessity of community participation in emergency, rehabilitation and reconstruction activities; (iii) the importance of social cohesion and community groupings for rebuilding after a disaster; (iv) the value of information from and communication with affected communities in shaping the support; and the positive role of early livelihood recovery through cash-for-work activities also engaging women in income generating activities and cash transfers targeted at families allowing them to meet their immediate needs. In addition, the authors reiterate the following additional lessons from past responses to disasters in Haiti: the importance of planning and incorporating early recovery and disaster risk reduction activities at the beginning of the humanitarian (emergency) response and the importance of adopting a long-term approach and continuing international engagement.

settlements, likelihood for compound and complex disasters and potential for secondary impacts on rural or regional producers. Targeting is particularly challenging in urban settings, complicated by several factors such as cities' fluid demographics, economic inequity, higher costs of living compared with rural settings and a lack of official records related to land and property rights'.²⁸ The latter, in turn, has been one of the many factors causing in a slow start of the reconstruction phase. Other factors being the lack of progress at the level of the Haitian authorities to advance and take policy decisions on critical issues for which they should take responsibility such as the settlement of legal issues (land, property and tenure rights) and the removal of rubble hampering repair of damaged property and construction of new houses and other types of physical infrastructure for public and private (commercial) use.

Various reports provide information on the magnitude of the humanitarian response provided in 2010 and their results to date. They also point out the enormous tasks still at hand, the need to continue to provide humanitarian assistance in 2011 and the challenges related to reconstruction and economic recovery.²⁹

3. Dutch Cooperating Aid Agencies (SHO) support to Haiti

3.1. Background of SHO

The SHO (*Samenwerkende Hulporganisaties*, or Cooperating Aid Agencies) Foundation established in 2007 consists of several Dutch non-governmental aid organisations that jointly engage in the organisation of national fund-raising campaigns in response to large humanitarian crises in developing countries.³⁰ The Foundation is accountable to a Supervisory Body (Raad van Toezicht) and operates a financial and administrative management plan.³¹ Since 1987 thirty campaigns have taken place, raising a total amount of 680 million Euros.

SHO aims to raise as much money as possible to provide aid to victims of a humanitarian disaster³², inform the Dutch population about the scale and severity of the disaster and ensure the accountability of its members regarding the expenditure of the raised funds including the results of the programmes and projects supported. The SHO Foundation is governed by the executive managers of the respective member organisations. On the ground the individual member organisations work together with their respective partner or 'umbrella' organisations in coordination with the UN and the local authorities.

The SHO consists of ten permanent partners: Cordaid Mensen in Nood, ICCO & Kerk in Actie, Rode Kruis Nederland, Oxfam Novib, Save the Children, Stichting Vluchteling, Tear,

²⁸ Rencoret, N., et al., p. 16.

²⁹ See e.g. United Nations (2010). Report of the United Nations in Haiti 2010 – Situation, Challenges and Outlook. www.onu-haiti.org; Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (2011). Haiti One Year Later: The Progress to Date and the Path Forward. A report from the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission, January 12, 2011.

³⁰ Prior to 2007 the collaboration between these organisations was not institutionalised in a corporate entity (foundation).

³¹ The current financial and management plan which was adopted by the Governing Board in March 2010 is in conformity with Dutch legal and procedural requirements for non-for-profit charity organisations and the (preliminary) rules and regulations governing the subsidies provided by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to non-government organisations providing support to developing countries as part of the so-called 'Medefinancieringsstelsel 2010-2015' (Co-financing agreement MSF-II).

³² SHO's Statute (26 April 2010) points out that funds donated to SHO are to be used to provide direct, effective and life saving support in the disaster area ('Deze middelen worden aangewend voor het verlenen van directe, effectieve, levensreddende hulp in het rampgebied). As well assistance may be provided to support reconstruction in the area at issue ('Daarnaast kan – bij voldoende middelen – hulp verleend worden bij de wederopbouw in de getroffen gebieden').

Terre des Hommes, UNICEF Netherlands Committee and World Vision Netherlands. Fund-raising campaigns may involve so-called ‘guest organisations’ that are committed to providing a specific contribution to the stricken area or population.

As a rule, ninety per cent of the net proceeds of a campaign³³ are distributed among the permanent members according to a pre-defined formula, with ten per cent distributed among the guest organisations.

According to SHO’s Management Plan each member organisation bears responsibility and is accountable for an adequate financial and administrative organisation of its activities which may be implemented through direct implementation or via partner organisations in the country at issue.³⁴

The organisations involved in a particular campaign collaborate with respect to fund raising, accounting for allocation of the funds to specific activities and their results as well as information to the general public and donors and publicity in a more general sense. For each campaign SHO establishes a front and back office to coordinate these activities.³⁵

3.2. SHO organisations involved in the Haiti campaign

Nine permanent member organisations are taking part in the campaign for Haiti – Stichting Vluchteling (Refugee Foundation) is not involved for obvious reasons. The campaign also involves the following guest organisations: Dorcas, Plan Nederland, Care Nederland, Habitat for Humanity, Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten (VNG) and Leger des Heils.³⁶

The public fund raising campaign ran from 13 January to 26 February 2010; funds that were donated after 26 March 2010 were allocated to the overall budget of SHO (bestemmings-reserve SHO). Taking into account the costs of organising the campaign (EURO 993,000) the net proceeds to be distributed among the SHO members and guest organisations amounted to EUR 112,200,000. This total amount will be disbursed during a period of three to five years, which is made up of the emergency relief phase initially planned to cover 2010 and the subsequent phase during which the emphasis will be on activities focused on rehabilitation and reconstruction.³⁷ It should be stressed that the contributions from the SHO partner organisations albeit important in their own right, consist a relatively small part of the total support of the international aid community to Haiti.

Figure 1 provides a detailed breakdown of the distribution of the total amount among the different partners for the entire programme period covering 2010 – 2014 (i.e. emergency aid, early rehabilitation and subsequent reconstruction). The most important actors in terms of funds allocated are Cordaid, Rode Kruis Nederland, Oxfam Novib, ICCO & Kerk in Actie and UNICEF Netherlands Committee. Together these organisations account for 82 per cent of

³³ These are the funds minus the costs of the campaign (advertising, costs of television and radio broadcasts, etc.).

³⁴ Member organisations are to submit an audited annual account to SHO.


³⁵ The front and back office are located in the SHO member organisation that has the overall responsibility for the campaign at issue. Oxfam Novib has this responsibility for Haiti campaign. The front office takes care of communication with the public; the back office handles administrative and financial aspects of the campaign including interim and final reporting.

³⁶ Habitat for Humanity, Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten and Care Nederland will not be supporting or implementing activities during the immediate relief phase, but will engage in the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase.

³⁷ In practice the distinction between those two phases is blurred to some extent. Rehabilitation and reconstruction activities may already be taking place during the emergency relief phase gaining momentum in the subsequent period.

the funds (EUR 89.3 million – rounded figure). The individual shares of the other permanent SHO members and the guest organisations range between 1.6 – 2.6 per cent.

Figure 1: Distribution of SHO funds for Haiti over the total programme period 2010 – 2014³⁸



Source: SHO-actie ‘Help Slachtoffers Aardbeving Haïti’, First Joint Report 13 January-31 March 2010

As indicated in figure 2 below, the activities implemented by the SHO members and guest organisations either directly or through financing and/or collaborating with their international and local partners³⁹ cover nine sectors: Protection, Disaster Management, Education, Livelihoods, Food Security, Water and Sanitation Facilities, Health Care, Shelter and Programme Management.

During the first 6 months following the earthquake 96% of the activities implemented concerned emergency relief related activities. The majority of these concern the provision of (temporary/emergency) shelter.

Through various types of large and small scale programmes and projects temporary shelter (in large or small camps) was provided by May 2010. Many of these activities are still ongoing as materials are in the mean time already in need of replacement. Apart from emergency shelter, also semi-permanent houses (temporary or ‘T’-shelter) have been constructed, which can be modified into permanent structures at a later stage. The urban setting in which the disaster struck compounded with the absence of government plans and decision-making on land rights and tenure rights, removing debris, and making land available has created challenges for the construction of more permanent housing and the rehabilitation of damaged property and infrastructure.


³⁸ Adding up to 99% of the total funds. EUR 3.946.411 has not been distributed yet.

³⁹ E.g. Netherlands Committee for UNICEF has channelled its funds through UNICEF New York. The contribution from the Netherlands Committee for UNICEF amounted to 4.4 per cent of UNICEF’s total budget for 2010 (see www.haitinu.nl) ; Rode Kruis Nederland has channelled its funds through the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC) with implementation through the Haitian Red Cross. However, Rode Kruis Nederland has also sent its own staff to Haiti to assist.

The provision of water and sanitation as well as food security has also been important in terms of disbursement. Activities in the Water and Sanitation cluster include (re)constructing water and sanitary facilities, organising awareness campaigns on the importance of hygiene and improving the capacity of local organisations to ensure the quality of water facilities in the long-term. The recent cholera epidemic has further enforced the necessity and urgency to carry out activities in this sector.⁴⁰ Programmes related to ensuring food security focus primarily on the distribution of food packages and ready-made meals. During the first few months following the earthquake such programmes targeted all victims; subsequently food aid was only provided to vulnerable groups such as babies, young children, pregnant women and elderly.

The other sectors have been less important in budgetary terms. They cover essential activities such as livelihood development (cash and food for work, rehabilitation of agricultural activities, trade and business), education, protection (child protection, protection against gender based violence, and housing and property rights), and disaster management (disaster preparedness planning, early warning systems, capacity building).

Figure 2: Expenditures by sector (as per 30 June 2010)⁴¹



Source: SHO-actie ‘Help Slachtoffers Aardbeving Haïti’, Second Joint Report 13 January-30 June 2010

As shown in table 1, the ‘programme focus’ among the different SHO partners varies considerably. Cordaid is the largest donor in the provision of health care and food security. The Dutch Red Cross (Nederlandse Rode Kruis) is the largest donor in the area of shelter. UNICEF is the largest donor in providing water and sanitation facilities and protection, ICCO in livelihoods programmes, Save the Children in education and Plan Nederland in disaster management.

⁴⁰ The cholera outbreak which started in October 2010 has affected more than 120,000 persons by the middle of December 2010 resulting in more than 3,500 dead by early January 2011 (UN OCHA, <http://ochaonline.un.org/tabid/6412/language/en-US/Default.aspx>). It is reported that the people in camps have been less affected by the epidemic due to the generally better water and sanitary conditions (information provided by J. Heeger - former UNICEF staff on water and sanitation - at a presentation at the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 December 2010)

⁴¹ These figures will be updated by IOB on the basis of additional information to be provided by SHO. Consolidated (audited) figures will become available in the report of SHO covering January – December 2010 due in April 2011.

Table 1: Expenditures by sector and organisation in EUR (as per 30 June 2010)

	Health Care	Water & Sanitation	Food Security	Livelihoods	Education	Shelter	Disaster Management	Protection	Programme management	Total
Cordaid	334.636	-	1.198.092	-	-	954.003	-	-	633.328	3.120.059
ICCO & Kerk in Actie	127.598	9.928	541.677	431.422	-	1.120.014	9.059	-	147.542	2.387.240
Oxfam Novib	-	829.865	-	266.188	-	638.722	14.370	-	250.855	2.000.000
Nederlandse Rode Kruis	46.520	25.200	-	-	-	7.821.015	4.000	-	163.500	8.060.235
Tear	55.115	138.226	47.726	41.283	-	-	-	-	39.609	321.959
Terre des Hommes	-	301.964	104.350	98.583	73.090	73.090	-	321.710	213.314	1.186.101
UNICEF Nederland	129.933	956.776	397.521	-	-	-	24.078	362.539	705.088	2.575.935
Save the Children	-	-	-	-	728.093	728.093	96.309	-	109.818	1.662.313
World Vision	-	-	-	-	525.135	525.135	-	-	52.455	1.102.725
Dorcas	-	187.064	-	195.292	144.157	144.157	-	-	12.667	683.337
Leger des Heils	107.491	7.403	150.037	-	143.654	143.654	35.501	-	9.994	597.734
Plan Nederland	-	-	-	-	171.344	171.344	193.743	-	54.763	591.194
Total	801.293	2.456.426	2.439.403	1.032.768	1.785.473	12.319.227	377.060	684.249	2.392.933	23.130.833

Source: SHO-actie Help slachtoffers aardbeving Haïti, Tweede Voortgangsrapportage 13 januari – 20 juni 2010, September 2010⁴²

4. Reporting on progress and results

The generous amount of funds donated by the Dutch public during the National Action Plan for Haiti to a large extent matched by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the Dutch ODA budget has resulted in SHO providing information to the public and the Ministry on how the resources have been put to use.

As stipulated in SHO's management plan for the Haiti Action, the individual member and guest agencies are to periodically report to SHO on the progress and results of their individual activities applying a standard reporting format. This not only facilitates the management of the entire programme but also joint periodic reporting on the programme.

In 2010, SHO has provided 3-monthly and 6-monthly joint progress reports respectively in June and September. On 11 January 2011, the anniversary of the earthquake, it also published a brief narrative report covering major accomplishments in 2010. As stipulated by the subsidy agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and SHO, these interim reports to the

⁴² These figures will be updated by IOB on the basis of information provided by SHO. Audited figures will become available in the report of SHO covering January – December 2010 due in April 2011.

public are to be complemented by annual reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs covering the period 2010 – 2013/2015.⁴³ The report for 2010 is to be published before 30 April 2011.

5. Rationale for the evaluation

The subsidy agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and SHO (19 April 2010) covering the subsidy of EUR 41.7 provided by the Ministry from Dutch ODA funds stipulates that SHO will commission a ‘meta evaluation’⁴⁴ covering the entire period of the Haiti Action, i.e. January 2010 – December 2014. The agreement also stipulates a number of administrative requirements including the submission of a plan for the reconstruction phase and substantive and financial reporting covering the relief and reconstruction stage. Finally, it contains a provision that the Ministry may undertake or commission specific studies or research.

With reference to the latter, the Ministry’s Department of Human Rights, Good Governance and Humanitarian Aid (DMH) and SHO agreed that the Ministry’s Policy and Operations Evaluation Department would undertake an independent evaluation covering SHO’s activities implemented during 2010, i.e. mainly characterised by interventions focused on emergency relief. The evaluation serves two purposes. In the first place it will allow drawing lessons about the implementation and results of the emergency relief activities in stead of having to wait until the results of the above mentioned meta evaluation.⁴⁵ At the same time, it will serve as one of the inputs for the latter.

6. Objective of the evaluation

The main objective of the Evaluation is to provide insight in the effects of the support provided by the SHO partners to Haiti during 2010 aiming to provide lessons for them and the SHO as a whole and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The evaluation also serves an accountability purpose by reporting how the funds provided by the Ministry and the general public in the Netherlands have been put to use and to what effect. In order to serve its accountability function for the Haitian stakeholders the final report will also be provided in French language.

The evaluation will provide a comprehensive overview of the activities which have been implemented in 2010 and will assess their results. The different SHO partner organisations are part of an international network organisation (e.g. Oxfam Novib) or channel their contributions to an international organisation (e.g. UNICEF Netherlands channelling its contribution to UNICEF International and Nederlandse Rode Kruis channelling its contribution through the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Organisations – IFRC). This implies that these SHO partner organisations have been contributing to the larger programmes implemented by these international organisations and their affiliates. Other SHO partner organisations provide direct support in collaboration with

⁴³ In its administrative plan for the Haiti Action, SHO assumes that its activities will cover a period of 3 to 5 years. The annual report covering 2010 is to be issued in the first quarter of 2011.

⁴⁴ This meta evaluation is to be based on and will synthesise the results of evaluations and/or evaluative studies conducted or commissioned by individual SHO partners.

⁴⁵ Such lessons will be valuable in view of the fact that the activities are implemented in a complex urban context which provides challenges to SHO partner organisations many of whom have been providing emergency assistance in rural rather than in urban settings.

their national counterparts which implement activities (e.g. Cordaid and ICCO & Kerk in Actie). The evaluation will take into consideration these different modalities.

The bulk of the support provided by the SHO partner organisations throughout 2010 have been focused on emergency relief interventions with a small – but growing – share of (early) recovery activities such as rehabilitation and reconstruction of houses, support for livelihood development, etc. However, in view of the fact that the relief phase has been extended, it is expected that it will be difficult to meaningfully cover the aspect ‘linking relief, rehabilitation and development – LRRD’ at this juncture.

The evaluation will in principle cover activities in all sectors supported by the various SHO partner organisations. In scoping the evaluation, the relative importance of sectors covered as well as the relative importance of the distribution of funds among the SHO partner organisations will be taken into account. For instance, in terms of sector focus, data on expenditures covering the period January – June 2010 indicate that the bulk of the support has been directed towards shelter with food security and water and sanitation also being very important. This relative weight of sectors will be expressed in the selection of programmes/projects activities to be reviewed in more detail (see also 7.1 scope of the evaluation).

Use of the Evaluation

Taking into account the objectives as stated above, the following primary users are identified:

- the SHO partner organisations and their implementing partners in Haiti;
- other organisations providing support to Haiti (non-governmental and multilateral organisations);
- the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and its Humanitarian Aid Division (DMH/HH) in particular;
- the Dutch Parliament and the general public
- the government of Haiti and national stakeholders;
- the wider development community, involved in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Haiti and other contexts.

To ensure the usefulness (and use) of the evaluation findings and (possible) recommendations, IOB has engaged the key stakeholders i.e. the SHO partner organisations and DMH/HH in the design of the evaluation. The interpretation of the evaluation findings will be grounded into the context of Haiti and the way in which the SHO partner organisations and their affiliates have had to deal with the challenges and opportunities defined by this context. In the event recommendations will be provided, they will be actor specific and actionable.

In order to ensure wide dissemination the final evaluation report and its summary (policy brief) will be published in English and French. Dissemination will take place through printed reports as well as electronically by posting the report on the websites of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the SHO and ALNAP.

7. Scope, approach and methodology

7.1. Scope of the Evaluation

In a complex environment like Haiti after the earthquake, a large amount of dispersed activities exist, carried out by a range of different actors across the country. To limit the scope of this evaluation, the evaluation will include programmes/projects which have been implemented in 2010, whereby the end of December 2010 will be taken as a cut-off point. This is also the period covered by SHO's 2010 report which is expected in April 2011.

As mentioned above, the evaluation will include all SHO partner organisations and their affiliates active in Haiti. Specific attention will be given to those partners having the largest share of the expenditure in 2010. The evaluation will also cover all sectors receiving support, with emphasis on sectors which have been the most important in terms of disbursements. Within the respective sectors specific interventions (projects) will be selected for in-depth investigation at field level.

As mentioned, the evaluation covers the first year of SHO support to Haiti, which is mainly characterised by (protracted) emergency relief. The boundary between emergency relief and early recovery/rehabilitation is not always clear and support to early recovery/rehabilitation activities should already be provided in the emergency phase.⁴⁶ Consequently, the evaluation will also cover activities related to recovery/rehabilitation, such as education (e.g. rebuilding schools) and livelihood programmes (e.g. food and cash for work programmes, the provision of small loans to families and small enterprises, etc.). Finally, whilst the evaluation will mainly focus on activities taking place in urban areas, it will also cover a number of interventions located in rural areas (e.g. projects/programmes focused on rural livelihoods and agricultural production).

7.2. Approach and methodology

Humanitarian interventions are inherently difficult to evaluate with any degree of rigor beyond measuring basic inputs and outputs (tonnes of food delivered, numbers of water pumps installed, etc.). Key challenges include the lack of baseline data, the absence of universally agreed overall results objectives, shortages of time and human resources for the task, and the problem of attribution. In a fluid and chaotic post-disaster environment characterised by many critical and quickly changing circumstances which affect people's lives the impact of specific interventions and the causal link between the programme/project at issue and beneficiaries' wellbeing are difficult to establish.

The evaluation will apply the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria adapted for evaluating humanitarian action (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, connectedness / sustainability, coherence, coordination, and coverage).⁴⁷ It will take into account the specific

⁴⁶ In the aftermath of a disaster such as occurred in Haiti, households commonly begin with recovery efforts immediately and it is important to investigate how and to what effect they have been supported.

⁴⁷ Beck, T. Evaluating humanitarian action using the OECD-DAC criteria – an ALNAP guide for humanitarian agencies, ALNAP Overseas Development Institute, London 2006. Sustainability – of particular importance for development aid – is concerned with assessing whether an activity or its results are likely to continue after the external (donor) support has ended. In contrast to development activities, many humanitarian interventions are not designed to be sustainable. They, however, still need to be assessed whether they, in responding to immediate needs, take into account the longer-term in their strategy. For example, effective and efficient food distribution which is going on for too long may negatively impact on local food producers whilst also creating dependency among those receiving food aid.

context of Haiti, the perspectives of different stakeholder groups and indicators in relation to the goals of the interventions at issue. With respect to stakeholders, the emphasis will be on the perspectives of the beneficiaries.⁴⁸

The evaluation will apply a two-stage approach: a desk study stage followed by field investigations of sample of interventions to be investigated in detail.

Stage 1 will involve:

- (i) an update of information on expenditures;
- (ii) an inventory of projects and programmes implemented in 2010;
- (iii) an analysis of relevant information pertaining to these interventions (project/programme plans, progress and completion reports, reviews and evaluations which will enable to (partially) answer the evaluation questions (see 8). This information will be obtained from each of the SHO partner organisations and/or through the SHO Haiti-action Back Office. The desk phase will also include an analysis of reviews and evaluations which have been conducted or commissioned by other agencies in order to be able to triangulate the findings of the current evaluation and put them into context.
- (iv) Interviews with the Haiti coordinators of each of the SHO partner organisations to discuss issues which emanate from the analysis of the documentation mentioned under iii.

On the basis of the insights obtained in the first stage, a purposive sample of activities will be selected for more detailed investigation at field level (Stage 2). The evaluation team will inform the SHO partner organisations which activities will be covered in the field investigations. It will also liaise with the headquarters of these organisations in order to ensure good coordination of the investigations with their field offices.

Stage 2 will entail a 3 week mission to Haiti aimed at probing deeper into the effects on the ground, looking at the ways in which the activities have been implemented as well as bringing in a wide-range of stakeholder perspectives on the ground.

The investigations will include on site focus group discussions with the affected population, face-to-face interviews and group discussions with the local partners of the SHO organisations, as well as interviews with selected key stakeholders involved in emergency relief and recovery activities in Haiti (for example: Cluster Leads, international NGOs, national institutions including local government, national NGOs/CBOs including churches). In covering programme and project beneficiaries, specific attention will be given to those who are extremely vulnerable, such as children including orphans, women and the elderly.

At the end of the field visit the evaluation team will hold a debriefing meeting to discuss and verify its preliminary findings with the various stakeholders.

The evaluation will be carried out in close cooperation with the SHO organisations which have been provided with the opportunity to provide specific issues in the evaluation's Terms of Reference. The evaluation will build as much as possible on existing data sets, progress

⁴⁸ Information coming from multiple angles and perspectives will help provide more of the "full picture" when linear causality between intervention and outcome is not possible to demonstrate'. See Rencoret, N., A. Stoddard, K. Haver, G. Taylor and P. Harvey (2010), *Haiti Earthquake Response. Context Analysis*, ALNAP, OECD/DAC Evaluation Network, UNEG, July 2010.

reports, reviews and evaluative studies of the SHO partner organisations and others. Finally, IOB will liaise with the Dutch Court of Audit to avoid duplication or overlap with the above mentioned investigation of the Court of Audit.

Methods and limitations

The evaluation will be based on an analysis of secondary sources and field verification of selected interventions.

- A content analysis will be made of the progress reports produced by all SHO organisations. Three periodic reports each having a similar format are available (January – March; January – June; January – December) allowing mapping of progress and describing results. An assessment will be made of the quality of these reports (completeness and evidence base);
- Where available, information will be gathered from baseline studies and beneficiary surveys produced by the agencies implementing the respective interventions. The evaluation will not conduct its own surveys due to time and budgetary limitations, but will make use of statistical information made available by the implementing organisations (e.g. information on the adherence to the Sphere Minimum Standards in Disaster Response⁴⁹, the number of beneficiaries supported and data on their well-being, etc.). Although it is not envisaged to make a comparison between the effectiveness of the organisations involved in the implementation of activities funded or co-funded by the SHO organisations, quantitative and qualitative information on the support provided (e.g. type and quality of services such as health services, water supply and education as well as materials provided such as temporary shelter and more permanent housing) may provide opportunities for benchmarking;
- Use will be made of the information provided by internal and external evaluations and reviews conducted by or for the agencies involved in the implementation of the activities funded through the SHO organisations. In addition information on the context, the challenges influencing the overall progress and success of the international support provided will be gathered from evaluations conducted by other agencies. Evaluation reports gathered thus far are listed in the annexed references; UNICEF's Evaluation Office will publish an evaluation covering part of UNICEF's 2010 support programme in March 2011, allowing the evaluation team to include the findings of this particular evaluation in its own evaluation;
- The information gathered through secondary sources will be complemented and verified by conducting interviews at the headquarters level of each of the SHO organisations. These interviews will amongst other things provide a perspective on the ways in which the interventions have evolved and how the organisations engaged in the implementation of the support have managed to overcome the various challenges related to the specific context in Haiti and its dynamics (e.g. the cholera epidemic which struck the country nine months into the emergency operations);
- Field verifications will be made of a number of activities. As indicated above, their selection will be based on a purposive sample. The sample will not be statistically representative, but allows for illustrative cases covering the most important sectors of aid provided. Methods applied during field investigation include focus group discussions with

⁴⁹ These standards define a minimum level of services to be attained in a given context. Standards are developed for 1) water supply, sanitation and hygiene promotion; 2) food security, nutrition and food aid; 3) shelter, settlement and non-food items; 4) health services.

selected population groups (e.g. women); face-to-face and/or group interviews with selected institutional stakeholders; the collection of quantitative data; and observations at project sites.

Prior to the field work stage a note outlining more detailed approaches and methods to be applied in the field investigations as well as an overview of interventions / activities to be studied at field level will be prepared and shared with the SHO organisations.

8. Evaluation questions

The evaluation will address the following central questions:

- To what extent has the (humanitarian) assistance provided by the SHO partner organisations been in line with the internationally accepted humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence and with the needs, priorities and rights of the affected population?
- To what extent has the (humanitarian) assistance provided been relevant for the affected population and achieved its purpose, i.e. has it met the immediate material and non-material needs of the beneficiaries?

These two overarching questions are specified below in a number of questions which follow the common OECD-DAC evaluation criteria adapted for evaluating humanitarian action and have been built on a set of questions contained in the Haiti Earthquake Response Context Analysis document.⁵⁰ The questions below are further detailed in an evaluation matrix (annexe 1).

Relevance

- Why did the SHO organisations decide to engage in providing support to Haiti?
- Was the needs assessment adequate, and did it take into consideration the specific context of the disaster?
- Was the involvement of Haitian actors in needs assessment, design of interventions and implementation adequate, and in accordance with good practice.
- Were the interventions appropriate in relation to the specific characteristics of the disaster: urban setting, scale, weak governance, damage to institutional structures (government as well as NGOs)?
- Were the relevant technical/professional standards that are agreed in the humanitarian system applied?
- Were the humanitarian efforts supported with SHO funding coherent with national development plans and strategies.

⁵⁰ These questions were formulated to provide a framework for evaluations of humanitarian and reconstruction support to Haiti. See Rencoret, N., A. Stoddard, K. Haver, G. Taylor and P. Harvey (2010), *Haiti Earthquake Response. Context Analysis*, ALNAP, OECD/DAC Evaluation Network, UNEG, July 2010.

Effectiveness

- Did the SHO support realise the envisaged outputs?
- Did the SHO support address the immediate needs of victims as defined in the needs assessments and as subsequently appeared?
- Were beneficiaries reached satisfied with the support provided?

Efficiency

- Were the SHO partner organisations and their affiliates (e.g. network organisation, international organisation, Haitian partner) sufficiently equipped to provide the required support?
- Were activities cost-efficient in terms of financial and human resources – taking into consideration the context in which the intervention had to be implemented, e.g. costs to be incurred to reach the beneficiaries, and application of benchmarks for the costing of support items?
- Were activities of SHO partners adequately coordinated in the cluster system
- Was there an adequate system for monitoring and evaluation in place in organisations receiving SHO support (SHO partners and their national partners in Haiti)?

Connectedness/Sustainability

- Did the design of the interventions contain a transition strategy to recovery and development?

9. Organisation of the evaluation

The evaluation will be coordinated by IOB evaluator Ted Kliet. IOB research assistant Rafaela Feddes will be involved in carrying out the desk research, will participate in the field investigations and in writing the final report. Two external experts (Bert van de Putte and Hans Bruning) will be contracted to further elaborate the evaluation's approach and methodology, participate in the desk research, conduct the field investigations, analyse the findings of the evaluation and participate in writing the final report. The two external experts will engage local support staff to provide assistance during the field investigations (e.g. translation in Creole during interviews with beneficiaries).

The evaluation will be guided by a reference group consisting of Madelon Cabooter (Head of Childrens Rights and Programmes Department of UNICEF Netherlands Committee) representing SHO; Margriet Koeleman, senior policy officer from the Human Rights, Gender Equality, Good Governance and Humanitarian Aid Department (DMH) of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Mariska van Beijnum (Deputy Head of the Conflict Research Unit, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. The reference group is chaired by Director IOB (Ruerd Ruben) and is responsible for reviewing and providing

comments on the draft Terms of Reference for the evaluation and on the draft final report. The reference group will convene two times during the course of the evaluation.

As part of IOB's quality assurance process, IOB evaluators Hans Slot and Henri Jorritsma will be involved as 'internal readers' providing comments on the draft ToR and the draft final report.

10. Deliverables

The evaluation will produce the following deliverables aimed at reaching different stakeholder groups:

- A final report in the English language (about 50 pages excluding annexes);
- A final report in the French language (about 50 pages excluding annexes);
- A policy brief (English, French, Dutch, and possibly Creole) summarizing the evaluation's results.

It is also envisaged to organise a workshop in the Netherlands to discuss the evaluation report with the SHO partner organisations, staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other interested parties. Possibilities for a feedback event in Haiti will be investigated.

11. Projected timetable

The evaluation will be conducted in the period February – May/June 2011 according to the time table below.

Table 2. Timetable

Activity	Timing/completion date
Preparation of ToR	January 2011
Review of draft ToR by SHO and reference group	February 2011
Finalisation of ToR	9 March 2011
Desk study phase (incl. interviews in the Netherlands)	15 February –24 March 2011
Provision of information to SHO on the field work stage (activities selected and field work approach and methods)	Last week of March 2011
Field study phase	In the period 29 March –16 April 2011 (NB. field work will take place after the 2 nd round of the presidential elections currently planned on 20 March)
Analysis and preparation of report	26 April – mid May 2011
Draft report for review by SHO and reference group	20 May 2011
Final report	Beginning of June 2011 followed by printing and publications (late June)

12. Budget

The evaluation will be financed from the budget of IOB with DMH/HH contributing 50 per cent of the total costs, i.e. EUR 56,175. DMH/HH will transfer its contribution to the budget of IOB for 2011 following completion of the evaluation.

Table 3. Budget for the evaluation

Budget category	Estimated Costs (EUR)
IOB evaluator T. Kliest (3 person months, travel and DSA Haiti)	PM
Team of external consultants (R.A. van de Putte en H. Bruning: 55 person days, travel and DSA Haiti, including in country field assistance)	59,500 (incl. VAT)
IOB research assistant R. Feddes (3 person months, travel and DSA Haiti)	22,000
Report production including costs of translation/language correction (English & French report; policy brief in English and French)	24,500
Reference Group (4 person days external expert M. van Beijnum)	1,000
Sub total	107,000
Contingency (5%)	5,350
Total	112,350

Annexe 1 Evaluation matrix

Evaluation questions	Detailed questions	Data sources		
Relevance		Desk study	Interviews at HQ level	Field study
Why did the SHO organisations decide to engage in providing support to Haiti?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What were the grounds for the decision to engage? • How was the decision taken? 		X	
Was the needs assessment adequate, and did it take into consideration the specific context of the disaster	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Were the interventions supported based on a methodologically sound, comprehensive and prioritised assessment of needs? Who conducted the need assessment? 	X	X	X
Was the involvement of Haitian actors in needs assessment, design of interventions and implementation adequate, and in accordance with good practice.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Were beneficiaries and local stakeholders consulted on needs and design of the activity? • Were staff involved in the consultations and design of the intervention French or Creole speakers? • Have ongoing participation and consultation of beneficiaries and local or national stakeholders being built in throughout the 'project cycle'? • Were there trade-offs between the need for coordination and local ownership, and the need for quick results/impacts? 	X X	X X	X X
Were the interventions appropriate in relation to the specific characteristics of the disaster: urban setting, scale, weak governance, damage to institutional structures (government as well as NGOs)?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Was the design of the interventions tailored to and appropriate for the urban setting? • Was the design grounded in a solid contextual understanding of the Haitian socio-economic context pre-earthquake and experience of sudden onset disasters (particularly in the peri-urban environment of Port au Prince)? • Were the interventions appropriately designed for the 'mega disaster' conditions in Haiti? • To what extent were the interventions designed in a flexible way, in order to be able to adapt to changing priorities and needs of the beneficiaries and changes in the context? • Were the interventions timely (i.e., how soon after earthquake did activities begin)? 	X X X X X	X X X X X	X X X X X
Were the relevant technical/professional standards that are agreed in	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Were the relevant technical standards (e.g. Sphere Standards) applied and met taking into account the context in which the interventions had to take place? Did the SHO partner organisations and their affiliates adhere to the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and non- 	X	X	X

the humanitarian system applied	<p>Governmental Organisations in disaster relief?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Were protection activities and measures included in or integrated with the intervention? • Did the interventions apply the principle of ‘do no harm’ and assist (early) recovery and reconstruction by strengthening livelihoods, community stability, or civil society or by addressing psycho-social needs of the earthquake victims? 	X	X	X
Were the humanitarian efforts supported with SHO funding coherent with national development plans and strategies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Were the different humanitarian efforts provided by the respective SHO partner organisations and implemented through their counterparts on the ground coherent with each other, those of other humanitarian actors, as well as with national strategies? • Were the interventions linked explicitly with pre-earthquake development objectives and activities? 	X	X	X
Effectiveness		Desk study	Interviews at HQ level	Field study
Did the SHO support realise the envisaged outputs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Were specific output targets met? • What percentage of the beneficiaries targeted by the interventions has been reached? 	X	X	X
Did the SHO support address the immediate needs of victims as defined in the needs assessments and as subsequently appeared?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Were the objectives of the interventions (outcomes) achieved on the basis of outputs realised? • Did the interventions contribute to saving lives (reduce mortality, morbidity or the risk of disease)? • Did the interventions directly relieve suffering by addressing acute human needs in the aftermath of the earthquake and did they contribute to restoring dignity of the affected population? • What were the unintended consequences – positive and negative? 	X	X	X
Were beneficiaries reached satisfied with the support provided?		X	X	X
Efficiency		Desk study	Interviews at HQ level	Field study
Were the SHO partner organisations and their affiliates (international partners, national partners) sufficiently equipped to provide the required		X	X	X

support?				
Were activities cost-efficient in terms of financial and human resources – taking into consideration the context in which the intervention had to be implemented, e.g. costs to be incurred to reach the beneficiaries?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Were activities cost-efficient in terms of financial and human resources – taking into consideration the context in which the intervention had to be implemented, e.g. costs to be incurred to reach the beneficiaries? Have benchmarks been applied for the costing of support items? 	X	X	X
Were activities of SHO partners adequately coordinated in the cluster system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Were all SHO partner organisations and affiliates working within the cluster system? Was coordination between (i) the SHO partner organisations and their counterparts and (ii) other actors including the organisations which were designed Cluster Leads effective? Did it identify and fill gaps in the support provided, enhance strategic prioritisation of activities and timeliness in implementation? Was it accomplished with a minimum of administrative burden? Did the SHO partner organisations manage operational information in an effective manner? Were coordination and management decisions made on the basis of information generated (by the humanitarian system) in Haiti? What have been the effects of the SHO assistance on local (counterpart) organisations (enhancing capacities)? 	X X X X	X X X X	X X X X
Was there an adequate system for monitoring and evaluation in place in organisations receiving SHO support (SHO partners and their national partners in Haiti)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Have the interventions been properly monitored to ensure (i) adaptations when required and (ii) periodic reporting as required in the SHO management plan? Have SHO partner organisations and/or their counterparts engaged in evaluations of ongoing and/or completed activities. If so, how have these evaluations been used? Have SHO partner organisations been involved in conducting specific studies and or lessons learning exercises. One may think about investigations focused on the ways in which the international community has engaged in Haiti, or the behaviour of specific groups of donors and agencies. If so, how have such studies been used? How did the SHO partner organisations communicate and report on accomplishments? 	X X X X	X X X X	
Connectedness/Sustainability		Desk study	Interviews at HQ level	Field study

<p>Did the design of the interventions contain a transition strategy to recovery and development</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent has a longer-term horizon been adopted in the ‘programme/project’ strategy (in terms of continuation of (recovery) activities after the activity has ended) – linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) and/or exit strategy? • Did the design of the interventions contain a transition strategy to recovery and development? 	X	X	
		X	X	

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Other source material for desk study

Interim reports to SHO Back Office by the individual SHO organisations:

Report 1: January – March 2011

Report 2: January – June 2011

Report 3: January – December 2011