Evaluation of UNHCR-led Initiatives to End Statelessness

FINAL REPORT – VOLUME I
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UNHCR Evaluation Service

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Acknowledgements

Key Evaluation Information at a Glance

Evaluation information at a glance	
Title of the evaluation:	Evaluation of UNHCR-led initiatives to end statelessness
Timeframe covered:	2001 to 2019
Duration:	May 2020 to April 2021
Type of evaluation:	Centralized evaluation
Countries covered:	Global with remote data collection in Regional Bureaux and select countries in each region
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Executive summary

Background

UNHCR's mandate to address statelessness has evolved significantly since 1951 from responsibilities for stateless refugees only, to the identification and protection of non-refugee stateless persons and the prevention and reduction of statelessness itself. In 2014, UNHCR redoubled its efforts under this mandate and established the Global Action Plan to End Statelessness: 2014 - 2024 (GAP) as a guiding framework for its Campaign to End Statelessness by 2024.

This evaluation was commissioned by the UNHCR Evaluation Service to generate evidence and insights regarding UNHCR's work to support States to end statelessness and was timed to inform potential adjustments for the remaining years of GAP implementation. The evaluation covered the period of 2001 to 2020 with particular focus on actions and advocacy efforts of UNHCR and partners to support the GAP since 2014.

A stateless person is defined as 'a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law' (Article 1 of the1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons). The causes of statelessness include discrimination, conflicts between or gaps in nationality laws, state succession, border or sovereignty disputes, lack of documentation (including birth registration), and forced migration. Stateless persons often lack access to basic socioeconomic and political rights that citizens enjoy. Statelessness affects millions of people globally, though the exact number of stateless persons is unknown. In 2019 UNHCR reported 4.2 million stateless persons in 76 States as persons of concern.[1] Between 2010 and 2019, 754,500 stateless persons have acquired nationality.[2]

The evaluation consisted of five key phases: the inception phase, remote data collection phase (global survey, interviews with internal and external stakeholders, documentation reviews), "deep dives" into four country operations (Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, the Philippines, and Tajikistan), three regional case studies (Americas, Europe, and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and consultations with Regional Engagement Groups in Africa and Asia and finally an analysis, validation and report writing phase. The final draft report was also subjected to a review by a Reference Group, comprising senior stakeholders from UNHCR and key partner agencies.

Key Findings

Evidence collected in the course of this evaluation reaffirm the importance that gaining nationality and official identification documentation (e.g. birth registration) has had for persons of concern, including the ability to access health care, housing, education, social services, facilitate freedom of movement and formal employment opportunities. Perhaps more importantly, citizenship and official recognition increase the sense of belonging and dignity and reduce fear of persecution and discrimination, as noted by persons formerly at-risk of statelessness in Cote d'Ivoire.

Most key informants expressed the belief that the overall objective of the Campaign, to end statelessness in ten years, was aspirational. Although predicated on the fact that statelessness is solvable with adequate political will and investments, the underlying causes include multiple persistent political and socio-cultural drivers in addition to simply technical and administrative hurdles. While the Global Action Plan to End Statelessness is widely viewed as a useful framework to guide States, UNHCR and other partners, monitoring data against targets on the 10 GAP actions suggest underachievement of six and challenges or lack of information on the other four.

UNHCR Contributions to Results

Nevertheless, according to UNHCR, 754,500 stateless persons have acquired nationality in the past decade, including 341,000 since the campaign was launched in 2014. Most key informants believe that UNHCR and its partners have substantially contributed to this overall achievement through directly preventing and resolving cases of statelessness, advocacy, capacity building, technical support, and the provision of protection services. In addition, the evaluation found that UNHCR has directly and indirectly improved the lives of many

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[1] UNHCR Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2019, page 68. This number of stateless persons include the number of persons of 'undetermined nationality' who may be confirmed as such if a stateless determination would take place.
[2] See UNHCR (2020) Refugee Global Trend. https://www.unhcr.org/en-ie/statistics/unhcrstats/5ee200e37/unhcr-global-trends-2019.html

stateless, formerly stateless, and people at risk of statelessness by giving voice to their rights and working to ensure obstacles to their recognition as equal members of society are addressed.

While laudable, UNHCR has struggled to meet statelessness targets for all but one key statelessness indicator within its Results Framework. There are serious limitations within the RBM system for measuring and reporting on UNHCR's success in achieving planned statelessness results. In particular, lack of data on stateless populations automatically creates inaccuracies in estimating a number of indicators - for example, the percentage of stateless persons granted nationality.

Despite challenges in estimating the total numbers of stateless, and the lack of systematic evidence on UNHCRs specific contribution to alleviating specific underlying causes of statelessness, key informants, survey respondents and documents reviewed suggest that most UNHCR-led statelessness initiatives have been highly relevant and appropriate, taking into account key drivers of statelessness and contextual factors. However, the evaluation found that there is scope for country-level strategies to shift to longer-term approaches and to move beyond legal and administrative causes of statelessness and to take other social, economic and cultural drivers and impacts of statelessness more systematically into account. Gaps in some of these areas suggest that other UN and non-UN organizations (including in particular civil society organizations who work in close proximity with stateless persons) could usefully play a more important role in preventing and ending statelessness.

At the global level, UNHCR has effectively convened and mobilized States to increase commitment to ending statelessness through events such as the 2011 Ministerial Intergovernmental Event, the 2014 Global Forum on Statelessness at Tilburg University and the 2019 HLS and preparatory meetings. At a regional level UNHCR has worked to further operationalize government commitments to ending statelessness by contributing to, and in some cases facilitating, dialogues among States and other interested parties, largely based on the efforts of regional statelessness officers. In addition to increasing knowledge and awareness, such efforts have resulted in specific regional treaties, agreements and plans of action with obligations for Member States.

The evaluation found that UNHCR has established a wide range of partnerships at various levels, which have been critical to the progress achieved. Some implementing partners shared the impression that UNHCR engagement has been opportunistic, time-limited and project based and that sustaining their involvement once partnership agreements and funding have expired is not easy. At the same time, CSOs and NGOs value the relationships UNHCR has with governments and the direct access this gives them, which allows UNHCR to link partners to key policy advocacy efforts.

Numerous bilateral global partnerships have added value, with other UN agencies, academic institutions, and governments. The Geneva-based Friends of the Campaign to End Statelessness is a good example of engaging Member States to align and exert diplomatic influence to support the campaign. The longstanding partnership with the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) was also viewed as particularly important in disseminating information to parliamentarians around the world and engaging them in discussions on promising practices. However, overarching coalition building and UN system-wide cooperation have not been fully maximized.

Institutional Effectiveness

Some internal and external key informants noted that UNHCR's focus on statelessness has diminished as attention has shifted to refugee crises, the GRF, partnership with the World Bank and more recently COVID-19. Key informants described a strongly siloed culture where protection and operations staff do not always interact and coordinate on a regular basis, with statelessness often seen as a technical and legal issue to be handled solely by protection staff.

Between 2001 and 2014 UNHCR made significant strides towards institutionalizing and mainstreaming its statelessness mandate through the creation of the Statelessness Section, introduction of regional statelessness officer positions, addition of the statelessness surge capacity sub-roster, adoption of the 2010 Strategy on UNHCR Action to Address Statelessness, and the introduction of the dedicated budget and planning pillar for statelessness work. Since the launch of the campaign, statelessness tools and resources to support planning have continued to increase and improve, with the introduction of the GAP Map, the Global Strategy and Implementation Plan (GSIP), and Good Practice papers.

Senior leadership attention to and support for work on statelessness, while somewhat inconsistent over time and geography, was frequently cited by key informants as playing a critical role in mainstreaming and integration at a global level, though with the recent regionalization / decentralization changes some

questioned whether "top down" prioritization guidance would remain as influential. Moreover, the evaluation found that there is a gap in coordination of efforts on statelessness across different divisions and functions.

At headquarters, the Senior Executive Team (SET) has a critical role to play in overall prioritization as well as for facilitating coordination across divisions. Despite early indications that the campaign was intended to be 'co-owned' by DIP and DER, many stakeholders felt that the campaign suffered from a lack of attention and prioritization by DER, due in part to inadequate personnel and budgets and a focus on emergencies, as well as the lack of knowledge and comfort level to communicate about statelessness. The new Division of Strategic Planning and Results in headquarters is starting to play an important role in supporting priority setting by Representatives, highlighting the importance of situation analysis across groups of PoC to inform multi-year plans, and ensuring that plans are aligned to the Global Strategic Priorities and follow other guidance for planning and budgeting. Regional Bureau Directors were cited as serving a key 'tone-setting' function for the staff within their bureau and for country operations under their responsibility and have major influence over allocating budget envelopes within their regions and approving country operations plans (and now strategies).

In the end, the evaluation found that Country Representatives play the most critical roles of all, as the face of UNHCR with national governments and the most influential decision-makers regarding whether an operation will prioritize statelessness work. They determine the degree to which statelessness work is funded and staffed, and whether operations make substantial efforts to influence government decisions, build the awareness and capacity of partners and governments, and whether politically sensitive topics should be broached publicly, privately or not at all. The familiarity of Representatives with statelessness topics and comfort level in engaging key decision-makers plays an important part in determining whether UNHCR can overcome obstacles to progress and move forward with specific initiatives towards sustainable solutions to statelessness.

To help operationalize work on GAP actions, the GSIP identifies UNHCR activities aligned to the 10 GAP actions for target countries. However, efforts to guide operations towards addressing GAP actions relevant in their country through the GSIP are commendable but have not always translated into inclusion of statelessness activities in operations' plans and budgets.

Changes to the Results Framework and RBM system are ongoing, and their potential influence on UNHCR's statelessness work remains somewhat speculative. Some potential concerns raised by stakeholders include the planned elimination of the pillar structure for planning and budgeting and the intention to allow operations to link activities and budgets to more than one population group. Both of these potential changes have logical merit from a programming perspective, given numerous examples of activities and initiatives that support more than one population group, or where population groups overlap. The new Results Framework also offers clearer linkages to the SDGs. However, the evaluation expects that these changes may further complicate UNHCR's ability to clearly demonstrate the link between resources and results for its statelessness work, potentially reducing transparency and accountability.

UNHCR Investments in Ending Statelessness

From 2012 to 2019 UNHCR invested just under USD 300 million in statelessness – with annual expenditure remaining relatively flat since the launch of the campaign in 2014. Budgets allocated for statelessness work represented an overall decrease in the overall organizational expenditure from 1.6 percent in 2012 to 0.9 percent in 2019. While expenditure for refugee programming increased proportional to the growth in the numbers of refugees globally, budgets for statelessness work did not increase as known stateless populations grew by 25 percent.

Just 10 out of 83 UNHCR offices with statelessness budgets made up 62% of all statelessness expenditures from 2012- 2019, including Myanmar (18%) and the U.S. multi-country office, which covers the Dominican Republic (12%). Within statelessness budgets, the evaluation found that some GAP action areas received greater attention than others. Work on status determination procedures received the highest percentage of budget requests. Work to improve public attitudes towards persons of concern received 64% of funding requested and strengthening of law and policy received 63%. Other areas, such as work on individual documentation, civil registration and civil status documentation, and identification of statelessness cases received significantly less support.

UNHCR resource mobilization efforts have not substantially increased the availability of funding for statelessness. In 2016 UNHCR launched the first ever special appeal that focused on statelessness and sought (unsuccessfully) to draw attention to the funding needed for implementation of the #IBelong Campaign. Earmarked contributions for statelessness work have been limited, totaling slightly over USD 58 million between 2010 and 2020.

> Seeds for Solutions funding was found to have a positive effect in scaling up UNHCRs operational work on statelessness

While experienced and appropriately skilled personnel are UNHCR's best asset, the evaluation found that there are few dedicated staff positions on statelessness within UNHCR (3 in HQ and between 10-17 in regional bureaus and country operations). The majority of Representatives, Protection Officers and External Relations staff spent less than 25% of their time on statelessness. Well appreciated reinforcements, through the global protection surge capacity roster for statelessness work, have come to an end in 2020 when the joint Surge project with the IRC ended.

While a significant focus of UNHCR's work on statelessness has been on capacity building of partners (national governments in particular), there has been less emphasis on learning and capacity building of its own workforce. The only dedicated training on statelessness within UNHCR is an online self-study module that was developed in 2012 (now out of date) which has been complemented by other ad hoc external training. This patchwork of training and learning support may not be able to ensure growing demands for capacity, and inadequately target staff in different functions and at different levels of responsibility within the organization.

Key enabling and hindering factors

Political will, awareness of statelessness, and strong partnerships across government, civil society and other organizations are the most important influencing factors that can enable or hinder government progress against statelessness. Finding key entry points among supportive government officials and parliamentarians and building their awareness and understanding, allowed some operations to build greater political will to act. Political incentives can also be generated through increasing public awareness and support, including the awareness of stateless or at-risk populations themselves. Partnerships across government and between external actors were credited with building momentum for positive change, influencing key decisions, and expanding government capacities.

A considerable number of internal and external stakeholders described UNHCR as risk-averse in terms of public advocacy on statelessness, though in some case study interviews and open-ended survey responses UNHCR staff suggested that low levels of public communications on statelessness are also due to lack of staff familiarity, perceived complexity of statelessness issues, and staff not having direct contact with stateless populations to help develop a better understanding of their situation. Given that discriminatory practices and beliefs are key drivers of statelessness, public advocacy is a potentially important tool for UNHCR and partners to try to shift sociocultural attitudes and create a more enabling environment for systems and legal changes.

Key informants and documents repeatedly emphasized data gaps and challenges in improving the reliability and quality of data. A lack of data can limit UNHCR's ability to communicate and advocate around the issue of statelessness, whereas good data can "open eyes and doors". In this regard, many UNHCR operations have invested in statelessness mapping studies to fill gaps in official data sources. However, the evaluation found that while augmenting official data collection can support building awareness and understanding of statelessness, it can be an expensive short-term solution for a systemic problem – requiring technical expertise and management support. The evaluation found that ongoing efforts and partnerships (UNSC, World Bank) at global level to work on common standards for statelessness statistics and statistical models for estimating statelessness offer a more sustainable model for improving statistics on statelessness over the longer term.

Conclusions

UNHCR and partners have positively impacted on the lives of many stateless people and those at risk of statelessness, evidenced by the number of people that have acquired nationality, stories about the value of gaining citizenship, and the many good and innovative initiatives to prevent and resolve statelessness. By working together, UNHCR and partners have successfully raised awareness of statelessness and begun to build the necessary political will and capacity to prevent and resolve statelessness. Since 2001 there is a

growing dialogue on statelessness and more political will to act, with notable successes in particular countries and regions, as well as at the global level.

The GAP has been a useful framework for guiding States, UNHCR and other partners, and its broad scope allows for application in a range of different contexts. Global diplomatic events, such as the 2011 Ministerial Intergovernmental Event and the 2019 HLS have inspired momentum and pledges for future action. Within UNHCR, in the absence of a strong theory of change for ending statelessness, the GSIP has provided a foundation for setting organizational direction.

Despite successes, the ambitions of the campaign and targets set within the GAP have proven to be highly aspirational and are unlikely to be achieved by 2024. The challenges of statelessness will continue to remain beyond the lifetime of the Campaign. The most significant progress on granting nationality and mainstreaming and institutionalizing actions to end statelessness was seen in the period leading up to the launch of the campaign. Since then, statelessness tools and resources to support planning have continued to increase and improve, while overall resourcing has not grown. Experience has proved that ending statelessness is a long-term and complex undertaking, which is highly dependent on political will and susceptible to set-backs – including other crises, such as COVID-19 – that can divert attention and either slow or reverse progress.

The invisibility of stateless persons and those at risk of statelessness in many places has hampered progress. Gaps in reliable data on stateless persons and the effect that statelessness has on their lives have made it more difficult to communicate and prompt action. More progress has been made to strengthen statelessness data in contexts where there is already political will to address the issue and some degree of public awareness. However, it is precisely in the places where the least is known about statelessness, and where political appetite to discuss and tackle statelessness is lacking, that data is most needed to support UNHCR and partner efforts to communicate and lobby on behalf of stateless persons. The JDC funded effort to develop the IROSS provides a critical opportunity to systematically improve the quality and comparability of national statelessness data.

Internal leadership on statelessness has been crucial to successes so far. Country Representatives play the most critical roles of all – as the face of UNHCR with national governments and the most influential decision-makers when it comes to prioritization of statelessness work. However, the ambitions of the campaign and the organization's clear mandate for statelessness have not been met with commensurate UNHCR statelessness budgets nor efforts to systematically mainstream statelessness within UNHCR. Leadership on the prioritization for statelessness has been inconsistent, with much greater attention to other priorities such as the GCR. Hesitancy to lobby on behalf of stateless persons in some sensitive contexts has been a risk to UNHCR's credibility. A short-term, emergency mindset has further relegated statelessness down the list of priorities within a culture that emphasizes quick impact over the long-term nature and results of statelessness work. Overall, the institutional culture of UNHCR has not adequately evolved to match the needs and challenges of the objective of the campaign and the organization's mandate for statelessness.

UNHCR's financial investments in statelessness have been critical to the progress made so far, providing opportunities to prevent and end statelessness for both the organization and its partners. However, UNHCR has not adequately prioritized statelessness in its resource mobilization efforts. Additional, sustained and carefully prioritized funding (and fundraising) is required, however, particularly for specific countries and regions where progress has been slow and for GAP actions that have been relatively neglected.

Investment in UNHCR's workforce is crucial, as work on statelessness relies primarily on knowledgeable and skilled personnel. Dedicated staffing has been a critical success factor in a number of operations. Conversely, where staff are stretched too thin and/or lack the necessary confidence to lobby on the topic, statelessness is often one of the first areas to be deprioritized. More dedicated statelessness staff and communications capacity are needed in key operations, including additional short-term surge capacity, and increased responsibility for statelessness is required across UNHCR staff functions. This implies a greater and more targeted effort to build knowledge and skills at all levels – allowing UNHCR to achieve more on statelessness with the limited resources available.

Ongoing changes within UNHCR – such as decentralization and multi-year planning and budgeting – are both opportunities and challenges for the work on statelessness. As responsibilities and authorities shift within the organization, and as ways of working evolve, a continued corporate prioritization of statelessness is required. Better configuration and use of systems for reporting on statelessness-related results would help UNHCR monitor its own performance during this period of transition and allow for greater transparency and accountability.

Aspects of UNHCR's institutional culture including the perceived primacy of the refugee mandate, concerns about jeopardizing access and relationships in politically sensitive situations, and a short-term emergency

mindset have negatively affected UNHCR's ability to meet the campaign's objectives for ending statelessness in some contexts where statelessness is a severe problem.

UNHCR has been particularly successful in implementing initiatives to address the legal and administrative causes of statelessness, which align with its institutional strengths. There are other key drivers of statelessness, however, including political, social and economic aspects, which need to be more consciously and robustly addressed. Similarly, the broader socio-economic impacts of statelessness, such as exclusion from schools, legal employment and social welfare, and the suffering that they cause, need to be more holistically recognized and addressed.

While UNHCR has played a critical and central role in highlighting and championing the situation of stateless persons, public advocacy has emerged as a gap, particularly at a global level. Furthermore, the organization has not responded to all of the drivers and impacts of statelessness, nor should it. Collaboration has been critical to the progress made so far on statelessness and UNHCR has successfully mobilized a wide range of stakeholders at different levels. Overall, however, there is not a strong enough sense of shared responsibility. UNHCR could do more to bring a diverse set of international, regional and national actors together to collectively mobilize for change, including harnessing the contributions of stateless persons directly. In particular, UNHCR should invest more in maximizing the potential for UN system-wide collaboration on statelessness.

The foundations are in place for scaling-up UNHCR and partner action to reduce statelessness, but success will require a dedicated, creative and sustained approach to overcoming the remaining challenges. The organization needs to find a way to work across divisions to elevate its work on statelessness and capacitate staff at all levels to contribute. Similarly, it will need to leverage the mandates and capacities of partners to create a stronger coalition – sharing the responsibility for preventing and ending statelessness. This comes at a time when funding and staffing are constrained, and difficult choices are already being made about how to prioritize limited resources in response to growing needs. Continued investments will be needed, however, as well as a careful look at existing commitments to maximize their potential for positive change. The reputational risk for UNHCR of not delivering against its commitments and mandate on statelessness are high. The remaining years of the Campaign are an opportunity UNHCR and its partners cannot afford to miss – both in terms of holding stakeholders to account for the commitments already made and generating new momentum for a collective effort to prevent and end statelessness beyond 2024.

Recommendations

As noted throughout this evaluation, UNHCR cannot act alone to end statelessness. It can however devote renewed energy, linked to a whole of society approach, to engage and mobilize stateless people and actors from all sectors of society, at global, regional, national levels.

	Recommended actions	Responsible
1	Strengthen UNHCR's integrated global cross-divisional leadership of the campaign in its remaining years and improve prioritization of activities to address statelessness at all levels of the organization, including clear direction from the High Commissioner to Regional Directors to give higher priority to statelessness.	SET
2	Invest in building the statelessness-related knowledge and skills of UNHCR staff and affiliates, including upskilling of Country Representatives' knowledge about, and comfort in engaging on, aspects of statelessness, and ensure surge capacity mechanisms are available to fill temporary gaps.	Global Learning and Development Centre with support of DIP, and RB protection pillars
3	Enhance organizational capacity and tools for public advocacy on statelessness, including dedicated communications staff at headquarters, Regional Bureau, and in priority countries. Prioritize public advocacy and building public awareness in operational contexts where it can influence changes in policy and practice.	DER with DIP / Statelessness Section and RB External Relations units

	Recommended actions	Responsible
4	For the remainder of the campaign, UNHCR should invest in shifting from fragmented bilateral partnerships towards building a lasting multi-stakeholder coalition to end statelessness, with shared ownership and responsibilities, that is replicable at regional and national levels, to carry the statelessness agenda forward after 2024.	DIP with the support of DER
5	Assess the feasibility of targeted resource mobilization efforts for statelessness, while simultaneously elevating prioritization of statelessness in internal resource allocation processes, to ensure sufficient resources for statelessness work. Jointly develop options for financing the statelessness work of UNHCR and its partners in the coalition that follows the campaign.	DER and DSPR
6	Integrate statelessness context considerations into the new multi-year operations planning process and situation analysis tools.	DSPR with support from Statelessness Section, Regional Bureau Strategic Planning Pillars, and multi-year planning Operations
7	Integrate consideration of statelessness in broader development and human rights initiatives and mechanisms to address the broader fundamental discriminatory and exclusionary drivers of statelessness and to strengthen national systems for better collecting data on stateless people.	DIP with DRS and GDS supported by Regional Bureau Development and DIMA Officers

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Abbreviations

AGD	Age Gender Diversity
AHC-O	Assistant High Commissioner for Operations
AHC-P	Assistant High Commissioner for Protection
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
AU	African Union
CEMAC	Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
CO	UNHCR Country Office
COP	Country Operational Plan
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DER	Division of External Relations
DIP	Division of International Protection
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ENS	European Network on Statelessness
ERG	Evaluation Reference Group
ET	Evaluation Team
ExCOM	UNHCR's Executive Committee
GAP	Global Action Plan to End Statelessness: 2014-2024
GCM	Global Compact on Migration
GCR	Global Compact on Refugees
GCENR	Global Campaign for Equal Nationality Rights
GRF	Global Refugee Forum
GSIP	Global Strategy and Implementation Plan for the Campaign to End Statelessness
GSP	Global Strategic Priorities
KII	Key Informant Interview
HLS	High-Level Segment on Statelessness
IAWG	Inter-Agency Working Group
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPU	Inter-Parliamentary Union
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IROSS	International Recommendations on Statelessness Statistics
LAS	League of Arab States
MCO	Multi-Country Office
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MSRP	Management System Renewal Project

NAP	National Action Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OAS	Organization of American States
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
OL	Operating Level
OP	Operations Plan
PoC	Persons of Concern
PPG	Population Planning Group
RB	UNHCR Regional Bureau
RBM	Results-Based Management
REG	Regional Engagement Group
SEA	Socio Economic Assessment
SET	Senior Executive Team
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UPR	Universal Periodic Review
UNSDCF	United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework

1. Introduction and background

1. UNHCR has had a mandate concerning stateless refugees dating back to its original Statute and the 1951 Convention related to the Status of Refugees. This mandate has evolved significantly since 1951, in international law and through United Nations General Assembly decisions[3] to encompass responsibilities not only for stateless refugees but also for the identification and protection of non-refugee stateless persons and the prevention and reduction of statelessness itself. In 2014 UNHCR redoubled its efforts under this mandate and established the Global Action Plan to End Statelessness: 2014 - 2024 (GAP) as a guiding framework for its Campaign to End Statelessness by 2024.

2. This evaluation was commissioned by the UNHCR Evaluation Service (ES) to generate evidence and insights regarding UNHCR's work to support States to end statelessness. It coincides with the mid-point of the Campaign to End Statelessness, launched in 2014, and the related Global Action Plan to End Statelessness: 2014 - 2024 (GAP). The evaluation was timed to inform potential adjustments for the remaining years of GAP implementation. It coincides with a concurrent evaluation commissioned by the US State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration on statelessness efforts and is the first UNHCR commissioned statelessness evaluation since 2001.

3. A stateless person is defined as 'a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law' by the 1954 *Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons* (Article 1). Statelessness continues to affect millions of people globally. The actual number of stateless persons is unknown, and experts disagree about means of estimating the population. Based mainly on government sources, UNHCR reported 4.2 million stateless persons in 76 States as persons of concern in 2019.[4] Between 2010 and 2019 UNHCR reported that 754,500 stateless persons have acquired nationality.[5] Statelessness data is scarce in most States and the scale of statelessness is likely much larger than currently estimated. Less than half of all countries in the world submit any data including populous countries with a large suspected stateless population.[6]

4. The consequences of statelessness are multiple. Without any nationality, stateless persons often lack access to basic rights that citizens enjoy. Statelessness affects socio-economic rights such as education, employment, social welfare, housing, healthcare as well as civil and political rights, including freedom of movement, property rights, inheritance rights, freedom from arbitrary detention and political participation. Stateless persons are alienated and marginalized, and in the worst cases, statelessness can perpetuate multi-generational poverty and lead to conflict and displacement.[7]

2. Purpose and scope of the evaluation

5. The evaluation is intended to serve learning and accountability purposes and help UNHCR strengthen its efforts at global, regional and country levels to resolve existing situations of statelessness, prevent new cases, and better identify and protect stateless persons.

6. Six objectives for the evaluation are outlined in the Terms of Reference (ToR – see annex 1), including four key lines of inquiry related to:

    a. mainstreaming and institutionalizing work on statelessness within UNHCR,
    b. outcomes and progress stemming from initiatives implemented to contribute to the GAP,
    c. relevance and effectiveness of efforts to end statelessness and the factors that supported or inhibited this, and
    d. the effects of actions to end statelessness on the protection, human rights and gender equity of stateless and formerly stateless persons.

7. The last two objectives relate to outcomes expected from the triangulated analysis and country case study work of the evaluation for i) generating good practices and/or lessons learned and analysis that can help enhance ongoing efforts of UNHCR and its partners, and ii) generating recommendations for actions

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[3] See in particular UNGA resolutions A/RES49/169 of 23 December 1994, A/RES/50/152 of 21 December 1995 and A/RES/61/137 of 19 December 2006.
[4] UNHCR Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2019, page 68. This number of stateless persons include the number of persons of 'undetermined nationality' who may be confirmed as such if a stateless determination would take place.
[5] See UNHCR (2020) Refugee Global Trend. https://www.unhcr.org/en-ie/statistics/unhcrstats/5ee200e37/unhcr-global-trends-2019.html
[6] Ibid.
[7] UNHCR's *What is Statelessness*. https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/wp-content/uploads/UNHCR-Statelessness-2pager-ENG.pdf

that UNHCR and its partners should take to continue progress on ending statelessness at global, regional and country levels.

8. The evaluation questions presented in the ToR were adjusted during the inception phase, reviewed with the Evaluation Reference Group (comprised of UNHCR stakeholders and external experts on statelessness) and approved by the ES. Changes to the questions were related to improving clarity and reducing duplication across questions. The revised evaluation questions are shown in Table 1. A full evaluation matrix linking key evaluation questions to sub-questions, criteria, indicators, data sources, collection methods, analysis approach and evaluability is presented in Annex 2.

Table 1 – Key evaluation questions

	Revised Evaluation Questions
1	What contributions have UNHCR and partners made at global, regional and country levels to ending statelessness? To what extent have these contributions led to sustainable and intended results? How does COVID-19 and other possible crises affect the sustainability of such contributions?
2	To what extent have UNHCR initiatives on statelessness led to demonstrable change in the lives of stateless people, formerly stateless people and those at risk of statelessness?
3	To what extent have UNHCR and partners successfully implemented actions and activities outlined in the GAP? What course corrections or alternative activities / interventions are needed from UNHCR to better support States in implementing the 10 Actions outlined in the GAP and to achieve the goals of the GAP?
4	What promising practices, innovations and other key learning can be distilled from the initiatives of UNHCR and partners in the case study contexts or other evidence sources?
5	To what extent has UNHCR effectively integrated / mainstreamed actions to end statelessness in its operational programming, partnering strategies, advocacy efforts, coordination efforts and institutional culture since 2001 to the midway point of the #IBelong Campaign to End Statelessness? How might ongoing institutional reforms and change processes affect the focus and prioritization of UNHCR and partners' actions to prevent and eliminate statelessness?
6	What recommendations can be made to further improve UNHCR and partners' strategy for assisting countries in preventing and reducing statelessness in the future?

9. The evaluation covered the period of 2001 to 2019, to cover the period since the last UNHCR global evaluation of statelessness, with particular focus on actions and advocacy efforts of UNHCR and partners to support the GAP since 2014. The evaluation considered UNHCR-led work and initiatives at global, regional and country levels including their interconnections.

10. The primary intended users of this evaluation are UNHCR senior management including the High Commissioner and other members of the Senior Executive Team; in particular the Assistant High Commissioners for Protection and Operations; Directors for the Divisions of International Protection (DIP) and External Relations; the Statelessness Section within DIP; Regional Bureau Directors and Country Representatives. The evaluation is also intended to be of use to external partners, including UN Member States, civil society partners and all others with an interest in ending statelessness, notably including affected persons themselves. The evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations are intended to be used by UNHCR leadership, management, and staff to inform the development of priorities, strategies and tactics to improve statelessness initiatives during the remainder of the campaign, and to develop UNHCR's strategic approach for this area of its mandate once the campaign concludes in 2024.

3. Evaluation methodology

11. The evaluation design was based on an iterative process split into five distinct phases. Each phase included a combination of evaluation activities and key inputs and results in a specific set of deliverables. An Evaluation Reference Group (ERG) was established by the UNHCR ES to review key deliverables and provide insights based on their roles and expertise at key points in the evaluation. Annex 14 lists the members of the ERG.

12. **Phase 1 – Inception** – During this phase the evaluation team conducted an initial literature review, assessed stakeholder interests, identified adjustments to the scope and evaluation questions, designed the evaluation methodology and tools for data collection and proposed adjustments to the evaluation work plan. Draft field work protocols were reviewed by an independent Global Ethics Committee to assess risks to persons of concern for remote data collection in the context of COVID-19. Based on the

assessment the evaluation team and evaluation manager, in consultation with the ERG, decided interviews with stateless persons could pose them harm and should not be conducted.

13. **Phase 2 – Remote global data collection** – During this phase the evaluation team conducted an in-depth review of global and regional documents, past evaluations and internal assessments, literature and other data sets. A list of documentary sources is included in a bibliography in Annex 7. Remote interviews were conducted with key UNHCR staff at headquarters and in regional offices, and a global survey of UNHCR country offices was undertaken. At the end of this phase, the evaluation team issued an interim desk review report presenting the consolidated and synthesized evidence collected.

14. **Phase 3 – Case study data collection** – The evaluation collected data for four country case studies (Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, the Philippines, and Tajikistan), and three regional case studies (Americas, Europe, and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)).[8] The evaluation team also facilitated iterative dialogues with two multi-stakeholder Regional Engagement Groups in Africa and Asia (see Annex 15).

15. **Phase 4 – Analysis and sensemaking** – Following the close of data collection, the evaluation team completed cleaning and coding of all data and held team analysis workshops to conduct cross case analyses and triangulate findings based on all stages of data collection. Initial case analysis work was discussed and presented in a series of sensemaking analysis meetings with the Evaluation Service and Statelessness Section followed by validation workshops with key stakeholders from each case study.

16. **Phase 5 – Reporting** – During this phase, the evaluation team drafted findings and developed case study reports (see Annex 4). This global synthesis report was produced with overall findings and recommendations for the evaluation. All final reports were reviewed by the ES, internal UNHCR stakeholders, and the ERG and their comments addressed by the evaluation team to the extent possible.

3.1 Methodological Approach

17. To effectively address the questions identified in the Evaluation Matrix according to available documentation and evidence, this evaluation followed a modified process tracing framework[9]. The approach to process tracing enabled the evaluation team to investigate the role of UNHCR's activities, partnerships, and institutional structure, investments in, and culture around statelessness in contributing to or hindering progress on UNHCR's statelessness goals. It also helped identify areas of good practice and innovation, while providing concrete recommendations for achieving the aims of the GAP in its remaining years according to country contexts, regional dynamics, and types of statelessness.

18. Table 2 provides an overview of evaluation data collection and validation efforts.

Table 2 – Overview of data collection and validation

Collection Method	Coverage and participation	Notes
Desk study	Over 150 global documents and literature sources reviewed, analysis of financial, RBM and human resources data	An evaluation library was compiled by the Evaluation Service covering historical and contemporary background documents on UNHCR and other actors work on statelessness, the campaign and GAP, internal UNHCR systems, past evaluations and assessments, partnerships, UN cooperation, financial data, and performance management data. Documents and data records were collected and reviewed on a rolling basis to fill gaps and on stakeholder recommendations.
Global survey to all operations, missions, national offices	483 survey responses received from UNHCR field staff	Overall, 53 percent response rate[10] by targeted individual, 93 percent by targeted operation or office[11]

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[8] Case studies were initially identified by the ES based on criteria related to i) UNHCR financial investment between 2013 and 2019, ii) stateless population size reported by UNHCR or another credible source, iii) significance of progress (positive or limited) against the GAP vis a vis UNHCR financial investments, and iv) factors contributing to statelessness that are representative of the region or new and emerging issues. Following consultations with Regional Bureaux, country offices and the ERG the four country cases were confirmed and the three regional case studies added to the evaluation design.

[9] Methodology is adapted from Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines (Beach and Pedersen 2013) according to (1) guidance from the Center for Development Impact (see Number 10 Practice Paper Annex, April 2015, "Applying Process Tracing in Five Steps") and (2) the tested modifications applied through Oxfam's evaluation approach as described in the Oxfam Process Tracing Protocol.

[10] The survey targeted 918 UNHCR staff in country offices and operations, multi-country offices and representation offices. By stakeholder group the response rates were: 58% for Country Representatives, Heads of National Offices and similar posts, 53% for Protection and Statelessness officers, 48% for Heads of Sub Office / Heads of Operations, and 41% for External Relations Officers. By region the response rates were: 46% Africa, 48% the Americas, 65% Asia and the Pacific, 57% Europe, and 52% MENA.

[11] At least one person from each targeted operation or office in Asia and the Pacific and MENA responded to the survey. For other regions the operation/office response rate was Africa – 91%, Americas – 94%, Europe – 88%.

Collection Method	Coverage and participation	Notes
Global and regional key informant interviews	27 HQ staff 26 regional bureau staff 18 external partners and experts	Semi-structured interviews based on key evaluation questions, follow-up consultations with many key stakeholders
Interim report	Interim data collection report covering global and regional data analysis	Interim report presented to Evaluation Reference Group and group of internal stakeholders for discussion and feedback
Country and regional case studies	4 country case studies, 3 regional case studies. Total of 56 external partners and experts, and 43 country office staff	Critical moments reflection workshops with 4 country offices to identify activities, outcomes and influencing factors; followed by individual and group interviews and document review. Regional cases based on interviews and document review with regional staff and partners, selected country office staff
Regional engagement groups (REG)	REGs for Africa, Asia and MENA comprised of diverse set of external stakeholders and UNHCR regional staff. 31 total participants	Two sessions held for each REG in Africa and Asia to consider key regional drivers of statelessness, activities, successes and lessons learned. MENA REGs included group discussions with civil society organizations and sub-regional groups of government actors
Sensemaking and regional validation workshops	Consolidated case study data and global preliminary findings. Regional consolidation of case data and impressions	Three sensemaking sessions held with the Evaluation Service and Statelessness Section to discuss global data and preliminary findings. 4 regional validation workshops held to present data and impressions to UNHCR regional and country staff

19. The evaluation team has coordinated its work with the team leading the concurrent PRM evaluation from Resonance. Based on a confidentiality agreement signed between Resonance and UNHCR, the two evaluation teams have shared some data and preliminary analysis and conducted a few joint interviews to minimize duplication for key informants.

20. A more detailed explanation of the methodology is included in Annex 3. The full list of stakeholders consulted by the evaluation team is contained in Annex 6 and the bibliography is in Annex 7. An explanation of the data sets used for the financial and RBM system analysis is contained in Annex 8. Financial and RBM data used in this analysis comes from the UNHCR Focus system. Budget and expenditure figures were used from the UNHCR Management System Renewal Project (MSRP) financial system to ensure the most updated source. Financial data covers 2012 to 2019 inclusive, as prior to 2012 detailed figures were not broken down by Pillar. RBM data covers the period 2015-2019, as prior to 2015 some key variables for the analysis were not available.

Key considerations and limitations

21. The evaluation followed the UNEG Code of Conduct for Evaluation[12], the UNEG Norms and Standards for Evaluation[13] including standard 3.2 on ethics, and the UNEG Ethical Guidelines for Evaluations.[14] The ethical principles in the UNEG guidelines set forth obligations for evaluators including independence, impartiality, credibility, conflict of interest, honesty and integrity, and accountability. The principles also include obligations to participants related to respect for dignity and diversity, the rights of individuals or groups in the evaluation, confidentiality and avoidance of harm. During the inception phase, the evaluation team assessed the ethical risks that could arise as a result of switching to remote forms of data collection as well as potential risks in the context of Covid-19. Following an assessment by the Global Ethics Committee, the overall methodology was endorsed but it was decided that the potential ethical risks outweighed the benefits of conducting consultations with persons of concern, where even remote interviews could place people at risk since most would need to travel to a central location for connectivity. As such, these consultations did not occur. To minimize this gap, the evaluation interviewed civil society groups that serve and advocate for these populations, including some stateless staff and members, given the value of their perspectives from working directly with persons of concern, and as a

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[12] United Nations Evaluation Group, "UNEG Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System", March 2008.
[13] United Nations Evaluation Group, "UNEG Norms and Standards for Evaluation", June 2016.
[14] United Nations Evaluation Group, "UNEG Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation", March 2008.

proxy measure. The confidentiality and all interviews, consultations, and survey responses was stressed with each participant and informed consent verbally obtained before collecting data from individuals.

22. An undetermined number of UNHCR operations incorporate statelessness work in their plans and budgets for work on refugees, returnees, and IDPs, even though statelessness has its own pillar in the planning and budget structure. Key informants explained that this happens sometimes to reduce administrative burdens associated with creating a separate budget and plan, as well as the belief that certain activities span multiple pillars. Thus, a potentially substantial amount of statelessness expenditures is not identifiable for analysis.[15]

23. COVID-19 imposed several limitations on the evaluation, mainly related to the inability of evaluation team members to conduct face-to-face conversations with key stakeholders due to travel restrictions. This may have somewhat limited the richness in understanding of specific country operation contexts that can only be obtained through in-person interactions and observation. A lack of in-person communication also made meeting certain stakeholders more challenging, particularly government representatives.

24. Staff turnover in some country operations and regional operations occasionally created challenges in building out storylines and understanding changes in the prioritization of certain activities. UNHCR helped to mitigate these situations by passing on the contact details of people who had previously been in specific posts, where possible. Key informants' capacity to recall events from the earlier periods covered by the evaluation was also limited in some instances. Recall bias and limitations were addressed to the extent possible by triangulating interview data with records and documents.

25. The remainder of this report presents the context for the global campaign followed by key findings and supporting evidence, conclusions and recommendations for UNHCR.

4. Context for the global campaign

26. This section frames the subject of the evaluation based on the context within which UNHCR's statelessness work, and the global campaign, operate. It presents the overarching legal framework, key drivers of statelessness, a historical global storyline of key milestones and events, the ambitions of the campaign and the GAP, and UNHCR's structure for statelessness work. Information about ongoing internal UNHCR reforms is provided in Annex 13.

4.1 Legal framework

27. States possess the sovereign competence to determine their citizenship criteria, consistent with the obligations of international law, including rules to acquire or lose nationality.[16] The States' discretion to grant nationality is limited by international treaties to which they are parties, as well as customary international law and general principles of law.[17] The 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons is the cornerstone of the international protection regime for stateless persons. This Convention defines a stateless person and establishes minimum standards of treatment with respect to their rights, such as the right to education, employment, and housing. The 1954 Convention also guarantees stateless people a right to an identity paper without exception, travel documents and administrative assistance, as well as facilitated access to naturalization.

28. The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness requires that States establish safeguards in legislation to prevent or reduce statelessness occurring at birth or later in life. The 1961 Convention sets out important safeguards to prevent statelessness due to loss or renunciation of nationality or state succession. It identifies very limited situations in which States can deprive a person of nationality, even if this would leave the person stateless. Regional treaties establish additional obligations to prevent statelessness by States parties.[18] Other international instruments also contain provisions relating to the right to a nationality, protection of stateless persons and the prevention of statelessness. These instruments include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the

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[15] See Section 5.3 for further information about the reasons and incentives cited for this.
[16] UNHCR's What is Statelessness. https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/wp-content/uploads/UNHCR-Statelessness-2pager-ENG.pdf
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.

Child, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.[19]

4.2 Key drivers of statelessness

29. The causes of statelessness include discrimination, conflicts between or gaps in nationality laws, state succession, and border or sovereignty disputes. A lack of birth registration and / or documentation can also leave people unable to prove their nationality, and thus be put at risk of statelessness[20], sometimes compounded over generations due to lack of awareness regarding its importance.

30. Discrimination linked with statelessness can be based on ethnic, gender, racial, or religious factors, and can be enshrined in law, or simply prevalent in government policies and practices, and social norms. UNHCR estimates that more than 75 percent of the world's known stateless belong to a minority group.[21] Unwanted groups can be denationalized or stripped of their nationality[22] and arbitrarily deprived of their citizenship.[23] Denationalization and restrictive citizenship often expose these groups to violence, human rights abuses[24] and hinder human dignity.[25] Children and women are often most at risk of statelessness due to inadequate or poor implementation of citizenship laws or discriminatory attitudes.[26]

31. Statelessness also arises in migration and forced displacement contexts. A stateless person can be a migrant, a refugee or an internally displaced person, as well as a victim of human trafficking.[27] The connection between statelessness and displacement may occur because of discrimination, loss of identity documentation and in some cases arbitrary deprivation of nationality.[28] The ability to obtain identity documents such as birth certificates[29] is a critical step to proving individual citizenship.[30]

32. Statelessness also affects nomadic and travelling groups due to the lack of habitual residence or fixed address required to acquire legal status for conferring citizenship.[31] Indigenous groups have often been affected by statelessness because some States claim territory where traditional or tribal societies have resided for centuries but are unable or unwilling to modify the boundary of their reserved domain for indigenous inhabitants.[32]

33. In times of States' formation/succession or adoption of new nationality law, some individuals may be unaware of or unable to acquire national identity document despite eligibility. Often, lack of identity documentation is due to administrative problems related to inefficient practices, excessive fees, or unreasonable application deadlines.[33]

4.3 Historical global storyline

34. Since 2001 UNHCR's statelessness role and activities have evolved significantly. Based on key informant interviews and the desk review, four phases were identified which reflect UNHCR's engagement and leadership of statelessness initiatives as outlined below.

Phase 1: 2001-2007: Creating political momentum

35. A 2001 evaluation of UNHCR's statelessness role and activities provides a comprehensive account of the situation at the time.[34] In 1995 the ExCom reaffirmed UNHCR's mandate for the prevention and reduction of statelessness but the evaluation found that the institution relied on a sole Senior Legal Officer in DIP to support this mandate. The evaluation noted increasing demand for services, challenges to respond at scale, and recommended the creation of a statelessness unit with three posts and its own budget.

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[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] UNHCR, *"Introduction to nationality and statelessness – UNHCR HQ Training" May 2019.*
[22] Ibid. Page 22.
[23] LE, Van Waas. L. (2008). Nationality matters: statelessness under international law. Page 95. See also [23] UNHCR Global Trends 2018.
[24] Kingston, L. N. (2017). Worthy of rights: Statelessness as a cause and symptom of marginalization. In Understanding Statelessness (pp. 17-34). Routledge. Page 17.
[25] Agamben, G. (1998). Homo sacer: Sovereign power and bare life. Stanford University Press.
[26] Ibid.
[27] See McGee, T. (2014). The Stateless Kurds of Syria: Ethnic Identity and National ID. Tilburg Law Review, 19(1-2), 171-181; and UNHCR, (2012) 'Resolving Statelessness' in The State of the World's Refugees: In Search of Solidarity: A Synthesis'.
[28] McGee, T. (2014). The Stateless Kurds of Syria: Ethnic Identity and National ID. Tilburg Law Review, 19(1-2), 171-181.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. (2016). On the Threshold of Statelessness: Palestinian narratives of loss and erasure. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 39(2), 301-321.
[31] Ibid. Pages 121 -122.
[32] Ibid. Page 126.
[33] Gibney, M. J. (2013). Should citizenship be conditional? The ethics of denationalization. The Journal of Politics, 75(3), 646-658. See Massey, H. (2010). UNHCR and de facto statelessness.
[34] *'Evaluation of UNHCR's Role and Activities in Relation to Statelessness,'* UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit (July 2001).

36. The 2001-2007 period served to create the required political momentum within and outside UNHCR. Coverage of statelessness was strengthened in UNHCR in 2004 with the addition of a small number of dedicated staff that led an internal and external communication effort to build internal awareness and understanding of UNHCR's mandate and develop strategic partnerships, in particular with OHCHR. High Commissioner António Guterres began his tenure in 2005 and was particularly supportive. In a 2006 address to UNHCR's ExCom, he called for boosting statelessness efforts through more operational support (in addition to legal advice) and increasing cooperation with UN agencies, NGOs and States.[35]

Phase 2: 2008-2014: Building operational capacity and international commitment

37. In 2008 a new head of the Statelessness Unit was hired, and the period that followed was characterized by UNHCR efforts to build capacity and international commitment. In 2009, a UNHCR Inspector General's Report raised concerns about limited knowledge of the mandate for stateless persons in headquarters and the field.[36] Buoyed by donor interest and support, and the need to increase staffing to adequately address statelessness in operations, a sub-roster within the Protection Surge deployment scheme was established. Furthermore, dedicated Statelessness Officers in selected regions and major/emerging statelessness operations were deployed from 2011.[37] Several internal and external informants considered this a turning point for UNHCR's work on statelessness. The Unit issued a series of doctrinal and operational guidance documents and a self-study module to support staff in addressing statelessness. They also facilitated the development of the UN Secretary General's Guidance Note on Statelessness to coordinate UN agency action.

38. In 2011, UNHCR organized a Ministerial Intergovernmental Event on Refugees and Stateless Persons. Numerous pledges were made which led to, inter alia, 45 new accessions to the two Conventions by 2014. The UNHCR RBM system and Pillar 2 budget designated for statelessness were introduced in 2012, effectively requiring field operations to include statelessness in their plans and budgets. Expenditure increased from USD 12m to 35.3m during the 2008-2014 period. UNHCR started holding an annual retreat on statelessness for large and small civil society actors. Building on staunch international commitment, in 2014, UNHCR launched the bold #IBelong Campaign to End Statelessness in ten years and adopted the GAP which set out the actions and targets for States and other actors to achieve the goals of the campaign. Following the launch of the campaign the Statelessness Unit was elevated to become the Statelessness Section.

Phase 3: 2015-2017: Supporting efforts to implement the GAP and cultivating coalitions

39. From 2015-2017, UNHCR supported States' efforts in the framework of the GAP and built coalitions with member States, UN and other international organizations, civil society, and academia. Despite a Special Appeal for Statelessness in 2016, Pillar 2 expenditures remained stable at an annual median of USD 32.5m. The Statelessness Section produced additional guidance and communications, training courses, good practice papers and in-depth thematic reports aimed at a broader audience, part of a shift towards exploring the socio-political causes and implications of statelessness and building coalitions with groups working on children's rights, women's rights and minority rights issues.

40. Crucially, within the regions and with regional institutional partners, commitments were adopted in various forms illustrating the highly diverse statelessness contexts and efforts to increase understanding and commitment between States. At global level, UN Member States and UNHCR established the group of "Friends of the Campaign" in 2016 to coordinate diplomatic activity on statelessness. The same year, the UNHCR-UNICEF Coalition on Every Child's Right to a Nationality paved the way for joint statelessness strategies in operations. Three-year Global Strategic Implementation Plans (GSIP) for the GAP were introduced to guide Operations as well as instruments to track GAP progress, achievements and pledges.

41. In 2016, the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF)[38] was agreed by Member States in Annex 1 of the New York Declaration.[39] In 2017 and 2018, the CRRF was rolled out in a number of refugee situations and lessons from its application were compiled. Inclusion is a key factor underpinning

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[35] Opening Statement by Mr. António Guterres, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, at the Fifty-seventh Session of the Executive Committee (ExCom) of the High Commissioner's Programme, Geneva, 2 October 2006 – see: https://www.unhcr.org/asia/admin/hcspeeches/45210aac4/opening-statement-mr-antonio-guterres-united-nations-high-commissioner.html

[36] UNHCR, 2009 Global Report, Operational Management.

[37] 'UNHCR Protection Staffing Benchmarks and Related Recommendations', UNHCR DIP (March 2010).

[38] Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, 2016. https://www.unhcr.org/comprehensive-refugee-response-framework-crrf.html

[39] The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, 2016. https://www.unhcr.org/uk/new-york-declaration-for-refugees-and-migrants.html. The New York Declaration recognized statelessness as both a potential driver and consequence of forced displacement and encouraged Member States to take actions to reduce the incidence of statelessness in accordance with the 1954 and 1961 Conventions on statelessness.

the vision of the CRRF– whereby refugees have access to education and labor markets, can become self-reliant and ultimately make positive contributions to the communities and societies hosting them. Within this vision, the CRRF set out a series of elements for a people-centered refugee response in accordance with international law and best practice, to be adapted as needed to different contexts. While there are no direct references to statelessness within the CRRF, several elements of the framework are indirectly supportive of efforts to prevent and reduce statelessness. For example, the CRRF envisages birth registration for all refugee children and the provision of adequate assistance for obtaining other necessary documents related to civil status, such as marriage, divorce and death certificates.

42. A 2017 assessment of the #IBelong campaign[40] called for a refresh and more resources, which was addressed over the next couple of years with a dedicated temporary officer appointed in the Division of External Relations (DER) in 2018 and the development of a 2020-2024 campaign strategy.[41]

Phase 4: 2018-2019: Sustaining momentum in an evolving institutional context

43. A Special Adviser on Statelessness appointed in 2018 was tasked to sustain campaign momentum and leverage coalitions in the lead up to the GAP mid-point in 2019. Strategic, high level engagement within UNHCR, externally, and in the regions contributed to a High-Level Segment (HLS) on Statelessness as part of ExCom in 2019. It provided an opportunity for States to demonstrate achievements and deliver concrete pledges for additional action. Further showcasing statelessness as an integral part of UNHCR's mandate, the Nansen Refugee Award was granted to a lawyer working on statelessness. The HLS and the Nansen Award combined contributed to a significant increase in media coverage on the issue of statelessness during 2019.[42] UNHCR also utilized the Global Refugee Forum (GRF) as a platform for drawing attention to statelessness. The pledges made during the HLS were included as part of the GRF, bringing the combined total to 369 pledges in 2019. An Inter-agency Working Group on Statelessness led by UNHCR was established to develop and deploy a system-wide strategy for the UN.

44. These initiatives took place against a backdrop of an evolving institutional context. The Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) were endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2018 on the basis of lessons learned from the CRRF, ushering in a new approach to UNHCR work, centered on the notion of addressing refugee issues in an integrated development context, with a "whole of society" approach linked to the 2030 Agenda commitment to leave no one behind. The GCR includes references to the importance of identifying, resolving and preventing statelessness as both a driver and consequence of displacement. It sets out a programme of collective action for meeting the objectives of the Compact, including the development of national, regional and international action plans to end statelessness (of which UNHCR's Campaign to End Statelessness is key). The GCM covers 'all dimensions of international migration in a holistic and comprehensive manner' and is grounded in States' 'responsibility-sharing, non-discrimination, and human rights'.[43] It identifies the need for cooperative approaches among States to optimize the benefits of migration and addressing risks and challenges in countries of origin, transit, and destination.[44]

45. The institution has also committed to a decisive effort to regionalize operations. Responsibility for programming and budgeting devolved further to the operation level starting in 2019. Regional Bureaux, previously based in headquarters[45], have moved to the field, becoming more operational. The previous Regional Offices based in the field have become Multi-Country Offices, reporting to Regional Bureaux. This has had a significant impact on staffing and budgets. Global expenditures dedicated to statelessness increased slightly, by 15 percent, in the 2018-2019 time period.

46. Figure 1 presents a summary of the critical moments in UNHCR's work on statelessness from 2001 to 2019.

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[40] Jill Van Den Brule, 'Campaign Assessment, #IBelong Campaign to End Statelessness,' UNHCR (Oct 2017).
[41] '#IBelong Campaign Long term strategy 2020-2024,' UNHCR Public Outreach and Campaigns Section.
[42] UNHCR (2020) 2019 High Level Segment Findings (internal presentation).
[43] Global Compact for Migration, 2018. https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/migration-compact.
[44] Ibid.
[45] For the MENA Regional Bureau, most staff were already located in Amman, previously known as the Director's Office in Amman (DOiA).

Figure 1 – Historical storyline

STORYLINE: EXTERNAL EVENTS THAT SHAPED UNHCR AND PARTNER EFFORTS TO PREVENT AND ERADICATE STATELESSNESS

Crises associated with major situations of statelessness

Dominican Republic

Myanmar

Syria

Venezuela

Côte d'Ivoire

Global trends towards nationalism, ethno-nationalism and exclusion

2001   2014   2015   2016   2017   2018   2019

Universal Periodic Review Round 1

UPR Round 2

UPR Round 3

Milestones in humanitarian, development, & human rights landscape

2011
UNSG Guidance Note on Statelessness (updated 2018)

2015
Commitment to Leave No One Behind & SDG Target 16.9

2016
Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF)

2017
UN Reform process

2018
Global Compact on Refugees & Global Compact on Migration

Milestones in the Global Action Plan to Eradicate Statelessness

2014-2024
GAP adopted

2017
GAP milestone/ targets

2019
GAP midpoint

STORYLINE: INTERNAL EVENTS THAT SHAPED UNHCR AND PARTNER EFFORTS TO PREVENT AND ERADICATE STATELESSNESS

CRITICAL MOMENTS

2001 – Evaluation notes increasing demand for statelessness services, calls for dedicated HQ unit

2004 - Staffing strengthened; focus on internal awareness & understanding

2006 - HC Guterres call for more operational support

2006 - ExCom decision to report data on persons of undetermined nationality

2009 - Inspector General's Report notes limited staff knowledge of statelessness mandate

2010 – Pillar planning/ budgeting introduced

2010 - Regional Statelessness Officers positions & Surge subroster

2012 – Self-study e-learning module in GLC

2015- Member States establish "Friends of the Campaign"

2016- Global Strategic Implementation Plan (GSIP) introduced

2016- UNHCR-UNICEF Coalition on Every Child's Right to a Nationality

2016 – Guidance and training for programming

2018 - Revitalized #Ibelong Campaign

2018- Special Advisor on Statelessness appointed

2018 - Inter-Agency Working Group on Statelessness & system-wide strategy

2019 - Expert Group on Statelessness Statistics established

2001-2007 Creating political momentum	**2008-2014** Building operational capacity & international commitment	**2015-2017** Supporting efforts to implement the GAP and cultivating coalitions	**2018-2019** Sustaining momentum in an evolving institutional context
	Expenditures : Tripled $12m to $35.3m	Expenditures Stable Median annual $32.5m	Expenditures : 15% rise Median annual $38.7m

MILESTONES

2007 Refugee magazine dedicated issue on statelessness

2011 Ministerial Intergovernmental Event

2014 1st Global Forum on Statelessness

2014 #IBelong Campaign launch

End of 2014 Statelessness Section created

2015 I am Here- I Belong Report

2016 Special Appeal for Statelessness

2017 Thematic reports on :
- Minorities
- Childhood
- Gender Discrimination

2019
- High Level Segment & Nansen Refugee Award
- Global Refugee Forum

Regional instruments

Brazil Declaration & Plan of Action (31 LAC countries and territories)

Abidjan Declaration & Banjul Plan of Action (ECOWAS)

Brazzaville Declaration & Plan of Action (ICGLR}

Commission on the Promotion & Protection of the Rights of Women & Children Consultation (ASEAN)

League of Arab States (LAS) Declaration

N'Djamena Initiative (CEMAC)

Conventions

1954: 55 States
1961: 26 States

16

1954: 63 States
1961: 34 States

51

1954: 85 States
1961: 63 States

12

1954: 90 States
1961: 70 States

9

1954: 95 States
1961: 74 States

4.4 Ambitions of the campaign and GAP

47. From its launch in November 2014, the Campaign was branded with the #IBelong hashtag that has become synonymous with the Campaign since. The Campaign priorities are set out in the GAP, set up to last from 2014 - 2024, with the objectives of resolving existing major situations of statelessness; preventing new cases of statelessness; and better identifying and protecting stateless populations. Progress in preventing and addressing statelessness is contingent on the goodwill of States, as it is their responsibility and only States can take the necessary steps to prevent statelessness and provide nationality.

48. The main focus of the GAP is on non-refugee stateless populations, although GAP Action 6 directly relates to stateless persons in migratory situations and other actions also relate to refugee populations, and the GAP seeks to complement UNHCR's efforts to resolve protracted refugee situations.[46] The GAP includes ten actions for States to take to achieve these objectives, which serve as a guiding framework for planning, implementing and reporting on collective progress (see table 3).

Table 3 – Key actions and targets of the Global Action Plan to End Statelessness

Action	Target by 2024
Action 1: Resolve existing major situations of statelessness.	▪ All major non-refugee statelessness situations resolved.
Action 2: Ensure that no child is born stateless.	▪ No reported cases of childhood statelessness. ▪ All States have a provision in their nationality laws to grant nationality to stateless children born in their territory. ▪ All States have a provision in their nationality laws to grant nationality to children of unknown origin found in their territory (foundlings). ▪ All States have a safeguard in their nationality laws to grant nationality to children born to nationals abroad and who are unable to acquire another nationality.
Action 3: Remove gender discrimination from nationality laws.	▪ All States have nationality laws which treat women and men equally with regard to conferral of nationality to their children and with regard to the acquisition, change and retention of nationality.
Action 4: Prevent denial, loss or deprivation of nationality on discriminatory grounds.	▪ No States have nationality laws which permit denial, loss or deprivation of nationality on discriminatory grounds.
Action 5: Prevent statelessness in cases of State succession.	▪ No cases of statelessness due to future situations of State succession.
Action 6: Grant protection status to stateless migrants and facilitate their naturalization.	▪ 70 States identify stateless migrants through determination procedures which lead to a legal status that permits residence and guarantees the enjoyment of basic human rights and facilitate naturalization for stateless migrants.
Action 7: Ensure birth registration for the prevention of statelessness. (related to SDG 16.9)	▪ No reported cases of statelessness due to a lack of birth registration.
Action 8: Issue nationality documentation to those with entitlement to it.	▪ No States have populations which are entitled to nationality under law, but which cannot acquire documentary proof of nationality.
Action 9: Accede to the UN Statelessness Conventions.	▪ 140 States are party to the 1954 Convention. ▪ 130 States are party to the 1961 Convention.
Action 10: Improve quantitative and qualitative data on stateless populations.	▪ Quantitative data on stateless populations is publicly available for 150 States. ▪ Qualitative analysis on stateless populations is publicly available for at least 120 States.

49. The GAP outlines a range of potential ways UNHCR can contribute to its targets in support of State action. These consist of activities including public advocacy (marketing, communications, events, public engagement); policy advocacy with government and inter-governmental actors; high-level diplomacy and ensuring statelessness is well positioned in international policy fora; training and awareness building with partners and government actors on the drivers and dimensions of statelessness; technical support for the reform of nationality laws and procedures and vital statistics and civil registration systems; capacity

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[46] UNHCR (2014) Global Action Plan to End Statelessness for 2014 – 2024.

development support to governments; provision of information, legal aid and documentation to stateless persons and those at risk of statelessness; and research and evidence generation to identify stateless populations and those at risk of statelessness and develop information on key thematic issues.

50. In order to structure and prioritize its own contributions to the 10 Actions of the GAP, UNHCR developed a Global Strategy and Implementation Plan for the Campaign to End Statelessness 2016-2018 (the GSIP). The GSIP emphasizes the importance of partnerships for achieving the goals of the Campaign and stresses UNHCR's key role in increasing States' bilateral, regional and multilateral activity on issues of statelessness. It also prioritizes particular Actions within the GAP for UNHCR to focus on, notably Action 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9 and 10. Extension of the GSIP to cover the period 2018-2020 preserved the same priorities but included more detailed planning tools to influence and guide operational planning and situated UNHCR's work more visibly within current global processes, including implementation of the Sustainable Development Agenda. A draft update to the GSIP for 2020-2022 adds Action 6 to the priority actions.

4.5 UNHCR structure for statelessness work

51. Responsibility for statelessness is spread across UNHCR. Within DIP at Headquarters, the Statelessness Section has responsibility for producing resources, guidance and tools, providing technical support and legal guidance to RBs (and through them to COs), producing global campaign updates and publications on specific challenges and solutions related to statelessness, and promoting learning on statelessness across the organization.

52. A temporary position of Special Advisor on Statelessness reported to the Assistant High Commissioner (Protection), with terms of reference focused on preparing for the HLS, and provided the High Commissioner with an assessment of the HLS and mid-term progress with recommendations on the way forward. Successive High Commissioners, Assistant High Commissioners and Deputy High Commissioners have pursued UNHCR's agenda on statelessness. Responsibilities for #IBelong Campaign communications materials and events are shared between DIP and DER, which currently has one temporary dedicated person working on the Campaign.

53. Dedicated Statelessness Officers are located in most of UNHCR's RBs; with re-establishment of such a post planned in the Americas[47]. In the Middle East and North Africa RB, statelessness is included within the responsibilities of one of the Regional Protection Officers. Few COs have positions dedicated to statelessness and the issue is generally covered within the wider remit of individuals and teams covering protection. Other parts of UNHCR have responsibilities for statelessness within the broader remit of their work, including: the Global Data Service (for improving statistical definitions and data on the number of stateless people and persons with undetermined nationality); Data and Information Management and Analysis teams (for identity management including national legal frameworks and policies on civil registration and legal identity documentation); the Division of Resilience and Solutions (for including stateless people within its work on livelihoods and economic inclusion, education and partnerships with development actors); the Division of Strategic Planning and Results (for ensuring that statelessness features in planning, resource allocation and result-based management processes); and the Evaluation Service (for generating evaluative evidence on UNHCR's statelessness work) to name a few.

5. Key findings

54. The key findings of the evaluation are grouped under three themes. Section 5.1 presents the overall UNHCR contribution to results, answering main evaluation questions 1, 2 and 3. Section 5.2 discusses key enabling and hindering factors that shape UNHCR's approaches or efforts, addressing evaluation sub-questions 3.3 and 4.3 regarding contextual influences. Section 5.3 provides findings on institutional effectiveness, addressing evaluation question 5. Promising practices, innovation and learning (evaluation question 4) are embedded throughout the three sections of key findings. An assessment of the evidence in support of each finding is presented in Annex 5.

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[47] Though this position is intended to provide support to the whole region, it is now planned to be physically located in the Dominican Republic.

## 5.1 Overall UNHCR contribution to results

55. This section highlights key findings and supporting evidence regarding UNHCR inputs and the results of its efforts to address statelessness.

UNHCR financial inputs for statelessness activities

Finding 1: UNHCR has made substantial investments in its work on statelessness, with a high rate of expenditure against approved budgets. However, the ambitious goals of the campaign have not been met with a significant increase in Pillar 2 budgets and the overall share of UNHCR's budget devoted to Pillar 2 has decreased considerably since 2012 due to increased expenditures on refugee assistance. Budget allocation decisions have deprioritized some regions and objectives linked to GAP actions more than others, including work on civil registration and civil status documentation, individual documentation, and identification of statelessness cases.

56. From 2012 to 2019 UNHCR offices requested a total of USD 553.54 million for Pillar 2 in their Operations Plans (OP). Approved Operation Level (OL) budgets over this period totaled USD 300.61 million. Expenditures totaling USD 281.84 million were recorded over the same period for a 94 percent expenditure rate against approved budgets.

57. Total Pillar 2 expenditures have remained relatively flat since the launch of the campaign, while the proportion of UNHCR's overall expenditures allocated to Pillar 2 has decreased over time, from 1.6 percent in 2012 to 0.9 percent in 2019 as shown in figure 2. The rate of growth in statelessness expenditures from 2012 was much lower than for refugees and IDPs. When compared to the growth rates in populations of concern we see the number of refugees increased 95 percent, roughly equivalent to the expenditure increase. But known stateless populations grew by 25 percent, outpacing expenditure growth. Even more dramatically, the number of IDPs grew by 146 percent whereas the Pillar 4 expenditures only grew by 87 percent.

Figure 2 – UNHCR expenditures by Pillar

58. Possible changes in country operation budgeting and planning practice may partly explain the limited budgets for Pillar 2. Following the introduction of the pillar budgeting system in 2010 there was initially a directive to create separate Pillar 2 budgets and 'ring-fence' related funding to protect it. This practice only seems to have lasted two to three years and the evaluation team could not determine whether the directive was officially rescinded. Many regional and country-level UNHCR key informants noted that statelessness activities have been covered under other pillar plans and budgets. There appear to be both programmatic and administrative factors that incentivize this. Some key informants noted that many activities supporting work on statelessness are cross-cutting and have benefits across pillars, particularly in refugee contexts, such as work on birth registration and vital documentation. Others noted that statelessness activities are not comparatively costly and there is an administrative burden associated with creating a Pillar 2 plan and budget (increased planning narrative, indicator reporting, and financial management work), which can be a disincentive, especially for smaller operations or operations with more limited work on statelessness, and combining budgets can give operations more flexibility.

59. A few key country operations outliers heavily influenced overall statelessness expenditures. Just 10 out of 83 UNHCR offices with statelessness related budget entries in Focus make up 62 percent of all

statelessness expenditures from 2012-2019. Over this time period, the UNHCR Myanmar operation made up 18 percent of total Pillar 2 expenditures (with large budget and expenditure increases in 2018 and 2019) and a further 12 percent was concentrated in the multi-country office in the United States (60 percent of which was dedicated to operations in the Dominican Republic). However, in West Africa where the number of reported stateless persons has increased 38 percent from 2017 to 2019[48] Pillar 2 expenditures have only increased slightly. Figure 3 shows the recorded statelessness expenditures for the top ten UNHCR operations and offices from 2012-2019.

Figure 3 - Top 10 UNHCR offices by statelessness expenditures (USD) per year

Analysis of UNHCR financial data shows that budget lines between 2012 and 2019 related to 20 objectives in the UNHCR RBM system, which made up 94 percent of total expenditures for statelessness related work. Of these, the Statelessness Section identified linkages between 10 objectives and the GAP.

60. Overall, from 2012-2019, 71 percent of UNHCR's expenditures for objectives related to statelessness was aligned with GAP actions, focusing on 10 objectives. In individual years, these 10 objectives represented a range from 58 percent to 85 percent of total UNHCR statelessness related expenditures. Figure 4 shows the objectives that have been mapped to GAP actions (noted in parentheses) and the total expenditures under Pillar 2 for each.

Figure 4 - Expenditures for objectives linked to GAP actions (USD) 2012-2019

[48] Calculated based on sub-regional and country data found in *Global Strategic Priorities reports for 2017, 2018 and 2019.*

61. Twenty-three percent of expenditures corresponded to 10 objectives not mapped to the GAP as shown in Figure 5. Many of these objectives not directly linked to the GAP appear to be more programmatically or operationally focused, though the evaluation team views strengthening of protection advice and support, coordination and partnerships, and promotion of peaceful co-existence with local communities as potentially cross-cutting objectives that can support all GAP actions.

Figure 5 – Expenditures for objectives not linked to GAP actions (USD) 2012-2019

62. Statelessness budget lines included 183 separate outputs found in the UNHCR RBM system. To better understand the logical framework, the correlation between these outputs and the top 20 outcomes was mapped. The outputs associated with each of the top 20 objectives and related total expenditures from 2012-2019 are detailed in Annex 9.

**Statelessness budget allocations and prioritization**

63. Overall, Pillar 1-Refugees consistently received a higher percentage of funding against budget requests than other pillars with an average of 61 percent funded from 2012 to 2019. However, Pillar 2-Statelessness received 55 percent of its overall budget requests during this timeframe, versus Pillar 4-IDPs (50 percent) and Pillar 3-Returnees (32 percent).

64. Prioritization of Pillar 2 budget requests has varied across regions. From 2012 to 2019 Africa received 47 percent of the funding requested, the Americas 51 percent, Asia and the Pacific 57 percent, Europe 71 percent and MENA 64 percent. These overall figures mask sub-regional disparities. For example, in Africa, Southern Africa only received 41 percent of its statelessness budget requests from 2012-2019, compared with East Africa (51 percent) and West and Central Africa (52 percent). Compared to overall funding levels, Pillar 2 received a similar percentage of requested funding in most sub-regions with the exception of Southern Africa (9 percent less) and North America and the Caribbean (6 percent less).

65. Among the GAP related objectives, work on ensuring access to and quality of status determination procedures received the highest percentage of budget requests, with 78 percent of requests funded (highly concentrated in the Europe region with 71 percent of expenditures on this objective). Work to improve public attitudes towards persons of concern received 64 percent of funding requested and strengthening of law and policy received 63 percent. The least prioritized objectives were increased level of individual documentation (43 percent), strengthening of civil registration and civil status documentation (46 percent), and improving identification of statelessness (50 percent).

66. At the same time, some of the more operationally focused objectives not directly linked to the GAP received a much higher percentage of requested funding. These include strengthening and optimizing operations management, coordination and support (71 percent) and optimizing logistics and supply to serve operational needs (70 percent).

UNHCR human resources inputs for statelessness work

Finding 2: UNHCR has not adequately invested in recruiting and building up a cadre of personnel, particularly national staff to work on statelessness at the operational level. There are relatively few dedicated statelessness staff and the recent closure of the global protection surge capacity roster creates additional gaps.

67. Given the nature of work on statelessness – and the necessary emphasis on relationship-building, capacity development and advocacy – experienced and appropriately skilled personnel are UNHCR's best asset. The evaluation found, however, that there are few dedicated staff positions on statelessness within UNHCR, other than within the Statelessness Section in DIP (with three posts, often supported by a small number of additional temporary staff), Statelessness Officers in each of the Regional Bureaus and a few dedicated Statelessness Officers working at country level.[49] Analysis of available data from 2015 to 2020 shows the number of UNHCR staff dedicated to statelessness fluctuating between 13 and 20, as shown in Figure 6, with HQ staff representing between 15 and 25 percent of the total over that period.[50]

Figure 6 – Dedicated statelessness staff by region and HQ, 2015-2020**[51]**

68. A snapshot of dedicated statelessness staff within UNHCR in 2020 compared with staff covering other areas of protection shows relatively low levels of resourcing (see Table 4). This aligns with the perceptions of a number of interviewees – that statelessness is less likely to be covered by dedicated experts.

Table 4 - Dedicated UNHCR staffing for statelessness and other protection areas in 2020[52]

Protection Area	Total Number	Number in HQ	Number in RB	Number in CO/MCO
Refugee Status Determination Officer	**108**	3	5	100
Resettlement Officer	**87**	10	13	64
Community-based Protection Officer	**46**	1	2	43
Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Officer	**40**	5	0	35
Child Protection Officer	**28**	2	1	25
Statelessness Officer	**14**	3	7	4

69. Global and regional key informants noted frequently that the establishment of the Statelessness Section, and the creation of the regional Statelessness Officer positions, both had a positive influence on integrating and mainstreaming statelessness in UNHCR. Where dedicated Statelessness Officers are in place at country-level, stakeholders noted the benefits, including keeping statelessness high on the institutional agenda, even in the midst of competing demands; more capacity for networking and for more

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[49] In addition, UNHCR appointed a Special Advisor on Statelessness in 2018 as a temporary role to support the organization for the HLS.
[50] This data does not include staff classified as 'affiliated workforce' i.e.hired as either consultants or contractors, nor those recruited via other means, for example through the surge deployment roster (see below) or as Junior Professional Officers (JPOs) or UN Volunteers.
[51] Data was extracted from Workforce Planning Data records, correct as of 31 October 2020, shared by UNHCR's Evaluation Service.
[52] Data on staffing of all other (non-statelessness) protection areas was shared by the UNHCR Human Resources People Analytics Team on 18 February 2021. Data was extracted from Workforce Planning Data records, correct as of 31 October 2020, shared by UNHCR's Evaluation Service. The numbers include fixed-term staff only, not including 'affiliated workforce' personnel.

productive relationship-building with government and non-governmental partners in particular; and spotting opportunities for public and policy advocacy on ending statelessness.

70. The vast majority of Operations cover statelessness within the wider remit of a Protection Officer. However, there is no clear corporate data on the amount of staff time dedicated to working on statelessness at the country level. Data from the evaluation survey shown in Figures 7 and 8, shows substantial majorities of Protection Officers and External Relations staff reported spending less than 25 percent of their time on statelessness and around 80 percent of Country Representatives and Heads of Sub Offices spent less than 15 percent of their time on statelessness. Survey data did not differ significantly by region, except for the MENA region where the proportion of Country Representatives, Protection Officers and External Relations Staff who stated that they spent no time at all on statelessness was higher than in other regions. Survey data was broadly in line with comments from internal key informants. A number of staff said they found it difficult to dedicate time to statelessness given other priorities and a general scarcity of resources. There was also a lack of confidence about knowing who to engage with and how to communicate effectively on statelessness in the case of External Relations staff.

> "The lack of human resources has limited the possibility to expand our work on statelessness."
>
> "It's good to have dedicated statelessness staff. You have that here and it really helps to remind us to keep a focus on statelessness. We're reminded of annual events coming up and opportunities to follow-up on. Without that, statelessness often gets lost"
> - Key informant interviews
>
> "We have dedicated staff members who, among their duties related to refugee protection, also work on statelessness matters. However, the current capacity (human resources, skills, knowledge) has to be strengthened to ensure availability of a 'full-time statelessness' team."
> - Survey respondent

Figure 7 – Estimated time spent on statelessness by external relations and protection staff


Figure 8 – Estimated time spent on statelessness by Country Representatives and Heads of Sub-Offices

71. While it is not realistic in the current resource environment to envisage dedicated Statelessness Officers in all Country Operations, nor is it necessarily desirable in contexts where there are few stateless persons and a low risk of increasing statelessness, there are clear benefits to ring-fencing adequate

human resources for statelessness in priority contexts. Getting the right staff is also key. A number of interviewees highlighted the added value of national staff focused on the statelessness agenda (for protection and communications functions), given their often-enhanced understanding of the local context and legal environment compared with international staff, their language skills, and, therefore, their ability to liaise more effectively with national government and non-governmental stakeholders.

72. Analysis of job descriptions across UNHCR protection staff functions showed that they generally do include duties related to statelessness. This is unsurprising for roles dedicated to statelessness, but statelessness was also notably prominent in other job descriptions, including Heads of Protection Service within Regional Bureaux; and conspicuously minimal in others, in terms of duties and required work experience, for Senior Protection Officers working in the field, for example, as well as Assistant and Associate Protection Officers. Only job descriptions for the Statelessness Officer and Senior Statelessness Officer have a mandatory requirement for completing the UNHCR statelessness training. The evaluation considers this a missed opportunity in terms of increasing levels of awareness and capacity on statelessness across a broader spectrum of UNHCR's staff.

73. Despite reported insufficiency of staffing or lack of dedicated staffing reported in survey responses and interviews, analysis of expenditure data by budget category shows that staffing is by far the greatest category of UNHCR statelessness expenditures. Given the predominant focus on advocacy and capacity development activities for statelessness work, this does not seem surprising. However, the evaluation team remains unclear whether the budget category designations in the Focus / MSRP data are an accurate depiction of the investment in human resources as staff budgets may be automatically calculated as a percentage of operational expenditures in a pillar. That said, key informants also stressed that statelessness activities are not particularly reliant on large-scale budgets given the predominant focus on advocacy and capacity development activities are not as cost intensive as other areas of UNHCR's work. Conversely, some key informants stressed that one obstacle to improving data on statelessness was the lack of investment in systems and staff to help ensure better data quality. Figure 9 shows the percentage of total expenditures by budget category and region for statelessness work from 2012-2019.

Figure 9 – Expenditures by UNHCR budget category and region

74. The level and cost of investment in human resources within the Statelessness Section in DIP/HQ has fluctuated since 2010, as shown in Figure 10.[53] Between 2010 and 2020, the total number of staff within the Section has ranged between three and six people, though this includes a mix of different staff types, grades and assignment durations. From 2010 to 2015 the section had only two fixed term core staff. From 2016 to 2020 the section had three fixed term core staff, all at level P3 and above. Overall, the Statelessness Section has relied heavily on temporary positions and short-term assignments, making it difficult for the team to plan ahead and predictably engage with other parts of the organization and external partners. Scaling down of statelessness capacity within DIP was done as part of an overall HQ alignment with the regionalization process, on the basis that it would be balanced with increased capacity elsewhere, i.e. at regional and country levels. Decreasing (or at best static) levels of dedicated statelessness staff within regions (see Figure 6) indicate that this reconfiguration of statelessness

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[53] The Statelessness Section was established in 2008 but data on the number of staff and related costs is only available from 2010 onwards.

capacity has not yet been achieved; nor was there any indication from key informants or corporate documents that such increases were likely in the near future.

Figure 10 – HQ Statelessness Section staffing – total positions and costs

Surge capacity

75. Staff capacity on statelessness has occasionally been supplemented using the Protection Surge Capacity Project (Surge), a roster managed by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) on behalf of UNHCR.[54] Following the addition of statelessness as an area of competence within the roster, the first statelessness deployments took place in 2005 – to Cambodia/Vietnam and Bangladesh. Since then, there have generally been between one to four statelessness deployments from the Surge per year – except for 2014 when there were seven deployments – with deployments lasting between one to sixteen months (the average duration of deployment over the period 2005-2020 has been eight months). As shown in Figure 11, the highest number of deployments between 2005 and 2020 were to the Asia region (14 deployments in total), followed by Africa (13 deployments).

Figure 11 – Statelessness surge deployments, 2005-2020

76. Statelessness Surge deployments were tightly managed. A strict process was in place for Country Operations to request additional capacity from the roster, with the need to demonstrate that deployments would contribute to developing and realizing a clear strategy on ending statelessness, rather than filling

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[54] The Protection Surge Capacity Project was originally designed for general protection deployments and was considered a non-emergency mechanism, since staffing needs for emergencies were covered in parallel by the emergency function. It was intended as a way of supplementing existing staff capacity with short-term, non-emergency personnel to cover priority niche areas of expertise where funding was otherwise not available. See: https://www.rescue.org/page/surge#:~:text=The%20Protection%20Surge%20Capacity%20Project,to%20protect%20refugees%20during%20crises.

more general staffing gaps. At the end of each deployment, handover notes were provided and the performance of each statelessness Surge deployee was evaluated. Based on the evaluations shared with the evaluation team, it would appear that there was a high level of satisfaction among Country Operations and the quality of work done by those deployed was rated consistently positively. Notably, a number of those on the roster were deployed on multiple occasions to different locations and a few individuals who initially deployed on the Surge roster then went on to work within UNHCR on statelessness in longer-term functions.

77. The overall Surge project was closed at the end of 2020. The rationale for its closure was apparently driven by a combination of financial constraints and a perception that as a global project, it was out of step with UNHCR's overall shift towards decentralization. Throughout its duration, surge appears to have helped fill an important staffing gap within UNHCR, boosting the capacity of Country Operations at strategic moments to develop their thinking on statelessness and allowing UNHCR to offer tangible support to governments and other actors in their efforts to end statelessness. Given chronic challenges in meeting the need for statelessness expertise within the organization, it will be important for UNHCR to consider how to move forward now that the global roster is no longer in place.

Overall results and effectiveness

Finding 3: UNHCR has substantially elevated the importance of preventing and resolving statelessness, created guiding frameworks and platforms to address many of its causes, and directly prevented and resolved cases of statelessness – globally, in most regions, and in many countries.

78. According to UNHCR, 754,500 stateless persons have acquired nationality in the past decade, 341,000 of whom obtained nationality since the Campaign to End Statelessness was launched.[55] Most key informants believe that UNHCR and its partners have substantially contributed to this overall achievement through its global, regional and country-level advocacy, capacity building, technical support, and protection services.

79. At the global level, UNHCR has effectively leveraged its capacity to convene and mobilize States to increase commitment to ending statelessness. The 2011 Ministerial Intergovernmental Event led to a substantial number of government pledges, significant increase in the number of accessions to the two statelessness conventions and created interest and momentum to address statelessness. In September 2014 UNHCR and Tilburg University hosted the first Global Forum on Statelessness, bringing together 300 participants, including government representatives, staff of UN agencies, NGOs, academics, lawyers, stateless and formerly stateless persons to discuss statelessness issues and promising practices. UNHCR used this momentum to organize stakeholder consultations that led to the development of the #IBelong Campaign and the GAP. The 2019 HLS and its preparatory meetings and events served to further increase awareness and understanding about the campaign and led to pledges for State action.

80. At a regional level UNHCR has worked to further operationalize government commitments to ending statelessness by contributing to, and in some cases facilitating, dialogues among States and other interested parties, largely based on the efforts of regional statelessness officers. In addition to increasing knowledge and awareness such efforts have resulted in specific regional treaties, agreements and plans of action with obligations for Member States.[56] Key informants stressed the importance of regional initiatives as they can help elevate consideration of statelessness above sometimes contentious national political and cultural issues, create positive peer pressure, and share lessons and good practices.

Finding 4: UNHCR has directly and indirectly improved the lives of many stateless, formerly stateless, and people at risk of statelessness by giving voice to their rights and working to ensure obstacles to their recognition as equal members of society are addressed.

81. The vast majority of UNHCR's work on statelessness has remained at the national level, where the authority resides to address the underlying causes of statelessness. Published reports and quarterly updates on the #IBelong Campaign prepared by the Statelessness Section describe a number of achievements since 2014 (see storyline in Section 2).

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[55] UNHCR, *Global Trends – Forced Displacement, 2019.*
[56] An example of which is the Abidjan Declaration on the Eradication of Statelessness (2015), within which the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) committed to eradicating statelessness.

82. In instances where cases of statelessness have been prevented or resolved there are substantial benefits. UNHCR and partner key informants at country-level stressed the importance that gaining nationality and official identification documentation can have for persons of concern, including the ability to access health care, housing, education, social services, and formal employment opportunities. Obtaining a birth certificate, and therefore a clear statement of age, was cited as enabling access to education in the Philippines[57] and in Cote d'Ivoire, where external key informants also noted that birth certificates facilitated employment and freedom of movement. Documents and literature also stress the value of access to civil and political rights such as voting and freedom to travel, as also noted by formerly stateless persons in Kenya[58]. Perhaps more importantly, citizenship and official recognition can increase the sense of belonging and dignity and a reduced fear of persecution and discrimination, as noted by persons formerly at-risk of statelessness in Cote d'Ivoire.

83. Data collected in case studies through critical moments workshops with COs and interviews with staff, and verified through external interviews, documents and records provided evidence of the type of country-level achievements UNHCR has contributed to through its statelessness work, with examples shown in Table 5. The scale of officially reported stateless persons under UNHCR's mandate in countries engaged for the evaluation varies considerably, including Albania (3,687), Colombia (11), Cote d'Ivoire (955,399), Kenya (18,500), Mauritania (0), the Philippines (383[59]), Spain (4,246), Tajikistan (7,151), and Ukraine (35,642) as of 2019[60], though these figures do not necessarily reflect the total number of stateless persons present in the country, and do not consistently cover persons at-risk of statelessness, as discussed in Section 5.2. Additional information on UNHCR's contributions, including detailed timelines of critical events for country cases, is provided in the case study summaries in Annex 4.

84. Many of the achievements identified in case studies represent intermediate outcomes, reflecting the long-term nature of work to prevent and resolve statelessness. Advances in data, knowledge and awareness, capacity, procedures, national laws, national action plans, coordinating mechanisms, HLS pledges, and convention accessions are all intended to inform and formalize the means by which a State will prevent and resolve statelessness.

"It may seem like just getting a document, but it opens up access to all sorts of other services and rights."
- *Interview with formerly stateless person in Spain*

"[Getting registered] opens up a lot of opportunities – access to health services and education, and government protection. You can't enroll in elementary school without a birth certificate or get health insurance, therefore it makes a big difference."
- *Interview with former UNHCR implementing partner in the Philippines*

"In 2018, UNHCR came to Gagnoa, asking the local radio station to help raise awareness. It was on the radio missions that I realized I was stateless. [After submitting documents] The response was swift. In one month, I received a phone call from the Ministry of Justice, but I was scared. With great emotion, tears flowed when I was told that the Minister had signed my certificate of nationality. I have missed many opportunities in life."
- *Interview with formerly stateless person in Cote d'Ivoire*

"Our organization identified more than 700 stateless persons. 130 of them obtained IDs because of our help. Many of these people are elderly. They obtained the right to enjoy social aid from the government, a source of income, and the change I most enjoy is children who weren't able to attend school can enjoy an education."
- *Interview with UNHCR implementing partner NGO in Ukraine*

"It has been difficult for us to access services and we always feared discrimination. But when we get a birth certificate, we will feel more respected and be able to live life with dignity. I will feel valued as a citizen."
– *Sama Bajau woman in the Philippines (article on UNHCR website)*

"The day I got my Kenyan identity card I came home and celebrated. I'm now a proper Kenyan. I can go anywhere and get assistance without any fear."
- *Makonde woman in Kenya (Story on Relief Web)*

"With my identity card, I can go to school, live in harmony with other ethnicities and Ivorians who no longer reject us, but accept our citizenship. Psychologically, it's very important to have a nationality and an identity."
- *Woman in Cote d'Ivoire granted identity documentation after 2013 change in nationality legislation (from Thomson Reuters Foundation news story)*

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[57] UNHCR, *"Ensuring the rights of nomadic seafarers", September 2019* available at: https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/stories/2019/9/5d8881b84/ensuring-rights-nomadic-seafarers.html

[58] UNHCR, *"The Makonde: From Statelessness to Citizenship", published on Relief Web, March 2017,* available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/makonde-statelessness-citizenship

[59] Including 374 people at-risk of statelessness and 9 officially recognized by the Government of the Philippines as stateless persons.

[60] UNHCR, *"Global Trends – Forced Displacement in 2019"*

Table 5 – examples of UNHCR contributions and achievements from case studies

Mandate	Key achievements linked to UNHCR advocacy, technical support and assistance
Prevention	▪ Improvement of birth registration rates, procedures, law (MENA, Kenya, Albania) ▪ Facilitating access to identification and documentation for refugees (MENA) ▪ Legal reform to create safeguards against childhood statelessness (Albania)
Identification	▪ Mapping and improved data for stateless persons and persons at risk of statelessness (Albania, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Philippines, Tajikistan) ▪ Inclusion of statelessness in national census (Kenya, Tajikistan)
Protection	▪ Statelessness determination procedures (Cote d'Ivoire, Philippines, Ukraine) ▪ Provision of assistance (through partners) to populations at risk of statelessness with civil documentation and legal advice (Albania, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Philippines, Tajikistan, Ukraine, some MENA countries)
Resolution	▪ Registration and granting of citizenship for in-situ stateless persons (Kenya, Philippines, Tajikistan) ▪ Granting of citizenship to displaced / migrants and their children (Colombia) ▪ Legal assistance leading to reduction in statelessness (Iraq) ▪ Nationality for foundlings (Cote d'Ivoire, Philippines (pending), Spain) ▪ Nationality by declaration for in-situ stateless (Cote d'Ivoire)
Cross-cutting	▪ Increased public and PoC awareness (Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, Tajikistan) ▪ Increased political will among government leaders / parliamentarians (Albania, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Philippines, Ukraine) ▪ Building capacity of government and civil society to act against statelessness (Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Philippines, Tajikistan) ▪ Accession to the 1954 and 1961 Conventions (Cote d'Ivoire, Philippines (1954, pledges at HLS for 1961) ▪ Statelessness National Action Plans (Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya (draft), Philippines) ▪ Inter-ministerial/agency steering committees / national task force (Kenya, Rwanda, Philippines, Tajikistan) ▪ HLS commitments (Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Mauritania, Philippines, Tajikistan) ▪ Facilitating collaboration between government, civil society, media, academic and UN stakeholders (Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Philippines, Tajikistan) ▪ Strengthening civil registration and civil status documentation (Cote d'Ivoire)

Monitoring and assessment of progress

> **Finding 5: The Global Action Plan to end Statelessness is widely viewed as a useful framework to guide States, UNHCR and other partners. However, the ambitions of the campaign and targets set within the GAP have proven to be highly aspirational and are unlikely to be achieved by 2024.**

85. Most key informants expressed the belief that the overall objective of the campaign, to end statelessness in ten years, was highly aspirational and even unrealistic. Although predicated on the fact that statelessness is solvable with adequate political will and investments, the underlying causes include multiple persistent political and socio-cultural drivers in addition to simply technical and administrative hurdles. The aspirational nature of the campaign objective and specific GAP action targets is viewed as a deliberate effort to motivate action.

> "It was a calculated risk to put out as bold of an objective as possible, to help galvanize action, even if we potentially would not get to the full goal." – *Key informant interview*

86. The Statelessness Section monitors progress against many of the GAP actions and produces quarterly campaign updates and periodic briefings for stakeholders. Table 6 shows the summary achievements and assessment of progress for each GAP action. The achievements included in the table are based on UNHCR's gathering of information about States' progress on GAP actions, triangulated with other documentary evidence (including official records of accessions to the Conventions), interviews and other information collected in case studies.

Table 6 – GAP achievements and assessment of progress against targets (from launch of campaign to end of 2019)

Source for achievements: UNHCR Statelessness Section, "Summary achievements – Global Action Plan to End Statelessness 2014-2024", Update 2 January 2020

GAP Action	Achievements by 2020	Assessment of progress
Action 1: Resolve existing major situations of statelessness.	Kyrgyzstan has become the first country to resolve all known cases of statelessness on its territory. Partial achievements in: Côte d'Ivoire, Iraq, Kenya, Malaysia, the Russian Federation, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Vietnam.	Underachieving signficantly on both 2017 and 2020 milestones (10% achievement of 2017 milestone)
Action 2: Ensure that no child is born stateless.	No States have included a provision in nationality law to grant nationality to children of unknown origin found in their territory (foundlings).	Unclear how to measure since baselines and targets are in % but 2020 achievements are in integers.
	7 States have included provisions in their nationality law to grant nationality to children born in their territory who would otherwise be stateless (Armenia, Cuba, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Tajikistan).	Unclear how to measure since baselines and targets are in % but 2020 achievements are in integers.
	2 States have included provisions in their nationality law to grant nationality to children born to nationals abroad who would otherwise be stateless (Cuba,	Unclear how to measure since baselines and targets are in % but 2020 achievements are in integers.
Action 3: Remove gender discrimination from nationality laws.	2 States have reformed their nationality laws allowing women to confer nationality to their children on an equal basis with men. 2 States have withdrawn reservations to CEDAW Art. 9(2) (Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iraq).	Underachieving significantly on both 2017 and 2020 milestones (20% achievement of 2017 milestone for reformation of laws to pass on nationality to children).
	1 State has introduced reforms to their nationality laws to grant women and men an equal ability to confer nationality on spouses (Lesotho). 1 State has withdrawn reservations to CEDAW Art. 9(1).	Underachieving significantly on both 2017 and 2020 milestones (5% achievement of reformation of nationality laws to confer nationality to spouse)
Action 4: Prevent denial, loss or deprivation of nationality on discriminatory grounds.	No States have reformed their nationality laws to remove provisions which permit denial, loss or deprivation of nationality on discriminatory grounds.	No progress on baseline for this GAP action
Action 5: Prevent statelessness in cases of State succession.	Not tracked	Progress is not being tracked for this Action
Action 6: Grant protection status to stateless migrants and facilitate their naturalization.	11 States have established statelessness determination procedures . 2 States have improved their statelessness determination procedure. 9 States have introduced procedures for facilitated naturalization for stateless migrants.	Partial achievement of 2017 milestone (45% introduced procedures for naturalization; 55% established SDPs)
Action 7: Ensure birth registration for the prevention of statelessness.	Not tracked	Progress is not being tracked for this Action - however, it is tracked as an indicator in the RBM system so there would be a potential way to track it
Action 8: Issue nationality documentation to those with entitlement to it.	1 State has issued nationality documentation to all those with entitlement to it (Kyrgyzstan). Partial achievements in 11 States	Unclear how to measure since baselines and targets are in % but 2020 achievements are in integers.
Action 9: Accede to the UN Statelessness Conventions.	13 States have acceded to the 1954 Convention since the campaign launch for a total of 96 States.	Underachieving on both 2017 and 2020 milestones (80% of 2020 target achieved for 1954 Convention)
	21 States have acceded to the 1961 Convention since the campaign launch for a total of 76 States.	Underachieving on both 2017 and 2020 milestones (74% of 2020 target achieved for 1961 Convention)
Action 10: Improve quantitative and qualitative data on stateless populations.	Quantitative population data on stateless populations is publicly available for 3 more States.	Underachieving signficiantly on both 2017 and 2020 milestones for number of States where quantative data is available (12% achievement of 2017 target).
	Qualitative studies on stateless populations have been conducted for 25 States.	2017 target for qualitative data has been achieved.

87. The evaluation is able to confirm the reported achievements in Table 6 related to the four country case studies, and has some independent evidence of the overall achievements reported from reports published by expert organizations[61], media stories related to changes in laws and practice, and interviews with knowledgeable internal and external regional and global key informants, but has not systematically verified results in all countries for all GAP actions. It should be noted that these achievements, or lack thereof, are not solely attributable to UNHCR, but are often the result of activities in partnership with other actors and ultimately decisions by States. The table has been color-coded according to the evaluation team's assessment, with red representing no progress made; yellow representing partial achievement of the targets in the GAP, and green representing achievement of the targets. Cells that are not colored represent GAP actions for which there is insufficient data to assess progress against global targets. Annex 10 presents the same information alongside the baselines, 2017 and 2020 milestones and targets articulated in the GAP.

88. The breadth of the GAP provides adequate scope for adaptation to different country contexts. Key informants frequently noted the usefulness of the GAP as a guiding framework for conceptualizing, planning, monitoring and reporting efforts to end statelessness at national level, including the development of National Action Plans (NAP). In the Philippines the government used the GAP as the base framework to develop its NAP, and in Cote d'Ivoire a government official noted that the GAP gave them a framework to engage the ministerial cabinet in developing and approving the country's action plan. It was described as practical and actionable, providing a useful way of structuring activities, and has served as a tool for advocacy and overall engagement with stakeholders.

89. Political sensitivity is noted as a significant hinderance in making progress on statelessness (see Section 5.2). On particular GAP actions – for example, Action 4 to prevent denial, loss or deprivation of nationality on discriminatory grounds – UNHCR has had to strike a balance of encouraging and supporting governments to take action without jeopardizing the relationships with national authorities, which are key to making progress on other issues and maintaining access for protection of other PoC.

> "It's a delicate balance that we need to strike. We could do more, yes, but at what cost? These are some of the dilemmas that we face at the country level when we try to advocate more robustly on statelessness. Especially when you approach the same ministry that deals with refugee protection issues – it may compromise the whole approach" – *Key informant interview*

90. The level of emphasis and investment in different GAP actions by UNHCR needs to be determined based on needs in different contexts, as discussed further in section 5.2. The Statelessness Section maintains a regularly updated mapping of the challenges for each GAP action for 194 countries, based on updates compiled by RB in consultation with country offices and uses this information when updating its triennial GSIP, including a summary of planned activities for each country per year for relevant GAP actions.

91. The evaluation found that case study operations were focused on context relevant GAP actions but resource constraints led to some deferred work on different initiatives. Analysis of the relationship between the official statelessness statistics published in UNHCR's annual Global Trends Report with expenditures and RBM reporting showed that almost all of the top 20 situations of statelessness are covered by UNHCR, though with varying expenditure levels and selected indicators. Brunei Darussalam is an exception, with 20,863 reported persons of concern under UNHCR's statelessness mandate, but with no Pillar 2 budget or reporting on statelessness-related indicators. According to UNHCR's website[62], Brunei Darussalam is covered by the RB for Asia and the Pacific, and the country is included in the GSIP and GAP Map. In some other top 20 statelessness countries, budgets and reporting on statelessness indicators are aggregated at the level of a multi-country office or regional office. Based on 2019 official UNHCR statistics on stateless populations and Pillar 2 expenditure data the per-capita expenditure[63] in these 20 countries varied from USD 0.17 in the Syrian Arab Republic to USD 21.81 in Myanmar.

92. Outside of the top 20 reported situations of statelessness, there are instances where it is difficult to analyze whether UNHCR has been doing enough to achieve the different GAP actions due to aggregation of country level information under multi-country offices and regional offices. Roughly half of all countries appear not to report statelessness statistics. This analysis showed that Albania, Austria, Lithuania, the Republic of Moldova, and Slovakia all have over 1,000 officially reported stateless persons but their Pillar 2 budgets and reporting on statelessness-related indicators were combined under regional

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[61] Such as the Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, the European Network on Statelessness, and the Global Campaign for Equal Nationality Rights
[62] See: https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/brunei-darussalam.html
[63] Not taking into account countries where budgets cannot be isolated as they are aggregated at MCO or regional office level.

93. There are almost two dozen countries where States do not report any data on stateless populations but there are suspected substantial populations of stateless persons of concern[64]. Among these countries UNHCR has budgeted for and reported on statelessness indicators in some (China, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Dominican Republic (under the United States multi-country office), Lebanon, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe). However, Afghanistan, Bhutan, Eritrea, and Libya have no statelessness-related budgets or indicator reporting, and Liberia had no budget and no reporting since 2017. Afghanistan and Bhutan are also omitted from the last two iterations of the GSIP, though they are included in the internal GAP Map.

Finding 6: UNHCR's results-based management system suggests achievements being in the unacceptable range in relation to global standards for all but one of the key statelessness indicators in its Results Framework. However, due to awkward performance assessment criteria, target setting, and incomplete reporting the system has not meaningfully supported assessment of the results of its statelessness work.

94. UNHCR's Global Strategic Priorities (GSP), first developed for 2010-2011, are revised every two years. They reflect areas of critical concern to UNHCR within its overall efforts to strengthen protection, provide assistance and seek solutions for refugees and other persons of concern. The GSPs set key priorities and guide planning for UNHCR operations worldwide. Each GSP includes a set of priority indicators for measuring progress drawn from the Results Framework, which outlines the results chain including impact indicators (total of 185), and provides the foundation for UNHCR's RBM software 'Focus', established in 2010. Operations integrate the relevant GSP impact indicators into their operations plans and set their own targets for progress, tracking results in Focus biannually, with achievements assessed in relation to global standards.

95. Since 2012, the current Results Framework has incorporated statelessness objectives, outputs and indicators. 11 impact indicators have been identified as directly relevant to the GAP[65], most of which[66] have been used as relevant by operations since 2015.

96. Analysis of the RBM system data, however, shows that UNHCR has struggled to meet the statelessness targets for impact indicators selected in their COP and recorded in Focus, or to meet the global standards for acceptable indicator achievement thresholds defined in the Results Framework for statelessness related indicators. The heatmap in Table 7 shows the assessment of consolidated year-end results based on the global standards for Results Framework thresholds, with all but one indicator showing achievements in the unacceptable or critical range against global standards in each year since 2015.

97. None of the data that was used to measure the key indicators on statelessness was disaggregated by age, gender or diversity (AGD) characteristics. As such, it was not possible to track how different sub-groups within populations were impacted by activities generally, nor how outputs for particular case studies aligned with the findings around AGD in needs assessments or mapping studies.

98. The evaluation found serious limitations of the RBM system for measuring UNHCR's success in achieving planned statelessness results, which is not surprising as the indicators are very similar to GAP indicators that UNHCR has not been able to track. Many operations do not report on statelessness indicators, or choose only a few. A number of internal stakeholders questioned the rationale for targets and were unclear how assessment criteria had been selected or applied for their operation. The evaluation did not find any evidence to suggest that the degree to which targets for impact indicators are achieved has influenced resource allocation decisions in subsequent years. Parallel monitoring – UNHCR's RBM system and the separate monitoring of GAP actions by the Statelessness Section – complicate the task of analyzing overall results. Neither exercise, separately or combined, provides a holistic overview of statelessness achievements and challenges.

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[64] See analysis in: Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, *"Statelessness in numbers 2019 – an overview and analysis of global statistics", July 2019,* accessed at: https://files.institutesi.org/ISI_statistics_analysis_2019.pdf

[65] UNHCR, *Guidance relating to programming statelessness in the Operations Plans, Additional Guidance for Planning: 2016-2017.*

[66] Some indicators are cross-cutting and may relate to different population groups. Two of the indicators ('Extent persons of concern can obtain identity documentation' and 'Extent status determination procedure meets minimum procedural standards advocated by UNHCR') were not analyzed because there were too few results available (10 and 13 respectively across the five-year time period).

Table 7 – UNHCR reported statelessness indicator results and population planning groups

Source: UNHCR Focus system data and assessment based on country operations and other offices self-reporting

Statelessness-related impact indicators	Global Assessment Based on Average of Year-End Results (color) and # of Operations Reporting (N)				
	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Key: Acceptable / Unacceptable / Critical					
% children under 12 months old who have been issued birth certificates by the authorities	N=2	N=3	N=3	N=4	N=4
This indicator measures the proportion of children under 12 months old who have been issued with birth certificates by the authorities (this includes documents issued by UNHCR or other organizations when the host government has given them the authority to issue legal documents). It is calculated by dividing the number of children under 12 months old issued birth certificates by the total number of children under 12 months old at the end of the reporting period. Only operations from Africa and Asia and the Pacific reported, despite links to SDG indicator 16.9.1 for which UNICEF is custodian and reports for almost every country.					
% of persons of concern who have a birth certificate	N=12	N=12	N=11	N=8	N=10
This indicator measures the percentage of persons of concern who are in possession of a birth certificate. It is calculated by dividing the number of persons of concern who have a birth certificate by the total number of persons of concern. Some operations from all regions reported on this indicator.					
Extent law consistent with international standards on protection of stateless persons	N=17	N=12	N=21	N=20	N=18
This indicator measures the incorporation of key provisions of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons into national legal frameworks. It is calculated by responses to Yes/No criteria questions that are weighted and aggregated. **Results for all regions remained in an 'unacceptable' range** from 2015-2019. Results from Asia and the Pacific operations dropped into a 'critical' range in 2016 and 2017.					
Extent law consistent with international standards on prevention of statelessness	N=40	N=39	N=36	N=35	N=33
This indicator measures how successful UNHCR protection strategies are in ensuring that policies, practices and laws are compliant with international standards on statelessness, including the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and other relevant human rights standards (such as Art. 9 of CEDAW, Art. 7 of CRC and Art. 24 of ICCPR). It does not measure how successfully standards under regional legal frameworks have been incorporated into national legislation. It is calculated by responses to Yes/No criteria questions that are weighted and aggregated. **Results for all regions remained in an 'unacceptable' range** from 2015-2019. Results from operations in MENA dropped into a 'critical' range in 2017 and 2018.					
Extent stateless persons and their situation identified	N=24	N=20	N=24	N=16	N=19
This indicator measures the extent to which UNHCR is successfully identifying stateless populations within States or obtaining reliable data from States on the size and characteristics of stateless populations on their territory. **Results for all regions remained in an 'unacceptable' range** from 2015-2019.					
Extent naturalization available for stateless persons	N=8	N=10	N=9	N=9	N=11
This indicator measures the extent to which the acquisition of citizenship is facilitated for stateless people through the reduction or elimination of requirements, as well as the extent to which naturalization requirements are discriminatory. It is calculated by responses to Yes/No criteria questions that are weighted and aggregated. **Results for all regions remained in an 'unacceptable' range** from 2015-2019. Results from Africa and Asia and the Pacific remained in the 'critical' range for much of this time period.					
Extent State has taken steps to become party to the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons	N=21	N=17	N=15	N=15	N=14
This indicator measures the progress of efforts to encourage States to ratify and accede to the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. It is calculated by responses to Yes/No criteria questions that are weighted and aggregated. **Results for all regions remained in an 'unacceptable' range** from 2015-2019. Results for operations reporting from Asia and the Pacific remained in the 'critical' range for the whole time period, while operations reporting from Europe remained in the 'acceptable' range.					
Extent State has taken steps to become party to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness	N=24	N=23	N=23	N=17	N=19
This indicator measures the progress of efforts to encourage States to ratify and accede to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. It is calculated by responses to Yes/No criteria questions that are weighted and aggregated. **Results for all regions except Europe remained in an 'unacceptable' range** from 2015-2019, **Europe remained in the 'acceptable' range** for the whole time period.					
% of stateless persons for whom nationality granted or confirmed	N=15	N=14	N=16	N=12	N=11
This indicator measures the proportion of stateless people for whom nationality has been granted or confirmed on a State's territory. The proportion is calculated by dividing the number of stateless persons for whom nationality has been granted or confirmed by the total number of stateless persons on the State's territory. Operations from all regions reported on this indicator. **Apparently positive results in reporting countries are partly based on serious discrepancies in how PoC population recorded.**					

99. Reporting on the indicator "% of stateless persons for whom nationality granted or confirmed" illustrates the data quality and target setting challenges identified by the evaluation. Within the underlying data the reported total number of stateless persons (denominator) does not correspond to the number of stateless persons reported in the annual Global Trends Report. Table 8 shows a comparison between the statelessness population statistics in the Global Trends Report and those recorded for calculating results under this indicator. It is understandable that some operations use higher figures than the official estimates, given known problems with official statistics. Yet, in other places UNHCR has recorded a much lower number of stateless persons than is officially reported (colored red in Table 8). This could suggest data entry errors, lack of clarity on how to apply target setting guidance, issues with the inclusion (and definition) of persons undetermined nationality or at-risk of statelessness, or possibly efforts to set more achievable targets.

Table 8 – Discrepancies between official PoC statistics and those used for indicator reporting[67]

| Year	2017 stateless PoC		2018 stateless PoC		2019 stateless PoC	
Data source	Global Trends Report	Focus - Indicator nationality granted[68]	Global Trends Report	Focus - Indicator nationality granted	Global Trends Report	Focus - Indicator nationality granted
Cameroon	-	60,000	-	not reported	-	not reported
Cote d'Ivoire	692,000	50	692,000	345,000	955,399	5,000
Iraq	47,630	500	47,515	not reported	47,253	23,625
Kenya	18,500	10,000	18,500	10,000	18,500	not reported
Kyrgyzstan	855	6,526	548	6,854	58	not reported
Malaysia	10,068	6,197	9,631	5,206	108,332	6,538
Philippines	2,678	4,373	1,068	4,373	383	4,373
Sudan	-	175,000	-	175,000	-	175,000
Tajikistan	10,500	14,767	4,616	17,210	7,151	6,076

Relevance and appropriateness

Finding 7: Most UNHCR-led statelessness initiatives have been highly relevant and appropriate, taking into account key drivers of statelessness and contextual factors.

100. Section 4.2 described the key drivers of statelessness globally. While different key drivers of statelessness can overlap, and there is no data source to objectively measure the correlation between specific drivers and the related number of cases of statelessness, evidence from key informants, survey responses and document review suggest that UNHCR statelessness initiatives are relevant and appropriate (with more evidence collected for countries covered by case studies). The survey asked respondents to identify the main drivers of statelessness in their country. Weighted analysis of the results shows that the most frequently cited driver was lack of birth registration, followed in declining order by lack of nationality documentation, other administrative barriers and costs, children born to stateless parents, forced displacement, and migration. Figure 12 shows the most frequently cited drivers by region (N = 363 UNHCR staff).

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[67] According to the Global Trends Report, data reported with a dash (« - ») indicates that the value is zero, not available, or not applicable.

[68] Data extracted for 2017, 2018, and 2019 from Focus using the reported "denominators" in Indicator Aggregation Report

Figure 12 – Most frequently cited drivers of statelessness by region

Africa (N = 124) ■ Americas (N = 29) ■ Asia and the Pacific (N = 71) ■ Europe (N = 66) ■ MENA (N = 73)

101. Protection Officers were also asked in the survey about the extent to which UNHCR-led initiatives in their country closely respond to the drivers of statelessness and are suitable for the country's specific contextual dynamics. Overall, 53 percent of respondents reported that activities correspond to drivers and are suitable to the context. Respondents from Europe reported the greatest appropriateness of initiatives for drivers and context, while those from MENA reported the least as shown in Figure 13 (N = 279 UNHCR staff).

Figure 13 – Appropriateness of UNHCR-led initiatives vis-a-vis statelessness drivers and context

■ Low correspondence / suitability ■ Moderate correspondence / suitability ■ Good correspondence / suitability

102. Internal and external key informants interviewed for country and regional case studies confirmed that in general there is a good correlation between the context in which UNHCR is working, including the drivers of statelessness and capacity of national actors to respond, and initiatives led and/or supported by UNHCR and partners. The work of civil society organizations, given their close proximity to stateless communities and those at risk of statelessness, was perceived to have strengthened UNHCR's understanding of the problems and issues facing stateless populations inform the direction of UNHCR responses. A review of successive country and regional Operational Plans in case-study countries/regions also demonstrated a clear link between operational contexts, drivers of statelessness and planned initiatives. As explored in section 5.2, however, there is scope for country-level strategies to take influencing factors more systematically into account and include longer-term approaches to achieve statelessness objectives.

UNHCR activities and promising practices

Finding 8: There are good examples of activities at national level that have contributed to positive results in terms of reducing statelessness and the risk of statelessness. UNHCR has placed more emphasis on activities that address the legal and administrative causes of statelessness, and less on political, social, economic, and cultural drivers. While this matches its institutional capabilities, statelessness will not be eliminated without attention to these other fundamental underlying causes. Public advocacy also emerged a gap, particularly at a global level.

103. The evaluation team found many good examples of policy advocacy, development and reform of laws and administrative systems, and direct case work to improve the protection and human rights situation of stateless persons of concern. Examples from case studies are presented in Box 1.

104. Survey respondents were asked to identify the main activities their operations engage in to prevent or eliminate statelessness based on the list of activities for UNHCR contained in the GAP. Analysis of the responses[69] shows that advocacy work with national governments, NGOs and CSOs was the most frequent activity, followed by provision of training to increase the capacity of relevant government agencies. Responses varied considerably by region. The frequency of main activities reported by region is shown in Figure 14 (N = 437 UNHCR staff).

Figure 14 – Frequency of main activities reported by region[70]

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
[69] A weighted analysis of the results was performed to ensure that country operations with more survey respondents did not skew the analysis of the data.
[70] Identification of new statelessness cases and provision of identity or travel documentation and/or birth registration services are the responsibility of States. Some UNHCR operations provide technical assistance to States to support these activities.

Box 1: Examples of promising UNHCR country operation statelessness initiatives

- In the **Philippines**, UNHCR supported the identification of populations at risk of statelessness through a series of roundtable discussions and field visits in 2011. The country operation also facilitated the development of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Public Attorney's Office and UNHCR, and the formulation of the joint Refugee and Stateless Status Determination Procedure (2012).

- In **Tajikistan**, after sustained UNHCR advocacy and collaboration with a coalition of statelessness actors, a new Constitutional Law on Nationality was adopted in 2015 and an Amnesty Law in 2019. In collaboration with UNDP and UNICEF, UNHCR also supported the government in addressing a range of issues with civil and birth registration through a process of civil registration reform (2019).

- As part of its response to the **Syria** conflict and the regional refugee crisis, UNHCR worked closely with governments and partners to prevent statelessness among conflict displaced persons by facilitating birth registration and issuance of vital documentation to persons of concern in **Jordan**, **Lebanon**, and **Iraq**, including creation of mobile courts, waiving legal fees and penalties, providing legal services inside camps, and raising awareness amongst communities.

- In the **MENA region**, UNHCR co-sponsored the 'First Arab Conference on Good Practices and Regional Opportunities to Strengthen Women's Nationality Rights', which resulted in an outcome statement that served as the basis for the Arab Declaration on Belonging and Identity in 2018. The statement urged all Member States to enact reforms to uphold gender equal nationality rights and ensure every child has access to a legal identify and birth certificate. The UNHCR MENA regional office also took a leading role in developing and facilitating a number of global statelessness courses in San Remo in collaboration with the International Institute of Humanitarian Law. This included the development of a tailored Arabic course, which has since been offered to more than 90 participants from the region.

- In **Ukraine**, UNHCR directly participated in drafting the Statelessness Determination Procedure law, together with CSO partners. In so doing, they also invested in building technical capacity within the Government of Ukraine.

- In **Albania**, UNHCR worked with partners to support the Government to revise the law on birth registration to reduce the risk of statelessness, particularly among marginalized groups, including the Roma population.

- In the **Europe region**, UNHCR has played an important role in lobbying for attention to statelessness, through participating in regional meetings and events, facilitation of capacity-building and technical exchanges between States, the publication of good practice papers, and informal information sharing. UNHCR collaborated with the OSCE on the publication of a Handbook on Statelessness; and joint advocacy by UNHCR, the European Network on Statelessness (ENS) and others led to including statelessness in the EU Roma Strategic Framework and the EU Child Rights Strategy.

- In **Côte d'Ivoire**, a 2014-2016 programme to regularize the status of historical immigrants resulted in the issuance of 16,000 nationality certificates.

- In **Kenya**, UNHCR's work with partners to strengthen data on these particular communities, as well as its lobbying with Government stakeholders in partnership with other organizations, contributed to the recognition and registration of approximately 1,500 people from the Makonde community in 2016, and 1,670 stateless Shona persons and 1,300 people of Rwandan descent in 2020.

- In **Colombia**, UNHCR established a working relationship with the government Registrar's Office beginning in the mid-1990s, in the context of internal civil conflict and large-scale displacement, to collaborate on implementing a system of mobile registration in remote areas of the country, providing documentation to indigenous populations potentially at risk of statelessness. This long-standing partnership allowed UNHCR to successfully advocate, publicly and with the government, for granting Colombian nationality to over 27,000 children born to Venezuelan parents on Colombian soil between 2015 and 2021.

105. The evaluation observed an emphasis on activities to address the legal and administrative causes of statelessness; less on political, social and cultural drivers. In terms of responding to the impact of statelessness, a number of stakeholders highlighted gaps in terms of UNHCR's response to the marginalization of stateless communities, or those at risk of statelessness, such as exclusion from schools, legal employment and social welfare. UNHCR responses generally correspond with institutional

capacities and a particular emphasis is therefore to be expected in terms of the organization playing to its strengths. It does, however, leave gaps and questions about the role that other UN and non-UN organizations could usefully play to address statelessness (see Section 5.2 on partnerships and cooperation).

> "We need to start asking questions about how are stateless people eating, living, going to school. What can we do to start making an impact beyond changing laws? An operational shift is required, we need to think about livelihoods, for example, and access to basic services for stateless people. We need to become more programme-oriented in the way we work on statelessness." – *Key informant interview*

106. Similarly, the evaluation found that UNHCR's response to AGD-related issues had focused heavily on legal drivers of statelessness, notably discriminatory nationality laws and laws and policies that increase the risk of statelessness for children. While UNHCR's AGD policy states that implementation modalities should be "designed and delivered to respond to the different risks, needs, and capacities of diverse women, men, girls and boys", the evaluation found little concrete evidence of programmes being tailored to these needs. Some key informants provided examples of gender blind approaches, despite working in contexts with demonstrated differences in needs based on gender.

107. Case-studies and interviews highlighted some examples of successful public advocacy and awareness-raising. For example, efforts to inform the general population in Kenya through the #IBelong Campaign are perceived to have increased public support for addressing the rights of certain stateless populations and encouraged Kenyan Government action. However, UNHCR has not made substantial investments globally in its public advocacy and communications, and did not have a dedicated headquarters staff member in DER until the addition of one temporary

> "There is definitely a big gender imbalance. What could we do in terms of this? I think we can provide support to all those that fall under criterial of our assistance."
>
> "We don't target women in particular, we provide legal services to men and anybody who seeks support." – *Key informant interviews*

communications position in 2019, nor has it consistently communicated about statelessness in all regions. Internal and external stakeholders described UNHCR as risk-averse in its public advocacy on statelessness, though in some interviews and open-ended survey responses UNHCR staff suggested that this is due to lack of familiarity, perceived complexity of statelessness, and staff not having direct contact with stateless populations to better understand their situation. Given that discriminatory practices and beliefs are key driver of statelessness public advocacy is an important tool for UNHCR and partners to try to shift socio-cultural attitudes and create a more enabling environments. Yet, from 2012 to 2019 UNHCR only spent USD 5.9 million under Pillar 2 on improving public attitudes towards stateless persons, 83 percent of which was in just five offices (U.S. multi-country office, Cote d'Ivoire, Brussels regional representation office, Myanmar, and the Democratic Republic of Congo in descending order). However, this does not include expenditures of headquarters' units, such as work with media, social media, and Goodwill Ambassadors, as these budgets are not quantifiable or recorded by pillar.

108. One of UNHCR's roles in leading the Campaign is to monitor and follow up on the actions and pledges by States towards preventing and eliminating statelessness. External Relations Officers were asked in the survey to identify how operations communicate with States about their pledges and actions. They most frequently cited direct meetings with national government focal points and awareness campaigns, followed by active capacity building support as the most frequent follow-up methods. External Relations Officers were also asked in the survey how effective the GAP is in providing opportunities and frameworks for communicating about statelessness in their country. 63 percent of these respondents said the GAP was moderately to highly effective in providing communications opportunities while the remaining 37 percent were neutral.

5.2 Key enabling and hindering factors for UNHCR efforts

Finding 9: Political will, awareness of statelessness, and strong partnerships across government, civil society and other organizations are the most important influencing factors that can enable or hinder government progress against statelessness. These factors can be influenced by the availability of data on stateless populations, social and cultural beliefs and attitudes, government capacities, crises and key events, and diplomatic efforts of other states - both positively and negatively.

Overarching enabling factors

109. UNHCR Protection Officers were asked in the evaluation survey to identify helpful or enabling factors for governments and most frequently cited political will to reduce or eliminate statelessness, followed by strong partnerships across government, civil society and NGOs. Figure 15 shows the regional variance in responses (N = 333 UNHCR staff).

Figure 15 – Factors that help or enable governments to make progress against statelessness, number of UNHCR protection officers citing factors in global survey

Legend:
- Political will to reduce or eliminate statelessness
- Strong partnerships across government, civil society and NGOs
- A specific event that has created momentum for change
- The availability of technical capacity
- Regional attitudes that encourage the elimination of statelessness
- Favourable public opinion / public support
- Diplomatic advocacy or pressure from other member states
- Unsure / I am not familiar with the statelessness context of my country operation
- Not applicable to my country operation

110. Data from key informants and the document review reinforced the survey results. Finding key entry points among supportive government officials and parliamentarians and building their awareness and understanding, allowed some operations to build political will. Political incentives can also be generated through increasing public awareness, including the awareness of stateless or at-risk populations themselves. Partnerships across government and between external actors were credited with building momentum for positive change, influencing key decisions, and expanding government capacities. Diplomatic advocacy, positive peer pressure, and sharing of lessons through regional bodies and global events and process (such as the Universal Periodic Review, and the HLS) were cited as positive influences supporting government action to address statelessness. In some cases statelessness prevention and reduction has also been enabled by UNHCR engagement of donors and other Member States to coordinate efforts to advocate with a government, such as in Cote d'Ivoire where the global Friends of the Campaign group has been replicated at the national level.

111. Key informants in Africa and the Americas particularly emphasized the importance of regional inter-governmental initiatives that have led to declarations and workplans (i.e., the efforts of ECOWAS, ICGLR, and the Brazil Plan of Action). They stressed the belief that such regional bodies can more effectively address cross-border concerns and overcome national sensitivities on statelessness by linking to broader political agendas such as economic integration in ECOWAS and the peace process in Cote d'Ivoire. Supportive legal environments, with some pre-existing favorable legislation to expand on, facilitated further improvements. Factors that help or enable national governments to make progress against statelessness cited by key informants included political will, financial and human capacity in the government, awareness of statelessness issues, favorable legislation, willingness to strengthen data systems, and inter-governmental and other partnerships and collaboration.

Overarching hindering factors

112. Factors that hinder or limit the ability of governments to make progress against statelessness were consistently raised by internal and external key informants at global, regional and country levels, and supported by documents. The most frequently noted was the political sensitivity of nationality, citizenship and statelessness issues, often related to underlying discriminatory beliefs and social norms, which are often reinforced by identity driven politics and historic policies of exclusion. Low awareness and understanding of statelessness within governments and the public also hindered progress, which can be due to a lack of data on stateless and at-risk populations. Other factors cited as hindering government progress included turnover among government officials (leading to loss of understanding and political support), lack of government capacity and weak systems (including lack of financial resources and staff capacity and weak civil registration and vital statistics and birth registration systems), the capacity and standing of civil society and their ability to partner and advocate within a context, low donor interest, and

competing priorities and emergencies (with COVID-19 frequently cited). In a few contexts sub-national attitudes about citizenship and belonging within modern nation states, linked to the legacy of colonialism and shifting borders, affected attitudes of populations about the value of citizenship, including among stateless populations and those of undetermined nationality.

113. Protection Officers responding to the survey most frequently cited political sensitivity and lack of awareness as hindrances to government progress. Lack of technical capacity was the most frequently cited hindrance to progress by Protection Officers in Africa.

The value and challenges of statelessness data

Finding 10: The lack of reliable data on stateless populations remains a critical hindering factor to preventing and resolving statelessness. Many UNHCR operations have invested in statelessness mapping studies to fill gaps in official data sources. Augmenting official data collection can support building awareness and understanding of statelessness, but can be an expensive short-term solution for a systemic problem. While slower, UNHCR's work to develop better standards for statelessness data gathering and statistical methods for estimating stateless populations offer greater potential for sustainable solutions to data gaps.

114. One of the key prerequisites to having the intended impact on people's lives is to understand the scope of the problem and ensure reliable data on stateless populations, as included in GAP Action 10. Key informants repeatedly raised data gaps and challenges in improving the reliability and quality of data as one of the major challenges for UNHCR's work on statelessness. A lack of data can limit UNHCR's ability to communicate about statelessness, whereas alternatively good data can "open eyes and doors".

115. As of 2019, less than half of all countries provide any data regarding stateless persons in their territory and large gaps exist in data on suspected stateless populations.[71] The number of countries reporting on stateless populations increased between 2010 and 2014 when the Campaign was launched, from 65 to 77, but has since fluctuated, with 76 countries reporting in 2019.[72] An additional 22 countries had known stateless populations but no data as of 2019.[73]

116. Whether through UNHCR facilitated mapping studies or inclusion in official government censuses, stakeholders noted two persistent challenges with the completeness of related statelessness statistics. The first is that some persons of concern may not be aware that they are stateless or at risk of statelessness, and thus would not be counted. The second is the fear of persecution and reprisal among stateless populations if they report their status.

> "Any initiative to support the campaign against statelessness must be based on the presence of stateless persons in a given state or region. The prerequisite for such initiatives is the identification of stateless people, in its qualitative and quantitative dimensions."– *Survey respondent*

> "I think that [data] is an entrenched problem in terms of figures on stateless issues. We always give approximations on figures. Like with everything else, figures are an eye-opener. Statistics bring the seriousness of the problem home." – *Key informant interview*

117. Another challenge is the lack of a legal definition of "at-risk of statelessness" and varying interpretations within UNHCR. UNHCR does not globally track this ambiguous category, though many country operations focus substantial efforts to identify and assist such populations, and the risk of statelessness is often reduced through UNHCR status determination and documentation assistance efforts in mixed migration contexts. Identifying in situ stateless populations can also be complicated by the cost and time-consuming nature of instating stateless determination procedures by a government.

118. From 2012-2019, UNHCR invested just under USD 23 million for activities under the objective of improving identification of statelessness, with expenditures in 51 of its offices and operations. Forty-six percent of these expenditures were linked with five offices and operations including the U.S. Multi-Country Office, Cote d'Ivoire, Myanmar, Pakistan, and the Regional Office in Sarajevo. The quality and consistency of UNHCR exercises to gather data on stateless populations remains a challenge. According to headquarters key informants and documents the results of these efforts have often remained unpublished due to methodological issues or sensitivity about releasing results. A UNHCR paper on Statistical Reporting on Statelessness[74] was issued in 2019 providing an in-depth analysis of the challenges with data gathering, including UNHCR efforts to augment government sources. In 2019 an

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[71] UNHCR, *Global Trends – Forced Displacement, 2019.*
[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid.
[74] UNHCR, *"UNHCR Statistical Reporting on Statelessness"*, UNHCR Statistical Technical Series: 2019/1

internal guide[75] on data collection was produced to address common issues associated with predominantly qualitative data gathering exercises.

> "If I was an activist on statelessness, even if I don't have numbers, I can go to court and make a case even if it is for one person. You start a case, set a precedent and this helps." –
> *Key informant interview*

119. The four country case studies covered by the evaluation provide examples of UNHCR's efforts at country-level to address data gaps for statelessness as presented in Box 2. While good practices are somewhat context specific, successful and ongoing efforts to include statelessness in official government censuses in Kenya, Tajikistan (to take place in 2020 and be analyzed in 2021) and the Philippines stand out as good practices for UNHCR to replicate. The household Socio Economic Assessment (SEA) in Kenya is also a good practice as it provides more granular details on the specific needs and situation of stateless persons, which can help UNHCR discuss prioritizing their assistance vis-a-vis other UN partners and development actors.

120. At the HLS in October 2019, 34 States pledged to improve qualitative and quantitative data on stateless populations, 29 pledged to conduct studies and 9 more pledged to include statelessness in upcoming censuses.[76] Studies to identify stateless persons have been completed in numerous countries. For example, by 2020, 22 countries in Europe had conducted dedicated mapping studies on statelessness. Progress on improving data systems has been concentrated in countries where resolving statelessness issues is more of a technical matter and there is political will at country and regional level to do so.

121. In 2019, UNHCR convened a meeting of experts to begin exploring ways of improving statelessness statistics. Two initiatives are ongoing under the work of the Joint Data Center on Forced Displacement (JDC), established by UNHCR and the World Bank. The Expert Group on Refugee and IDP Statistics (EGRIS, a sub-group of the UN Statistical Commission), comprised of national statistical officers, UN agencies and regional commissions, is charged with developing common definitions and standards for collecting statelessness statistics and is expected to develop International Recommendations on Statelessness Statistics (IROSS) in 2023.[77] A separate group of inter-agency representatives from international organizations and academic experts is also working, with strong support from UNHCR, to

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Box 2: Examples of country operation efforts to improve data on statelessness

Multiple country operations engaged through evaluation case studies have initiated some form of mapping studies. In **Kenya**, discrete mapping studies have been conducted over time for different stateless or at-risk populations along with strong collaboration with the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics. Of particular note are UNHCR's contributions to mapping of the Makonde population in 2015; and a household listing and mapping of the Shona population in 2019, including a first of its kind Social Economic Assessment (SEA), funded by the World Bank-UNHCR Joint Data Center. These mapping studies, combined with persistent policy and public advocacy and awareness raising efforts, are partly credited with the recognition and registration of 1,500 Makonde (in 2016) and 1,670 Shona (in 2020) persons of concern.

Building on a 2016 study of statelessness in **Cote d'Ivoire**, an extensive mapping exercise was carried out in collaboration with the National Statistics Institute in 2018-2019. The mapping engaged community-based organizations and UN Volunteers and resulted in identification of groups of persons at risk of statelessness. The process promoted buy-in from a cross-section of government and agencies who participated in and validated the exercise.

In the **Philippines,** a mapping exercise was conducted in 2012 and 2013 of Persons of Indonesian Descent (PID). UNHCR has engaged in ongoing advocacy efforts to include PoC in the implementation of the Philippine Identification System pursuant to Republic Act 11055 and PoC-related indicators in the Philippine census. A joint UNICEF / UNHCR position paper on civil registration and vital statistics, which includes recommendations for enhancing reporting of statistical data, was submitted and presented to key stakeholders to enhance proposed legislative measures filed in the current Philippines Congress.

Some operations have also succeeded in advocating for inclusion of statelessness questions in the national census. In **Tajikistan** a question related to statelessness was added to the census set to take place in 2020 and 2021. UNHCR has a long-standing working relationship with the **Philippines** Statistics Authority. In 2017 the Philippines Statistics Authority issued guidance on reporting the births of children born abroad to Filipino parents as a means to address the risk of statelessness among children in migratory situations.

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[75] UNHCR, "UNHCR Reporting on Statelessness", July 2019, Version 1.2
[76] Ibid.
[77] Key informant interviews and UNHCR *Global Trends – Forced Displacement, 2019.*

develop better statistical models for estimating stateless populations around the world.[78] The JDC has awarded over USD 500,000 to UNHCR to work on these two initiatives.

122. Some UNHCR key informants at headquarters and in Regional Bureaux cautioned that directly collecting data on stateless populations invokes high costs, as opposed to more sustainable and less costly efforts to advocate for including statelessness questions in national censuses or surveys. There is reportedly some pushback in different levels of management regarding allocating funding for direct data collection. Other UNHCR country staff raised concerns about the belief that quantitative statistics are always needed for advocacy, as opposed to human interest type qualitative data that helps tell the story of the consequences of statelessness and value of citizenship among formerly stateless people. Some staff support focusing instead on setting legal precedents through litigation and expanding on that basis.

123. Overall, key informants noted that the ultimate decision on whether and how UNHCR invests in statelessness data collection efforts should depend on whether it is opportune to invest based on the prospect that such investments are likely to support positive changes based on government interest and willingness to act once presented with data. Analysis of contextual factors and bottlenecks to preventing and resolving statelessness in each country should determine the best combination of UNHCR tactics.

Partnerships and cooperation

Finding 11: UNHCR has established a wide range of partnerships at various levels, which have been critical to the progress achieved, but overarching coalition building and UN system-wide cooperation have not been fully maximized.

124. **Country-level partnerships** - Overall, Protection Officers surveyed reported moderate engagement of partners in working with national governments on statelessness issues. Survey responses showed engagement of partners is strongest in Europe (60 percent saying UNHCR was engaged with partners essential to their work), followed by Africa (50 percent) and Asia and the Pacific (37 percent). Protection Officers were also asked if they felt there are partner organizations in their country with the capacity to work on statelessness. Overall 59 percent reported yes, 9 percent no, and 32 percent were unsure.

125. UNHCR staff consulted for case studies in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and Europe felt that the organization was working with a good range of partners, both in terms of variety and quantity, on statelessness issues. In some individual country operations UNHCR has established good partnerships with civil society organizations, the media, and UN agencies, while in other contexts a lack of UNHCR focus on, and funding for, statelessness was noted as limiting efforts to identify and work with potential partners. Stateless and formerly stateless people and communities have been important partners for UNHCR in supporting their own efforts to resolve statelessness and advocating for prioritization of efforts to resolve situations of

> "UNHCR has done well in terms of selecting the right partners but not necessarily sustaining their own interest and engagement in statelessness."
>
> "UNHCR increasingly develops its priorities and we're informed. It's not a collaborative approach and it's too short-term."
> – *Key informant interviews*

statelessness with governments and within UNHCR itself. For example, in Kenya stateless communities, supported by UNHCR, have acted and advocated for themselves vis-a-vis the government and through public protests such as the four-day march from Mombasa to Nairobi to draw attention to their statelessness. In West Africa, the RB reported including stateless persons in their trainings for staff and partners to communicate the consequences of being stateless. Numerous civil society organizations and UNHCR implementing partners working on statelessness also include stateless and formerly stateless persons among their staff and leadership. Key informants highlighted a number of critical roles being played by civil society organizations, NGOs, networks and related campaigns in their countries. Some operate as UNHCR implementing partners and others work in loose coordination with UNHCR. These organizations have contributed substantially to raising awareness, public and policy advocacy, and direct support to individual statelessness cases. The value of local civil society organizations as implementing and cooperating partners was stressed by many key informants as they both have greater access to stateless and at-risk populations (especially in remote areas where distance and security concerns limit direct UNHCR engagement) and they are often known and trusted by persons of concern since they are embedded in communities.

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[78] Ibid.

126. UNHCR has invested in civil society organization and NGO capacities at country level, including women's rights organizations among others. Some implementing partners shared the impression that UNHCR engagement has been opportunistic, time-limited and project based and that sustaining their involvement once partnership agreements and funding have expired is not feasible for them. At the same time, CSOs and NGOs value the relationships UNHCR has with governments and the direct access this gives them, which allows UNHCR to link partners to key policy advocacy efforts.

127. In a few cases partners noted divergent tactics around advocacy, with CSOs and NGOs more willing to publicly and strongly advocate for changes in government policies and practice, while UNHCR has sometimes preferred a quieter diplomatic approach out of concerns about political sensitivity. Different approaches and risk tolerance should not be mutually exclusive and the combination of vocal public advocacy with discreet diplomatic interventions by different actors working in coordination could be most influential. For example, in Cote d'Ivoire UNHCR has funded an implementing partner that works with the media and at community levels (using participatory theatre, mobile cinema, and radio shows in local languages) to raise awareness in the hope of depoliticizing statelessness issues over time.

128. **Global and regional partnerships -** UNHCR works with a wide range of different partners at global and regional levels to address statelessness. Annex 11 provides additional details about key global partnerships. Member States participate in the Geneva-based Friends of the Campaign to End Statelessness group to align diplomatic efforts with the achievement of the goals of Campaign. Participation in the Friends group has ranged from 15-20 Member States since its inception in 2015. A smaller core group of about 6 countries shape the agenda for meetings and rotate hosting duties. The group serves as an "ally" to UNHCR in addressing statelessness where they can leverage their diplomatic influence through bilateral diplomatic advocacy and efforts to ensure statelessness is prioritized in various multi-lateral fora. The group is strongly supported by inputs from the Statelessness Section. Its work has included issuing joint statements at the HLS, and targeted recommendations to particular States in the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process under the auspices of the Human Rights Council and in the Commission on Human Rights.

129. Regional organizations – such as the African Union (AU), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the League of Arab States (LAS), and the Organization of American States (OAS) – have been important partners for UNHCR in underlining the importance of actions by their Member States to address statelessness, nationality issues, and developing regional declarations and plans of action related to statelessness. National government, regional economic commission, and regional NGO network key informants appreciated UNHCR's support for these regional initiatives and suggested this played a key role in the declarations and action plans adopted by regional inter-governmental bodies. They noted that regional initiatives have created reference points to guide national government action, led to greater sensitization of government actors and generated political will to act, including through accessions to the two Conventions and development of national initiatives and action plans. There are also efforts to enhance collaboration with other regional bodies, including the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

130. One of the longest-standing, and important global partnerships is between UNHCR and the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). The two organizations jointly published a Handbook on Nationality and Statelessness in 2005, and subsequently updated it in 2014. In 2018 they published an additional resource on Good Practices in Nationality Laws for the Prevention and Reduction of Statelessness, building on the results of a 2015 conference co-hosted by UNHCR, IPU and the Parliament of South Africa which brought together representatives from the parliaments of 39 countries to discuss ensuring everyone's right to a nationality. UNHCR and the IPU have also held briefings and webinars for parliamentarians to raise awareness of specific legislative approaches for statelessness.

131. Although UNHCR has established a wide array of partnerships and collaborated with many organizations leading up to, and during, the campaign, it has not organized the campaign in the form of a global coalition. There is no overarching membership aspect of the campaign, nor a governance structure beyond that of UNHCR itself. In contrast, the Global Campaign for Equal Nationality Rights (GCENR) and the Coalition on Every Child's Right to a Nationality have formal organizational membership aspects and GCENR has a steering committee made up of other organizations (including UNHCR). Due to capacity constraints in DER and DIP efforts to coordinate among partners appear to be mostly through bilateral means, though UNHCR sponsors an annual meeting of CSOs bringing together a range of organizations. Some NGO/CSO partners noted that they did not feel they had substantial influence over the campaign after the period leading up to its creation when a core group was highly involved in shaping the GAP. A

few noted that they felt marginalized at the HLS given its understandable focus on governments and were relegated to a singular side event. No formal mechanisms were identified by which a coalition of partners is engaged in setting campaign direction, assessing progress, identifying priorities, or developing plans for collective action.

132. **UN system-wide cooperation –** Collaboration with other UN agencies has been important for the Campaign. In November 2018, the UN Secretary General issued a Guidance Note on the United Nations and Statelessness[79] which highlights the principles and approaches to ensure coordinated action to address statelessness. UNHCR and UNICEF collaborate on the Coalition on Every Child's Right to a Nationality,[80] and UNHCR and UN Women have worked together with NGO partners on the Global Campaign for Equal Nationality Rights.[81] UNDP and UNHCR have exchanged staff to build mutual understanding and support future joint programming.

> "It's such a specific and technical issue, especially the legal causes, that I think they're [UNHCR] the only ones really in a position to work on it."
>
> "It seems that the coalition is a beautiful initiative at HQ, but it's completely disconnected from the reality on the ground."
>
> "Statelessness is one issue among many protection problems. If I don't have an adrenaline boost from UNHCR, it's difficult for us to have that boost."
> – *Key informant interviews*

133. Regional and country-level key informants noted that some of UNHCR's key UN partnerships have not always resulted in willingness to invest time and resources in joint activities at the country level. Conversely, multiple key informants said that UNHCR protection officers in the field are unaware of various global partnerships with UN agencies, and that such partnerships lack funding while generating additional reporting requirements. Some cases demonstrated instances of some positive collaboration on birth registration with UNICEF and work on including statelessness in national censuses with UNFPA.

134. In January 2018, the Executive Committee adopted a decision[82] calling on UNHCR and relevant organizations to develop a system-wide strategy for statelessness and to scale up UN efforts ahead of the 2019 HLS. This decision also called on the UN Deputy Secretary General to develop a common approach to issues of legal identity and registration, to prevent statelessness and support the SDGs' aim of leaving no one behind. As a result, UNHCR established an Inter-Agency Working Group (IAWG). This IAWG met three times in 2019 and developed the UN System-Wide Strategy to Address Statelessness and a workplan, to support the GAP. UNHCR leads all key actions / workstreams in the workplan.

135. Following the workplan, the IAWG has developed common key messages on statelessness for the UN System and updated and reissued the 2011 Secretary General's Guidance Note on Statelessness. The IAWG has also identified a set of priority countries for more focused attention by the UN System to address statelessness issues, pending confirmation from the Executive Office of the Secretary General. According to records, work on other actions in the plan is still underway, including efforts to develop common approaches on disaggregated data collection and analysis related to statelessness, enhancing inter-agency efforts to eliminate gender discrimination in nationality laws, examining the link between counter-terrorism and statelessness, and analyzing issues of statelessness related to nomadic peoples to formulate recommendations to address their situation.

> "I'm not sure Resident Coordinators have an understanding of statelessness and that it is part of their job. Refugees and statelessness, it is like a stone in their shoe. They define their success based on how close they are to governments. If it would compromise their standing, they would say deal with it bilaterally. I don't think we have been successful in engaging RCs."
>
> "Nothing could assist UNHCR in alleviating statelessness more than States changing citizenship laws to grant citizenship. I don't think we see enough directly lobbying from senior figures in the UN system and direct criticism of some countries. Every country has a different law but maybe it's time we started making stronger efforts to convince States that birth right citizenship is a human right."
> – *Key informant interviews*

136. The evaluation did not find any evidence of an active role played by any Resident Coordinators (RC) in advocating on statelessness issues, despite the UN Secretary General's guidance note. Nor did any key informant provide examples of UNHCR approaching RCs to seek their help in coordinating among UN Country Team (UNCT) members or for advocacy with government officials. Considering the long-term nature of resolving the most difficult and sensitive situations of

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[79] See https://www.refworld.org/docid/5c580e507.html
[80] See https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/unicef-unhcr-coalition-child-right-nationality/#:~:text=The%20Coalition%20aims%20to%20develop,child%20to%20acquire%20a%20nationality.&text=Ensure%20that%20no%20child%20is%20born%20stateless
[81] See https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/press/2014/6/53a15cc56/ending-gender-discrimination-nationality-laws.html
[82] UNHCR, *Update on Implementation of EC Decision 2018/02 on Statelessness (17 January 2018).*

statelessness, and links to other UN development aims, this appears to be a missed opportunity to leverage the weight of the UN system.

Influences on the sustainability of progress and the importance of context analysis

Finding 12: Experience has shown that external factors, such as political change, trends related to nationalism and xenophobia, and crises can divert attention from statelessness efforts and reverse positive changes in policy and practice. Combined with internal factors, such as single-year funding and staff turnover, they threaten the durability of solutions to statelessness. Ending statelessness is a long-term endeavor and progress is often slow, even in conducive operating contexts. The introduction of multi-year planning and budgeting, based on context analysis, provides opportunities to better address contextual and influence factors and threats to sustainability.

137. The sustainability of solutions to statelessness is supported by the positive attention the campaign and its supporters have generated, the commitments it has elicited from States, and the positive peer pressure and sharing of good practice seen in multiple regions. However, the sustainability of UNHCR's contributions to preventing and eliminating statelessness and related achievements at country-level are potentially at risk due to a number of trends and factors.

138. As with other large-scale emergencies, the impact of COVID-19 was of concern to most key informants, given that national attention and budgets and donor resources will likely be reallocated to fight the pandemic and its economic effects, at the expense of work on statelessness. At the same time, COVID-19 also presents an opportunity to highlight the plight of stateless persons and those of undetermined nationality, as part of broader advocacy on inclusion and equity in the response to the pandemic. UNHCR has published recommendations and good practices for States for addressing protection concerns, including stateless persons, related to the pandemic[83] and a specific paper on the impact of COVID-19 on stateless populations[84]. UNHCR has also publicly communicated through global, regional and national interviews[85] about how access to healthcare, social protection systems and education are all more complicated and important during the pandemic, yet in most countries stateless persons lack equal access and rights to systems and services.

139. Key informants and UNHCR reports have also noted that the sustainability of progress towards ending statelessness also faces pressures from rising trends of nationalism, nativism, xenophobia, racism, growing hostility to 'outsiders' and broader deterioration of the human rights situation in many countries, including donor States. These trends have been growing over the period evaluated, fueled by economic recessions and conflict-related large-scale migration and displacement, and have often been couched in national security or economic terms that will require the concerted efforts of a much broader coalition of actors to halt or reverse. In 2020 UNHCR published Guidance on Racism and Xenophobia[86], including a section related to forced displacement and statelessness, to inform staff on ways UNHCR can address these issues in programming and through national, regional and global mechanisms and platforms.

140. Practical challenges to sustainability include staff turnover, both within UNHCR and among national government actors and partner organizations. This is particularly the case for work on statelessness given the multi-year nature of the work and dependence on many short-term contracts and deployments (see section 5.3). Individual knowledge and interest, comfort with speaking about statelessness issues, personal initiative, and strong inter-personal relationships are important for maintaining forward momentum against statelessness. Sustainability is dependent on broadening understanding and institutionalizing mechanisms to ensure continued focus and prioritization.

141. Financing of UNHCR's statelessness work overall, and that of all its implementing partners and the governments it supports, is still limited to one-year funding cycles and relies on the continued support of leadership at different levels of the organization. Given the responsibilities of States, overall sustainable financing will need to be addressed through government planning and budgeting mechanisms. UNHCR planning and budgeting considerations are discussed further in section 5.3.

142. The durability of specific solutions to statelessness cannot be taken for granted, whether legal or administrative. Key informants highlighted that the proof of durability is in the equitable and consistent

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[83] UNHCR, *"Practical Recommendations and Good Practice to Address Protection Concerns in the Context of the COVID-19 Pandemic", April, 2020.*
[84] UNHCR, *"The Impact of COVID-19 on Stateless Populations: Policy Recommendations and Good Practices", May 2020.*
[85] For example, see *"UNHCR warns stateless people risk being left behind in coronavirus response" May,* 2020 https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2020/5/5eb952222ec/unhcr-warns-stateless-people-risk-behind-coronavirus-response.html
[86] UNHCR, *"Guidance on Racism and Xenophobia – How UNHCR can address and respond to situations of racism and xenophobia affecting persons under its mandate", 2020*

implementation at national and sub-national level. To ensure this, UNHCR needs to play a continued monitoring role and be prepared to advocate on behalf of stateless and formerly stateless persons if and when instances of discrimination or exclusion arise, or when funding and capacity are threatened to implement agreed solutions, despite changes in laws and policy. Case study and global interviews offered multiple cautionary stories of contexts where statelessness was thought to be minimal or resolved, only to find that legislative or executive arms of a national government, or sub-national government bodies, were discussing changes in law, policy or practice that would generate new cases of statelessness or put people at-risk of statelessness.

143. Based on identified influencing factors and lessons about prevention and resolution of statelessness in different contexts, the evaluation team developed an inferred success pathway that could be used for developing long-term strategies and plans for work on statelessness in UNHCR operations. Figure 16 illustrates these planning elements and simplified progression towards sustained solutions.

144. The inferred success pathway, while presented in a rather linear fashion, is representative of a holistic view of the incremental changes and related efforts required to achieve durable solutions for identifying and protecting persons of concern, preventing and resolving statelessness, and facilitating local integration of PoC. In some case studies certain elements have already been achieved or are easier to influence. In other cases, there has been the need to continuously and incrementally build on progress (such as improving data or revisiting political sensitivities as they arise) while continuing on to other actions.

Figure 16 – Inferred success pathway

145. Key informants stressed that the appropriate combination of initiatives UNHCR plans and implements to address statelessness need to be context specific. Plans need to be based on nuanced understanding of the historical and political circumstances of a particular situation, key drivers of statelessness, the current dimensions of the problem, and the role of different stakeholders to tailor, advocate for, and implement the best approaches.

146. Two particular external factors dominated discussions on what shapes UNHCR's potential to influence positive change: the political and legal environment, and the socio-cultural norms and environment in a country. Each of these external context factors influences the other. With strong political and legal enabling environments, it is often easier to shift socio-cultural norms and vice versa.

147. Building on the lessons collected from case studies and other data sources the evaluation team developed a matrix illustrating the types of contextual scenarios that characterize the operational environments where UNHCR works. The country typologies matrix, including suggested combinations of UNHCR activities for each context type, is shown in Annex 12.

5.3 Institutional effectiveness

UNHCR organizational culture and statelessness work

Finding 13: Aspects of UNHCR's institutional culture including the perceived primacy of the refugee mandate, concerns about jeopardizing access and relationships in politically sensitive situations, and a short-term emergency mindset have negatively affected UNHCR's ability to meet the campaign's objectives for ending statelessness in some contexts where statelessness is a severe problem.

148. The institutional culture of UNHCR was often cited by internal key informants and some knowledgeable global external experts as somewhat hindering prioritization of statelessness in UNHCR programming and effectively working towards the goal of ending statelessness. The historical and persistently strong emphasis on UNHCR's "primary mandate" for refugees was seen by some as making it difficult to create space, widespread understanding and resources for statelessness work. This emphasis also creates informal incentives for Country Representatives and staff to focus on Pillar 1. Some internal and external key informants noted that UNHCR's focus on statelessness has diminished as attention has shifted to refugee crises, the GRF, and partnership with the World Bank. Overall branding as the "UN Refugee Agency" and even the title of the High Commissioner for Refugees were also cited by some stakeholders as conveying a message to UNHCR's workforce and external partners and represent legacies of a time when the organization's mandate for IDPs and stateless persons were less established.

149. Key informants described a strongly siloed culture where protection and operations staff do not always interact and coordinate on a regular basis, with statelessness often seen as a technical and legal issue to be handled solely by protection staff. Staff perceive the technical and legal focus of much of UNHCR's statelessness work as somewhat disconnected from stateless persons and how statelessness affects their lives. Staff working on statelessness also reported often being uninformed and not consulted in advance about key opportunities such as field and diplomatic missions of the High Commissioner and interactions between Country Representatives and Resident Coordinators and UN Country Teams, limiting their ability to leverage such leadership engagements to raise important statelessness issues with key external parties.

> "We must find a way to map countries with a highly sensitive approach in statelessness and harmonize efforts in how we maintain this agenda and achieve progress! So far, once we mention political sensitivity, we stop without any action"
>
> "Our choice of engagement is controlled by government opposition to ANY involvement by UNHCR on statelessness issues, due to their extreme sensitivity in relation to questions of national identity."
>
> "Advocacy is carried out by local civil society groups and not UNHCR due to political sensitivities."
>
> "We have concluded that any UNHCR engagement with this population could trigger a political backlash with grave consequences for our refugee protection work."
> – *Survey respondents*

150. In contexts where statelessness is politically sensitive the primacy of the refugee mandate can lead to a low risk tolerance for raising issues regarding statelessness for fear of jeopardizing government relationships, access and presence. Key informants cited instances where political sensitivities led UNHCR to place severe limitations on statelessness work, up to and including not engaging on statelessness at all. Many UNHCR staff and partners believe that risk aversion is a big obstacle that must be overcome to achieve progress on ending statelessness. That said, multiple interviews suggested that UNHCR's organizational culture is generally risk averse across all of its mandates based on a general fear to raise sensitive issues with governments. UNHCR key informants also stressed that a Representative's comfort with engaging main government decision-makers on statelessness issues is a key factor in the assessment of risks and trade-offs. According to the same key informants, weighing the risks and trade-offs of engaging governments where statelessness is highly sensitive is not systematic or standardized in UNHCR's

planning approach but could benefit from the intended introduction of context analysis as part of the new multi-year planning process.

151. A 2017 assessment of the #IBelong Campaign[87] stressed the negative implications of UNHCR avoiding public engagement on statelessness in politically sensitive situations. It noted disparities in public communications on the campaign in some sensitive contexts and highlighted that this could lead to UNHCR being seen "negatively – or worse, complicit – in abstaining from the conversation". It also noted that UNHCR silence could create a vacuum leading to a loss in credibility with negative implications for resource mobilization.

> "From an organizational level, it needs to be better acknowledged that most times, addressing statelessness requires long-term, multi-years interventions and a development – rather than humanitarian – approach."
> – *Survey respondent*
>
> "The programme staff get very frustrated, they want to see quick and obvious results. But statelessness isn't like that – the work takes time and the results are less obvious."
> - *Key informant interview*

152. In many interviews, key informants noted that UNHCR's culture is dominated by humanitarian emergency thinking and practices. These include prioritization of life-saving activities, one-year budget and planning cycles, and a tendency to emphasize areas where UNHCR has a dominant mandate, rather than long-term systems change, human rights and development approaches more suited for the type of advocacy and long-term initiatives and partnerships required to address the underlying causes of statelessness. The efforts to implement the GCR, specifically the whole of society approach, offer opportunities for UNCHR to better consider ways of developing longer-term, multi-stakeholder strategies for addressing statelessness over time.

Institutionalizing and mainstreaming the statelessness mandate

Finding 14: Between 2001 and 2014 UNHCR made significant strides towards institutionalizing and mainstreaming its statelessness mandate. Since the launch of the campaign, statelessness tools and resources to support planning have continued to increase and improve, but overall resourcing has faced more competition with other internal priorities in the face of massive increases in forced displacement around the world and COVID-19 pandemic.

153. As shown in the historical storyline (see figure 1) many of the most important milestones in UNHCR's institutionalization of statelessness cited by key informants took place in the years prior to the launch of the #IBelong Campaign. The creation of the Statelessness Section, introduction of regional statelessness officer positions, addition of the statelessness surge capacity sub-roster, 2010 Strategy on UNHCR Action to Address Statelessness, Protection Guidelines on Statelessness, the introduction of the dedicated budget and planning pillar for statelessness work, and the launch of the self-study module on statelessness (hosted in the UNHCR Global Learning Centre) all took place between 2005 and 2014.

154. From 2015 to 2018 the Statelessness section introduced internal tools to give structure to the campaign and support country operations. These included the GAP Map, with information on State pledges and UPR recommendations, the GSIP for a multi-year outlook on country operations priorities for working with States on relevant GAP actions, and the Good Practice papers for knowledge sharing. The Statelessness Section has also worked to maintain and strengthen key relationships with other actors during this period, developed guidance and ad-hoc training for programming, and facilitated various research studies and thematic reports to build internal knowledge and external awareness on key statelessness issues.

155. The role of DER leading up to the campaign suggested they would play a substantial role in public communications and resource mobilization aspects of the campaign, but from 2017 to 2018 there were no dedicated DER staff focused on the campaign. Over the course of the campaign, most global communications work has been conducted by the Statelessness Section, including drafting and dissemination of thematic reports and organizing and speaking at public events. Public information officers in the field report minimal direction and support on how to communicate about statelessness during this time period. Some stressed that they were less comfortable communicating about statelessness and that the topic needs to be "de-mystified". Others noted that UNHCR does not usually provide direct services for stateless persons so they feel more disconnected from their experience and find it more difficult to communicate the ramifications of statelessness. Following the 2017 internal assessment of the campaign, DER established one temporary dedicated post at headquarters and made efforts to revitalize the public aspects of the campaign, focused primarily on the preparations for the HLS.

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[87] Van den Brule, Jill, *'Campaign Assessment, #IBelong Campaign to End Statelessness', October 2017.*

156. The preparations for the HLS, including the establishment of the temporary position of the Special Advisor on Statelessness, served to reinvigorate the campaign and increase internal attention, though the Special Advisor was not provided with a budget or support staff. The Special Advisor was engaged in vigorous diplomatic outreach leading up to the HLS to encourage State participation and pledges, while also helping to increase internal attention to statelessness. Preparatory meetings facilitated by UNHCR staff with governments and partners served to increase internal and external focus on statelessness in 2018 and 2019. Since the HLS the Statelessness Section, regional statelessness officers and some Regional Directors have emphasized the importance of country operations following up with States on the statelessness pledges they made at the HLS and GRF. The HLS was immediately followed by the GRF, and key informants and review of public communications suggest that high level attention, messaging and follow-up has focused much more on non-statelessness issues. The outbreak of COVID-19 has also reportedly complicated UNHCR's follow-up and delay of some government actions.

Learning and training for statelessness work

Finding 15: A lack of staff knowledge and skills hinder UNHCR's ability to effectively prevent and end statelessness. Training resources are out of date and inadequately target staff in different functions and at different levels.

157. Overall, 53 percent of UNHCR staff that responded to the survey said they are familiar with the contents of the GAP and either sometimes or regularly use it to guide their work, while only 3 percent said they had never heard of the GAP. Familiarity and use of the GAP was particularly high in the Europe region, with 69 percent of staff claiming that they either sometimes or regularly used it to guide their work, compared with only 38 percent in the MENA region. Country Representatives were particularly likely to refer to the GAP (77 percent said they sometimes or regularly used it), while only 32 percent of External Relations Officers said they were familiar with and referred to the GAP within their work.

158. Despite reasonably high levels of familiarity with the GAP, staff knowledge and skills were consistently cited as a hindering factor for UNHCR's work on statelessness. While a significant focus of UNHCR's work on statelessness has been on capacity building of partners, national governments in particular, there has been less emphasis on learning and capacity building of its own workforce. A 2009 UNHCR Inspector General's Report noted that, "While there is growing awareness of the emphasis being placed on the prevention and reduction of statelessness, staff both at Headquarters and in the Field, still have a limited knowledge of the Office's mandate for stateless persons."[88] In 2016 the lack of understanding of birth registration procedures and priorities and lack of dedicated staff time were cited as internal challenges in achieving results on birth registration (for both refugee and stateless populations).[89] A number of key stakeholders also stated that lack of awareness, knowledge and specialist skills have persistently hindered UNHCR from expanding its work on statelessness and achieving its stated aims.

159. The only dedicated training on statelessness within UNHCR is an online self-study module that was developed in 2012.[90] While its content covers some important topics, it pre-dates the start of the #IBelong Campaign and is therefore de-linked from the GAP and other important global and regional processes and achievements of relevance to statelessness. According to data from UNHCR, a total of 1,277 individuals completed the online training between 2012 and 2020,[91] with a particular peak in 2020 when the number of trainees was more than double that of previous years, primarily because of a jump in the number of consultants and contractors completing the training that year (see Figure 17).

> "We need training, virtual training is not sufficient"
>
> "A one-day training is not sufficient and needs to be followed up through more trainings and day-to-day coaching, which is challenging to ensure amidst non-stop refugee related emergencies."
> – *Survey respondents*
>
> "We do have an online training but not necessarily targeting leadership. That's needed, they're the ones making the decisions, particular with the regionalization process internally." – *Key informant interview*

[88] UNHCR, 2009 Global Report, Operational Management.
[89] UNHCR, Birth Registration: UNHCR Global Field Survey on Policies and Practices, 2016.
[90] UNHCR (2012) Self-study Module on Statelessness, UNHCR 2012.
[91] Data on the number of individuals to complete the UNHCR self-study module on statelessness varies. The figure of 1,277 trainees is extracted from UNHCR Global Learning and Development Centre record, shared by the UNHCR Evaluation Service.

Figure 17 – Individuals completing UNHCR's self-study module on statelessness, 2012-2020

160. Over the nine-year period, the highest number of trainees were from within G2 to G7 grades – 513 individuals representing 40 percent of the total number of trainees (see Figure 18). A notably large number – 93 individuals representing 7 percent of all trainees – identified as external users; while 126 individuals – 10 percent of the total – represented consultants or contractors (classified as AW Professional in Figure 18), accounting for over one third of all trainees in 2020; and a further 114 individuals – 9 percent of the total – were consultants/contractors hired as UN Volunteers. Only two UNHCR Representatives (P4 and P5 levels) and one Deputy Representative (P5 level) are recorded as having completed the training. Course evaluations show that the majority of trainees found the module useful, relevant to their work and provided them with new information, knowledge and skills. In the online survey for this evaluation, however, as well as in interviews, a number of UNHCR stakeholders commented that either they had not completed the training (including some individuals with specific responsibilities for statelessness) or felt that it was outdated or otherwise insufficient.

Figure 18 – UNHCR self-study module on statelessness – trainees by grade[92] 2012-2020

161. There are several other external statelessness training initiatives that UNHCR has supported (including design, teaching, and funding), targeting different stakeholders, which UNHCR staff have benefited from. These include collaboration with the International Institute for International Humanitarian Law in San Remo to provide dedicated training on statelessness; joint work with the World Bank on an e-learning course on statelessness focused on civil registration and vital statistics;[93] the Melbourne University McMullen Centre on Statelessness course; and a dedicated course on statelessness at Tilburg University in the Netherlands.[94] According to the Statelessness Section, all of these training opportunities have been oversubscribed, and there is more interest than capacity to support these courses. Headquarters and RB key informants also mentioned periodic efforts to disseminate guidance through ad hoc internal training sessions at headquarters, regional workshops, and seminars, particularly for the roll out of the operational planning guidance in 2016. Some RB key informants noted that they have adapted materials to offer training in relevant languages for their region to staff, partners and government officials.

162. This patchwork of training and learning support may not be fully adequate to ensure growing demands for capacity, nor to respond to the needs of individuals within the organization with differing levels of responsibility and depth of existing knowledge and experience on statelessness. The 2012 UNHCR self-

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[92] AW Professional = Affiliated Workforce Professional - individual consultants or contractors hired by UNHCR directly or through UNOPS and other secondment/loan arrangements; UNVIC = UN Volunteer International Consultant/Contractor.
[93] Ibid and UNHCR 2016 Global Strategic Priorities Progress Report.
[94] UNHCR, 2018 Global Strategic Priorities Progress Report.

study module on statelessness is in the process of being updated in 2021. This is much needed but is not an adequately strategic approach to learning on statelessness within the organization. Ideally an overall learning strategy would include a review of the learning needs of different target groups, mandatory versus voluntary training, and suggestions for complementing e-learning with a more comprehensive approach to learning within UNHCR.

Sharing of promising practices and innovation

> **Finding 16: Sharing of best practices, innovations and lessons learned is one of the main ways that UNHCR staff and partners learn about effective ways of advancing the statelessness agenda. However, knowledge management related to statelessness is not systemized or prioritized within the organization.**

163. UNHCR stakeholders in case-study countries and regions noted that one of the key ways in which they enhanced their own learning on statelessness was through the exchange of promising practices and innovation from other contexts. This was either done formally[95], or more often informally, with sharing of good practice and innovation facilitated by the Regional Statelessness Officers. The Statelessness Section has also hosted a global NGO retreat and an annual meeting of the global statelessness team to facilitate sharing of practices and experiences, though with a very limited budget.

164. Given the effectiveness of this kind of learning, there was some frustration that the sharing of best practices on statelessness has remained somewhat limited within the organization. A number of interviewees expressed the desire for a more systemized approach to knowledge management in UNHCR (in this case related to statelessness, but also more generally in the form of facilitated communities of practice covering different thematic areas and populations of concern). Such networks should not be limited to staff dedicated to statelessness, but open to a wider spectrum of personnel in order to nurture greater ownership of UNHCR's statelessness mandate and learn from the experiences of those covering other issues and populations of concern.

> "We share learning in the region and between regions. This happens between statelessness officers, also via UNHCR broadcast. But little goes beyond those working directly on statelessness. We need all colleagues to feel ownership of statelessness issues in the same way as refugees." – *Key informant interview*

165. Some stakeholders particularly valued the sharing of experiences related to statelessness within regions. In Europe, for example, there was a strong appetite for the exchange of best practices taking the specificities of the region into account; while others were keen to see more sharing of best practices across regions and between UNHCR and other actors. Interaction with partners for learning purposes was described as more limited in some regions than others – in the East and Horn of Africa region, for example, as well as in MENA – due to restricted networks of actors with which to share experiences with. Both virtual and face-to-face opportunities to share experiences were valued, with a particular desire among partners in the MENA region for more regional forums for discussing common challenges and sharing innovative solutions between UNHCR and other stakeholders.

Prioritization and leadership

> **Finding 17: Leadership attention and support, and allocation of financial resources for statelessness have been inconsistent over time and in different locations, and there is a gap in management roles related to coordination and integration of efforts across different divisions and functions. Country Representatives play the most critical roles of all, as the face of UNHCR with national governments and the most influential decision-makers regarding whether an operation will prioritize statelessness work.**

166. Senior leadership attention to and support for work on statelessness was frequently cited by key informants as playing a critical role in mainstreaming and integration at a global level, though with the recent regionalization / decentralization changes some questioned whether "top down" prioritization guidance would remain as influential. Successive High Commissioners have very visibly supported

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[95] Examples of formal sharing of good practices include the series of Good Practice Papers on different GAP actions developed by the Statelessness Section, which were widely appreciated by staff; or within more spontaneous and reactive papers on new issues, such as the paper produced by the Europe Regional Bureau on good practices to address protection concerns, including for stateless persons, in the context of COVID-19: UNHCR (2020) Practical Recommendations and Good Practice to Address Protection Concerns in the Context of the COVID-19 Pandemic, 9 April 2020.

UNHCR's statelessness mandate, especially at the Ministerial Conference, around the launch of the campaign, and for the HLS.

167. The importance of the High Commissioner's ability to access high levels in Member States and engage in diplomatic advocacy was stressed by numerous key informants, but a few noted that statelessness does not always "make it into his talking points from regional bureaux when he comes to visit a region or country" as there is no systematic sharing of talking points with the Statelessness Section or the regional statelessness officer.

168. At headquarters, the Senior Executive Team (SET) has a critical role to play in overall prioritization as well as for facilitating coordination across divisions. The Assistant High Commissioner for Protection (AHC-P) in particular has a key role, and opportunity, to set priorities for stateless work, facilitate external partnerships and to raise awareness of the importance of identifying solutions. This is even more important, according to key informants, with the ending of the Special Advisor on Statelessness position following the HLS. The Director of DIP plays a critical internal role in ensuring that statelessness is prioritized among the many different protection priorities UNHCR has to juggle on a daily basis. Many stakeholders within and outside of UNHCR felt that such prioritization was an ongoing challenge, noting that various protection functions at headquarters were better resourced and mainstreamed in UNHCR.

169. The Director of DER has responsibility for resource mobilization, campaigns, events and communications. Despite early indications that the campaign was intended to be 'co-owned' by DIP and DER many stakeholders felt that the campaign suffered from a lack of attention and prioritization by DER, due in part to inadequate personnel and activities budgets and focus on emergencies, as well as the lack of knowledge and comfort level to communicate about statelessness. Although DER has filled one position to support the campaign following the 2017 internal campaign assessment and created focal points for statelessness among diverse communications functions, many believed that the Division was still not fully engaged or prioritizing statelessness awareness, partnerships and resource mobilization.

170. The Assistant High Commissioner for Operations (AHC-O) oversees the RB as well as the Division of Resilience and Solutions, activities related to climate change and IDPs, and the Division of Emergency among other operational issues. The ability of UNHCR to integrate statelessness work with the broader initiatives of the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and with development agendas will depend upon closer coordination and collaboration between operations and protection functions at all levels.

171. The Division of Strategic Planning and Results in headquarters also serves an important role for supporting priority setting by Representatives, highlighting the importance of situation analysis across groups of PoC to inform multi-year plans, and ensuring that plans are aligned to the GSPs and follow other guidance for planning and budgeting.

172. At headquarters the key missing function for advancing statelessness objectives is that of an overall integrator and coordinator across divisions. While ostensibly the function of the SET, most key informants felt that it is unrealistic to expect the SET to serve this function effectively given the vast responsibilities a relatively small leadership team must fulfil. To address similar needs for IDPs, UNHCR established an inter-divisional working group.

173. Regional Bureau Directors are cited by stakeholders as serving a key 'tone-setting' function for the staff within their RB and for country operations under their responsibility. Regional Directors have major influence over allocating budget envelopes in their regions and approving COPs. In most cases key informants felt that Regional Directors were providing strong support and even engaging externally in public and policy advocacy. At the same time, they have the unenviable position of having to guide choices on which among many priorities should get attention, often in the face of major emergencies.

174. Country Representatives were found to be the most critical influencer of whether statelessness work is prioritized, to what degree it is funded and staffed, and whether operations make substantial efforts to influence government decisions, build the awareness and capacity of partners and governments, and whether politically sensitive topics should be broached publicly, privately or not at all. The familiarity of Representatives with statelessness topics and comfort level in engaging key decision-makers plays an important part in determining whether UNCHR can overcome obstacles to progress and move forward with specific initiatives on statelessness. Representatives also set the tone for all of the staff in an operation and can facilitate the work of protection officers, or when uninterested send the message that statelessness is not prioritized.

Planning and budgeting

> **Finding 18: Strategically directed seed funding, such as from the Seeds for Solutions initiative, can have a positive effect on scaling up UNHCR's work on statelessness in operations. Efforts to guide operations towards addressing GAP actions relevant in their country through the GSIP are commendable but have not always translated into inclusion of statelessness activities in operations' plans and budgets.**

175. Some country operations have received financial support from UNHCR HQ to encourage development of their statelessness work, in particular through the 'Seeds for Solutions' initiative which promoted innovation, and provided small amounts of funding to 19 country operations in 2015. No records were located for the overall Seeds for Solutions initiative beyond brief references in an UNHCR annual report. Case study countries that received funding from the initiative credited it with providing a catalyst to scale up statelessness work, providing important initial investments that paid for dedicated staff to work on identification and registration drives, capacity development and training for partners and government counterparts, advocacy efforts to reduce birth registration fees, and legal commentary. HQ key informants believed that the Seeds for Solutions awards made a big difference in increasing operations' attention to statelessness, including by demonstrating the value of investing in dedicated statelessness staff positions. Since the funding from the Seeds for Solutions initiative ended, no other dedicated pool of funding for strategic investments in scaling up statelessness work has been available. Some of the limited earmarked funding has served a similar purpose, such as the German government's contributions to support initiatives in Kenya, which helped secure pledges at the HLS.

176. To help operationalize work on GAP actions the GSIP identifies UNHCR activities aligned to the 10 GAP actions for target countries. The GSIP is country-oriented, but it is descriptive and not directly linked to the Results Framework and RBM system. According to the "Guidance on Operational Activities to Address Statelessness", the GSIP is intended to be consulted by UNHCR offices when developing their operating plans for specific goals and activities deemed most important for countries based on their progress and achievements in each of the GAP actions. This guidance further explains the types of stakeholders that should be consulted and provides more detailed information on the activities operations should consider implementing for each of the GAP actions, depending on an assessment of the statelessness population and issues in a context.

177. In 2016, the Statelessness Section and then DPSM jointly issued "Guidance relating to programming statelessness in the Operations Plans"[96]. It provides information on how to plan for implementation of the GAP through UNHCR's Results Framework. This guidance states that all operations that plan to "undertake significant statelessness activities must create a Pillar 2 in their operations plans" to ensure adequate accountability and reporting.[97] The document goes on to map, for each of the 10 GAP actions, the statelessness specific problem, related GAP action, rights groups and objectives in the Results Framework, impact indicators relevant to the action, intended solutions and related resources to consult. Trainings on this guidance were conducted in 2016 and 2017.

178. Key informants offered mixed views on the extent to which country operations regularly consult the GSIP and planning guidance in the development of their plans and budgets and how relevant and useful these offices feel the guidance is. Most of what is contained in the GSIP is derived from operations' inputs.

179. A few key informants noted that funding can be shifted between different pillar budgets. In one interview it was noted that statelessness budget requests that were not approved at the beginning of a planning year can sometimes receive sudden funding from unspent Pillar 1 budgets towards the end of the year, at which point it is difficult to fully programme these funds as intended. Others noted that when COPs fail to adequately articulate statelessness activities it undermines the ability to properly budget for such work.

Resource mobilization for UNHCR statelessness work

> **Finding 19: UNHCR resource mobilization efforts have not substantially increased the availability of funding for statelessness. Earmarked contributions for Pillar 2 were limited and a singular appeal for the #IBelong Campaign was unsuccessful, leaving statelessness funding dependent on management to allocate flexible resources.**

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[96] UNHCR, *Guidance relating to programming statelessness in the Operations Plans, Additional Guidance for Planning: 2016-2017.*
[97] The guidance states that all operations should create a Pillar 2 in their plans if they have an Operating Level OPS budget for statelessness exceeding USD 50,000 and / or a significant amount of staff time dedicated to statelessness activities.

180. Key informants at global and regional levels reported very few examples of fundraising specifically for statelessness. In conjunction with the launch of the campaign the United Colors of Benetton provided corporate support to develop the #IBelong website. In 2016 UNHCR launched the first ever special appeal that focused on statelessness and sought to draw attention to the funding needed for implementation of the #IBelong Campaign, with an estimated requirement of USD 47 million for 2017-2018 in 11 countries that host major stateless or at-risk populations[98]. In 2017, however, UNHCR reported that the appeal did not attract the required funding, which had a "negative impact on the capacity of UNHCR to support efforts to end statelessness around the world in 2017"[99].

181. The #IBelong campaign web page titled "Take Action" on the main UNHCR website does include an option for donating to support stateless people, though it is unknown how much has been received through this platform and whether such donations are ringfenced for statelessness work. Key informants reported that statelessness has not been prioritized for private sector fundraising (including individual giving), partly due to the complexity of communicating about statelessness. 56 percent of External Relations staff responded in the survey that their operation communicates with donors about statelessness. Yet, 71 percent reported that statelessness is not prioritized in fundraising efforts.

182. Generally, UNHCR does not solicit earmarked resources from its donors, preferring to stress the importance of flexible financing for its work. Between 2010 and 2020 a total of USD 58,665,529 was received in earmarked contributions for Pillar 2, 56 percent of which was recorded prior to 2015. Fifty-one percent of earmarked contributions have been from government donors, 33 percent from inter-governmental sources, 15 percent from other UN entities, and less than 1 percent from the private sector.

183. The European Union is credited with contributing the most earmarked contributions for statelessness between 2010 and 2020 with a total of USD 19,534,538, or 33 percent of total Pillar 2 earmarked funding. Japan is the next largest earmarked contributor with USD 13,864,180. However, many of UNHCR's highest contributing donors strongly support the statelessness mandate but have made mostly unearmarked contributions.

184. Earmarked contributions for statelessness were sometimes restricted for use on particular activities with no discernible pattern, and often earmarked for specific operations. Four operations received 89 percent of earmarked statelessness contributions: Myanmar (USD 33.5m), the U.S. multi-country office (covering the Dominican Republic) (USD 10.9m), Cote d'Ivoire (USD 4.1m) and Sudan (USD3.8m).

Potential impact of ongoing institutional reforms

Finding 20: Ongoing changes in UNHCR's structure, planning and budgeting systems present both opportunities and challenges for the organization's work on statelessness.

185. Some key informants expressed that the regionalization changes would have little influence over their work on statelessness, as the Regional Statelessness Officers would continue to provide the same advice and support, linking country operations to global strategies, guidance and resources. Others expressed some concern that regionalization presents risks for ensuring statelessness is prioritized and addressed consistently as the priorities of Regional Directors would likely become even more influential in determining the resources and attention given to statelessness. A few key informants also noted the original decentralization reform intended to shift staff resources and positions from HQ to regional bureaux, and eventually lead to more posts at country level, including from DIP – the effects of which could be positive or negative for the priority given to statelessness. Changes to staffing due to regionalization evident to date are a reduced level of staff for the Statelessness Section as of 2020, a reduction in staffing in the West and Central Africa Region, the downgrading of the vacant statelessness officer position in the Americas, and retitling of a position in East Africa (no longer fully focused on statelessness).

186. Some structural changes are ongoing as well. The responsibilities and coverage of the U.S. multi-country office (MCO) are being divided, with approximately half of Caribbean countries shifting reporting responsibilities to the Regional Bureau in Panama. While this may address capacity and span of control challenges the implications for prioritizing statelessness are unclear. The evaluation observed some challenges with MCO coverage and capacity to facilitate statelessness work where UNHCR has minimal

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[98] UNCHR, *2016 Global Strategic Priorities Progress Report.*
[99] UNHCR, *2017 Global Strategic Priorities Progress Report.*

or no presence or capacity. The decision to have a country presence seems to be influenced most by refugee and IDP issues, leaving potential gaps in coverage of key statelessness situations.

187. Changes to the Results Framework and RBM system are ongoing, and their potential influence on UNHCR's statelessness work remains somewhat speculative. Some potential concerns raised by stakeholders include the planned elimination of the pillar structure for planning and budgeting and the intention to allow operations to link activities and budgets to more than one population group. According to the latest Administrative Instructions, for now operations will still budget by pillar for outputs, while the primary starting point for budgeting is based on context-specific results statements UNHCR plans to achieve in a given context, though it is unclear how long this approach will remain in practice. Both of these potential changes have logical merit from a programming perspective, where key informants offered numerous examples of activities and initiatives that support more than one population group, or where population groups overlap and thus one or the other has not always been identifiable in the RBM and budget system for analysis. The new Results Framework also offers clearer linkages to the SDGs. However, while these changes may make sense for good programming, the evaluators do expect that they may further complicate UNHCR's ability to clearly demonstrate the link between resources and results specifically for its statelessness work, potentially reducing transparency and accountability.

188. The low number of impact and outcome indicators specific to statelessness (there are 2 'core' indicators specific to statelessness, while 40 out of 52 may be considered relevant) might also be insufficient to fully capture changes in stateless people's lives, particularly where country operations are not selecting their own further statelessness indicators and targets. Assessments will also need to be able to identify whether someone is stateless or of undetermined nationality and properly sample these populations, especially where UNHCR is not providing basic needs assistance directly for these groups to make sure they are factored into planning. The Statelessness Section could mitigate both of these issues by issuing comprehensive guidance on further indicators that country and regional operations could use to track results or signposting existing good practice indicators. The new RBM system will introduce six mandatory core impact indicators, which could help ensure some consistency across indicator design and selection, though the use of optional indicators will continue to pose challenges for the aggregation of results, cross-operation comparison and the calculation of change over time. Whether RB review country strategies (replacing COPs) and question whether statelessness-related flexible indicators are absent in contexts where statelessness is a known issue will be important.

6. Conclusions

189. UNHCR and partners have positively impacted on the lives of many stateless people and those at risk of statelessness, evidenced by the number of people that have acquired nationality, stories about the value of gaining citizenship, and the many good and innovative initiatives to prevent and resolve statelessness. By working together, UNHCR and partners have successfully raised awareness of statelessness and begun to build the necessary political will and capacity to prevent and resolve statelessness. Since 2001 there is a growing dialogue on statelessness and more political will to act, with notable successes in particular countries and regions, as well as at the global level.

190. The GAP has been a useful framework for guiding States, UNHCR and other partners, and its broad scope allows for application in a range of different contexts. Global diplomatic events, such as the 2011 Ministerial Intergovernmental Event and the 2019 HLS have inspired momentum and pledges for future action. Within UNHCR, in the absence of a strong theory of change for ending statelessness, the GSIP has provided a foundation for setting organizational direction.

191. Despite successes, the challenges of statelessness remain and will continue to remain beyond the lifetime of the Campaign. The most significant progress on granting nationality and mainstreaming and institutionalizing actions to end statelessness was seen in the period leading up to the launch of the campaign. Since then, statelessness tools and resources to support planning have continued to increase and improve, while overall resourcing has not grown and the pace of resolving cases of statelessness has been more gradual. Experience has proved that ending statelessness is a long-term and complex undertaking, which is highly dependent on political will and susceptible to set-backs – including other crises, such as COVID-19 – that can divert attention and either slow or reverse progress.

192. The invisibility of stateless persons and those at risk of statelessness in many places has hampered progress. Gaps in reliable data on stateless persons and the effect that statelessness has on their lives

have made it more difficult to communicate and prompt action. More progress has been made to strengthen statelessness data in contexts where there is already political will to address the issue and some degree of public awareness. However, it is precisely in the places where the least is known about statelessness, and where political appetite to discuss and tackle statelessness is lacking, that data is most needed to support UNHCR and partner efforts to communicate and lobby on behalf of stateless persons. The JDC funded effort to develop the IROSS provides a critical opportunity to systematically improve statelessness data.

193. Internal leadership on statelessness has been crucial to successes so far. Country Representatives play the most critical roles of all – as the face of UNHCR with national governments and the most influential decision-makers when it comes to prioritization of statelessness work. However, the ambitions of the campaign and the organization's clear mandate for statelessness have not been met with commensurate efforts to systematically mainstream statelessness within UNHCR. Leadership on the prioritization for statelessness has been inconsistent, with much greater attention to other priorities such as the GCR. Hesitancy to lobby on behalf of stateless persons in some sensitive contexts has been a risk to UNHCR's credibility. A short-term, emergency mindset has further relegated statelessness down the list of priorities within a culture that emphasizes quick impact over the long-term nature and results of statelessness work. Overall, the institutional culture of UNHCR has not adequately evolved to match the needs and challenges of the objective of the campaign and the organization's mandate for statelessness.

194. UNHCR's financial investments in statelessness have been critical to the progress made so far, providing opportunities to prevent and end statelessness for both the organization and its partners. However, UNHCR has not adequately prioritized statelessness in its resource mobilization efforts. Additional, sustained and carefully prioritized funding (and fundraising) is required, particularly for specific countries and regions where progress has been slow and GAP actions that have been relatively neglected.

195. Investment in UNHCR's workforce is crucial, as work on statelessness relies primarily on knowledgeable and skill personnel. Dedicated staffing has been a critical success factor in a number of operations. Conversely, where staff are stretched too thin and/or lack the necessary confidence to lobby on the topic, statelessness is often one of the first areas to be deprioritized. More dedicated statelessness staff and communications capacity are needed in key operations, including additional short-term surge capacity, and increased responsibility for statelessness is required across UNHCR staff functions. This implies a greater and more targeted effort to build knowledge and skills at all levels – allowing UNHCR to achieve more on statelessness with the limited resources available.

196. Ongoing changes within UNHCR – such as decentralization and multi-year planning and budgeting – are both opportunities and challenges for the work on statelessness. As responsibilities and authorities shift within the organization, and as ways of working evolve, a continued corporate prioritization of statelessness is required. Better configuration and use of systems for reporting on statelessness-related results would help UNHCR monitor its own performance during this period of transition and allow for greater transparency and accountability.

197. UNHCR has been particularly successful in implementing initiatives to address the legal and administrative causes of statelessness, which align with its institutional strengths. There are other key drivers of statelessness, however, including political, social and economic aspects, which need to be more consciously and robustly addressed. Similarly, the broader socio-economic impacts of statelessness, such as exclusion from schools, legal employment and social welfare, and the suffering that they cause, need to be more holistically recognized and addressed.

198. While UNHCR has played a critical and central role in highlighting and championing the situation of stateless persons, the organization has not responded to all of the drivers and impacts of statelessness, nor should it. Collaboration has been critical to the progress made so far on statelessness and UNHCR has successfully mobilized a wide range of stakeholders at different levels. Overall, however, there is not a strong enough sense of shared responsibility. UNHCR could do more to bring a diverse set of international, regional and national actors together to collectively mobilize for change, including harnessing the contributions of stateless persons directly. In particular, UNHCR should invest more in maximizing the potential for UN system-wide collaboration on statelessness.

199. The foundations are in place for scaling-up UNHCR and partner action to reduce statelessness, but success will require a dedicated, creative and sustained approach to overcoming the remaining challenges. The organization needs to find a way to work across divisions to elevate its work on statelessness and capacitate staff at all levels to contribute. Similarly, it will need to leverage the mandates and capacities of partners to create a stronger coalition – sharing the responsibility for preventing and ending statelessness. This comes at a time when funding and staffing are constrained

and difficult choices are already being made about how to prioritize limited resources in response to growing needs. Continued investments will be needed, however, as well as a careful look at existing commitments to maximize their potential for positive change. The reputational risk for UNHCR of not delivering against its commitments and mandate on statelessness are high. The remaining years of the Campaign are an opportunity UNHCR and its partners cannot afford to miss – both in terms of holding stakeholders to account for the commitments already made and generating new momentum for a collective effort to prevent and end statelessness beyond 2024.

7. Recommendations

200. The recommendations presented in this section are intended to address the evaluation findings and conclusions, on aspects of the campaign and UNHCR's work to address statelessness that are within the organization's control or ability to influence. Each recommendation is important for UNHCR to strongly consider in order to more systematically invigorate efforts during the remainder of the campaign and solidify the organizational foundation for work under this part of UNHCR's mandate.

201. As noted throughout this evaluation, UNHCR cannot act alone to end statelessness. It can however devote renewed energy, linked to a whole of society approach, to engage and mobilize stateless people and actors from all sectors of society, at global, regional, national and local levels. Together, through collective action, UNHCR and a strong coalition of dedicated partners can find better ways to influence State decisions and practice to identify and protect stateless persons of concern, and prevent and resolve statelessness.

The recommendations, responsibilities and timeframe are presented in table 9.

Table 9 – Recommendations

	Recommended actions	Responsible
1	**Strengthen UNHCR's integrated global cross-divisional leadership of the campaign in its remaining years and improve prioritization of activities to address statelessness at all levels of the organization, including clear direction from the High Commissioner to Regional Directors to give higher priority to statelessness.** Maximizing progress towards ending statelessness during the remainder of the campaign will require a renewed, and integrated cross-divisional effort, to ensure adequate focus and investment, and clear leadership support for prioritizing statelessness work. The initially planned "joint ownership" of the campaign between DIP and DER has not materialized, with statelessness efforts somewhat isolated in DIP and protection functions in the field. Leaders at all levels need to be engaged in strategically thinking about how and where UNHCR, and its partners, can remove obstacles to progress, including more effective and sustained visibility and communications. DIP should expand the existing protection dialogues, currently limited to participants from DIP and the regional bureaux, to include other divisions. These cross-divisional discussions of senior experts should help drive change and identify ways UNHCR can leverage all of its capabilities, knowledge and relationships to improve work on statelessness. Similar cross-divisional coordination efforts should be strongly encouraged in country operations. The SET should also review the consequences of regionalization on statelessness staffing, and strongly encourage careful examination and prioritization of statelessness elements of multi-year, multi-partner strategies and budgets, ensuring coverage of critical situations and adequate resource allocation, including dedicated statelessness staffing in priority operations. Annual meetings of the SET plus Regional Directors should be held to review progress against the GSIP, pledges from the GRF and HLS, and internal capacity building objectives and to ensure that statelessness activities maintain a focus on sustainable, long-term change.	SET

	Recommended actions	Responsible
2	**Invest in building the statelessness-related knowledge and skills of UNHCR staff and affiliates, including upskilling of Country Representatives' knowledge about, and comfort in engaging on, aspects of statelessness, and ensure surge capacity mechanisms are available to fill temporary gaps.** Once the new self-study e-learning course on statelessness is completed all protection staff, senior programme officers, public information officers, and resource mobilization staff should be strongly encouraged to complete it. It should also be shared with UN agency and other implementing and cooperating partners. Training on soft skills and advocacy related to statelessness should be made available to statelessness staff and public information officers. Regional Statelessness Officers, in consultation with the Statelessness Section, should systematically identify staff with lead responsibilities for statelessness that would benefit from participating in the external courses on statelessness that UNHCR has contributed to developing. Outside of training, the ongoing efforts of Regional Statelessness Officers to disseminate knowledge and facilitate events to showcase and discuss good practices should continue and be expanded, and funding allocated to intra-regional and global meetings to share learning and good practices. Other informal learning opportunities such as coaching, mentoring, on-the-job learning and communities of practice are fundamental and should be institutionalized. Special focus should be paid to building the skills and comfort level of Country Representatives, beginning with priority countries where statelessness is known or thought to be prevalent. Statelessness content should be incorporated within the existing training packages that Country Representatives receive. At the same time, more tailored briefings and cross-regional knowledge sharing events for Representatives should also be considered, as well as integration of statelessness into other broader learning events and meetings. Given the importance of national staff in tackling statelessness, it is essential that learning opportunities are translated and provided for non-English speaking staff members. Indicators should be established to monitor the impact of efforts to increase learning on statelessness so that areas for further development can be identified. Regional protection officers should collaborate on creating a renewed, decentralized surge capacity system that meets temporary essential staffing needs.	Global Learning and Development Centre with support of DIP, and RB protection pillars
3	**Enhance organizational capacity and tools for public advocacy on statelessness, including dedicated communications staff at headquarters, Regional Bureau, and in priority countries. Prioritize public advocacy and building public awareness in operational contexts where it can influence changes in policy and practice**. Despite persistently low levels of awareness and understanding of statelessness among the public and some government officials, UNHCR has assembled a relatively deep set of good stories about the causes and consequences of statelessness. The gap in communications staffing for the campaign needs to be remedied to better support global and field efforts to build public awareness. Ensuring that reliable estimates of the scale of stateless populations of concern, and qualitative information on their situation is available in countries that have not engaged in building public awareness and other work on statelessness is important to support all forms of advocacy. The organization has experience facilitating public advocacy through the use of major events, goodwill ambassadors, special publications, and social media, though the application of these capacities to the statelessness mandate has been sporadic or has not been documented. The recommendations of the 2016 internal campaign assessment should be followed up in order to provide better guidance and tools to the field so they are able to tailor the messages of the campaign to their context, while receiving overarching support from global social media and other communications efforts. Advocacy goals should be set at regional level to enable context-specific communications and advocacy work to be undertaken. Case studies have shown good initiatives taken by some country operations to engage the media and influencers on specific public advocacy efforts. These experiences should be studied, and lessons disseminated to field operations. The voices of stateless people should be front and center in these efforts, and for operations where UNHCR staff feel they do not understand the lived experiences of stateless persons UNHCR should	DER with DIP / Statelessness Section and RB External Relations units

Recommended actions		Responsible
	consider conducting qualitative 'listening' studies to better capture these experiences and bring them out of the shadows.	
4	**For the remainder of the campaign, UNHCR should invest in shifting from fragmented bilateral partnerships towards building a lasting multi-stakeholder coalition to end statelessness, with shared ownership and responsibilities, that is replicable at regional and national levels, to carry the statelessness agenda forward after 2024.** A wide array of actors have emerged since the launch of the #IBelong Campaign to work on issues of statelessness but thus far UNHCR has not effectively etablished a robust coordination and engagement structure to develop strategies for collective action. Shifting from a campaign that is seen as UNHCR's responsibility to an enduring coalition structure is better suited for the long-term nature of this work and the high likelihood that statelessness will last beyond 2024. Building such a coalition will require the time and attention of senior UNHCR leadership to mobilize a committed group of actors during the remaining years of the campaign. The coalition should follow a whole of society approach, seeking to ensure the voices of stateless and formerly stateless persons are at the center of strategic thinking and public advocacy. It should engage civil society and NGOs and their networks, academia, UN funds and programmes, other international and regional organizations, and Member States. Key elements and consituencies for a global coalition exist and should be brought together at the formative stages, including the Friends of the Campaign to End Statelessness, NGO and CSO statelessness networks, the GCENR, and the Coalition on Every Child's Right to a Nationality. The coalition should serve to link various already committed actors and new ones, under a coherent strategy with five year targets and priority countries of focus, to steer diplomatic, policy and public advocacy and programme interventions (including joint efforts to follow up on pledges made at the GRF and HLS). The coalition should hold meetings that bring all involved actors together periodically to review progress, identify gaps and challenges, and make adjustments to overall strategies. UNHCR should also leverage all of its relevant global partnerships and incorporate statelessness into related agreements and joint plans.	DIP with the support of DER
5	**Assess the feasibility of targeted resource mobilization efforts for statelessness, while simultaneously elevating prioritization of statelessness in internal resource allocation processes, to ensure sufficient resources for statelessness work. Jointly develop options for financing the statelessness work of UNHCR and its partners in the coalition that follows the campaign.** Questions regarding whether UNHCR should do more to seek earmarked funding from governmental and private sector sources should be carefully considered in light of understandable concerns about undermining the flexibility and quality of funding. Yet, without dedicated funding UNHCR will always be in a difficult position to make resource allocation decisions across many mission critical programmes and earmarked funding brings benefits in terms of guaranteeing focus on statelessness. Potential donors should be consulted to better understand their willingness to contribute to statelessness work, the limitations they face in doing so, and those interested in statelessness identified. At the same time, prioritisation of statelessness within existing resource allocation processes should also be strengthened so that the proportionality of investments made is more aligned with internal and external messaging on the issue and its status as a core mandate of the organization. Existing pooled and trust funds should be analyzed for potential to access funding, and options for creating other collective appeals and financing mechanisms should be considered. Special attention should be paid to avoid creating competition among actors working on statelessness or undermining localization commitments. In conjunction with the development of an enduring coalition at different levels, joint resource mobilization strategies, mechanisms and approaches should be thoughtfully considered.	DER and DSPR
6	**Integrate statelessness context considerations into the new multi-year operations planning process and situation analysis tools.**	DSPR

Recommended actions	Responsible
UNHCR's shift to multi-year planning and budgeting, with tools for conducting preparatory context analysis, multi-stakeholder consultations, and development of theories of change, can be beneficial to statelessness work, allowing for more holistic planning, more realistic target setting, and better links with other actors. These ongoing changes seem to have progressed without much consideration of statelessness. To take advantage of these developments a rapid review should be conducted to determine whether there are opportunities to better integrate consideration of statelessness in the new Situational Analysis process in the RBM system. Additional augmenting guidance may be necessary to help more fully explain ways of ensuring new systems keep statelessness considerations incorporated at every step, including guidance on how to select optional indicators or tailor country specific indicators that help record UNHCR contributions to different GAP actions.	with support from Statelessness Section, Regional Bureau Strategic Planning Pillars, and multi-year planning Operations
7 **Integrate consideration of statelessness in broader development and human rights initiatives and mechanisms to address the broader fundamental discriminatory and exclusionary drivers of statelessness and to strengthen national systems for better collecting data on stateless people.** Leaving no one behind is the key premise of Agenda 2030 and this is fundamentally tied to the plight of stateless persons. Resident Coordinators could play an important role in facilitating system-wide action on statelessness at country level and in marshalling the capabilities of various UNCT members. They could also help advocate with governments on sensitive issues so UNHCR is not bearing all the possible risks of advocacy. UNHCR should more clearly identify and mainstream statelessness into efforts to strengthen its work on the humanitarian – development – peace nexus and expand its efforts to communicate the links between statelessness and broader development goals – particularly in terms of addressing the political, social, economic and cultural drivers of statelessness. UNSDCF development processes and documents are one key place to do this. UNHCR should also formally incorporate statelessness into its global partnership with the World Bank. Guidance on how to best estimate the number of stateless persons, those of undetermined nationality, and those at-risk of statelessness should should be updated to incorporate the International Recommendations on Statelessness Statistics (IROSS) being developed by the Expert Group on Refugee and IDP Statistics (EGRIS) once available, to ensure UNHCR and partners appropriately take these populations into account. Other UN organizations are involved in multiple systems strengthening efforts related to GAP actions and may be better placed to influence and support governance, including initiatives that could contribute to better data on statelessness. This requires coordination, but would pay dividends in terms of coherence and efficiency. Opportunities for better mainstreaming statelessness in other areas of UNHCR's protection work that deal with social cohesion, inclusion and social protection should also be explored.	AHC-P with the Statelessness DIP with DRS and GDS supported by Regional Bureau Development and DIMA Officers

Annexes

See Volume II