Corruption costs lives

01 December 2017

Corruption represents a major obstacle to the effectiveness of humanitarian aid. It erodes democracy and the rule of law in countries it afflicts. It hampers economic growth by depleting national wealth and deterring investment. And, all the while, increasing poverty and depriving marginalised groups from accessing vital basic services such as healthcare, education, water and sanitation. When disaster strikes, countries with high levels of corruption are often unable, and in some cases unwilling, to help those most in need. In these places, humanitarian operations become the main lifeline for affected populations.

However, despite the noble intentions that underpin humanitarian aid programmes, problems such as bribery and extortion distort decision-making and increase the cost of goods and services. The amount of aid reaching the most vulnerable is reduced, or its quality is diminished. Other forms of corruption – like nepotism and cronyism in the hiring of staff, or bias or political interference in the distribution of relief – can occur even when financial accounts seem in order. There can even be extortion of sexual favours in return for aid, and intimidation of staff so they’ll turn a blind eye to malfeasance.

Corruption exists across the programme cycle of humanitarian aid. Transparency International’s recently published report (drawing on case studies from Afghanistan, Guinea, Lebanon and Somalia) highlights that these risks are not specific to a single type of organisation and that, while there are a number of mitigation measures in place, a more coherent collective approach is needed.

Examples of corruption in humanitarian aid
Human resources

More than in other activities, due to the dangers involved and the need to ensure lifesaving and sustaining assistance, the humanitarian sector requires good quality human resources (HR). Honesty, integrity, courage, technical competencies, and capacity to interact with diversified stakeholders in a principled manner are among the key qualities needed.

Detailed background checks on the integrity of a potential recruit are not a strength of the humanitarian sector. In southern Somalia, an example relates to a member of staff who was carefully ‘managed out’ of an international agency in a large-scale case of corruption (having stolen upwards of a quarter of a million US dollars), who then found employment with a Third Party Monitor (TPM) and subsequently moved on to a major UN agency. In neither case was the original employer contacted regarding references. Multiple examples were provided of staff terminated from one agency for corrupt practices soon finding employment in other agencies.

There are also difficulties in firing staff, because of perceived threats to the agency’s security. Sacking is generally considered a security risk and has to be handled very sensitively. Rather than deal with it head-on, agencies may reduce responsibilities, change staff roles and improve checks and balances so that known corrupt staff are removed from a position of influence, or ultimately removed from the agency completely, but as a carefully managed process. However, this can raise major ethical dilemmas about the moral authority of agencies and perceptions of their commitment to tackling corruption and improving accountability.

The procurement process

Procurement remains one of the highest risk areas in the humanitarian chain. As noted by two different stakeholders:

I own a company that usually supplies the UN agencies in both Kenya and Somalia. I have just won a [large contract]. However, it is hardly the case of just writing a bid. I never do that as I know that you will never get anything. (…)  I use different brokers for different bids. What they do is to help you write the bid, inflate the price by 40 per cent and take their cut from there. (…) The brokers work across countries which means they are linked to each other. They offer me bids in Somalia and Kenya. The network is big and runs deep into the agencies. It is true that you normally don’t expect to win a contract without paying. In the cost of delivering a project you include all the bribes you pay to the local authorities and elders in the area you are working in. So unless you know the system well and can account for all costs beforehand, you will definitely falter and fade away within short time (Interview, private company owner, 2/5/2016).  

Procedures do not work without good clean people as all paperwork can be made [up] so agencies and NGOs should prioritise the investigation of the integrity of those who they entrust with the job of managing procurement [and that] if you really want to know more about which agency have corrupt procurement services talk to the contractors who know more about the integrity of the person who runs the system (Interview, INGO staff, 11/2/2016).

The report argues that there needs to be an increase in the dialogue and openness towards discussing and addressing corruption risks, and recognising that residual risks will likely remain. Organisations need to assess the risks of corruption (both internal and external) in a more structured and holistic way. Incentives to report and discuss cases of corruption are an important step in acknowledging the problem, and then analysing them to find ways to improve systems and strengthen integrity.

Fortunately, stakeholders in the humanitarian aid sector are recognising the fundamental problem that corruption poses, and are looking at ways to tackle it. Transparency and accountability, key elements to mitigating corruption, were high on the agenda at the recent AidEx Brussels conference, and are prominent in the WHS Agenda for Humanity and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

De-prioritising monitoring and evaluation in complex operational settings

In Afghanistan, pressures on humanitarian resources overall have led to staff cuts.

A recent RMU review noted that since 2014, the UN in Afghanistan, including the UN’s Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the UN agencies, funds and programmes have reduced their overall personnel levels by 18 per cent (about 1,000 staff). And, perhaps more significant, the operating presence of the UN has been reduced by 30 per cent, from 20 operating locations in 2014 to 14 locations in 2016, which in turn has led to fewer resources and increased the possibility of a reduction in internal monitoring mechanisms. As the RMU review concluded, ‘This provides more opportunities for people to commit fraud’ (Risk Management Unit – Afghanistan, 2016).

The biggest perceived hindrances to effective M&E were often the ‘lack of capacity in local partners’, followed by ‘lack of willingness to share data or lessons’ among organisations, and ‘the lack of capacity in aid agencies’. These capacity constraints may mean (at best) that opportunities for detecting corruption are not identified or (at worst) that poorly trained and inexperienced staff can be pressured to deliver positive project results.

Community complaint and feedback mechanisms

Local people interviewed reported that corruption, bias and favouritism were major impediments to their receiving aid. In Somalia and Afghanistan, affected people repeatedly reported stories of community power holders or ‘gatekeepers’ misusing aid assets for patronage purposes. Aid staff working in these countries have insufficient awareness of the extent of these practices, reflecting a general tendency within aid agencies to emphasise upward accountability to donors at the expense of the kind of downward accountability to affected communities that could identify these problems.

In Afghanistan, local population reported that they were generally unaware of the level and timing of aid entitlements and were not aware of any formal feedback mechanisms being used; and where they have been used the critique was that complaints were not followed up on or that some of the mechanisms were not appropriate for the Afghan context.

Lebanon posed a different set of problems. There the multiplicity of feedback, complaints and whistleblowing mechanisms, coupled with the weakness of referral systems between organisations and sometimes between departments within the same organisation, discredits the mere existence of these mechanisms and the integrity of accountability processes.

Those who are in charge of the complaint mechanisms and those who can provide answers are often not the same (e.g. donor/implementing agency). The limited staff resources for this work also leads to a high number of questions and complaints left unanswered. The fact that the same mechanism is used for feedback (constructive contribution to improve the project) and complaints creates confusion on how the different types of issues are treated regarding procedures, referrals, question of anonymity or concerns regarding manipulation of services.

Transparency International’s Handbook on Preventing Corruption in Humanitarian Operations provides a comprehensive overview of the corruption risks in humanitarian operations, as well as a range of mitigation measures that can be adopted. Having policies, processes and structures in place is important, but ensuring staff are aware of them and know how to use them is critical.

This won’t solve the problem. But, it is a start to ensuring life-saving resources are used for their intended purpose. Only if there is a collective and strategic approach to this involving all stakeholders – UN agencies, INGOs, Red Cross, donor agencies, governments and most importantly those people suffering due to crises and corruption – can we hope to ensure transparency and accountability to affected populations.

In the end it is the most vulnerable people, desperately in need of aid, that pay the price of corruption. Often with their lives.